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INTRODUCTION
New law students often experience a kind of culture shock. A bit of this
shock comes from the flurry of unfamiliar words and phrases that students
confront in most every class—assumpsit, bill of attainder, demurrer,
easement, ex post facto law, seisin, trover. Another share comes from
seeing more familiar words used in new ways—bond, consideration,
covenant, release, servitude. Law professors tell students, especially in
those rocky first few weeks of first year classes, to “look it up!” Look it up
in Black’s Law Dictionary, or Bouvier’s Law Dictionary . . . just look it
up.1
Law professors thus follow the tradition of teachers generally, who help
students fully join a language community by urging them to consult an
exhaustively researched, carefully constructed repository of the range of
ordinary meanings of words in that community—in other words, a
dictionary. And in this exchange both teachers and students reflect and
reinforce the “reverence for dictionaries” that is “deeply embedded in our

1. For an engaging account of Bouvier’s decline and Black’s ubiquity, see Mary
Whisner, Bouvier’s, Black’s, and Tinkerbell, 92 LAW LIBR. J. 99 (2000).
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culture.”2 Indeed, dictionaries can be powerful symbols of cultural
accomplishment and belonging. Consider, for example, the ad copy that
accompanied the 1961 launch of Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary, still one of the leading unabridged dictionaries of the English
language: “Hold the English language in your two hands,” embodied by a
copy of Webster’s Third, “and you possess the proven key to knowledge,
enjoyment, and success!”3
If judicial behavior is any indication, dictionary formulations of ordinary
meanings not only mark common ground in a language community, they
also play a prominent role in officially stated justifications for legal
judgments. The U.S. Supreme Court, setting the tone for the national
judiciary, continues to quote extensively from both law dictionaries and
general purpose English language dictionaries in its opinions. In the
October 2003 Term, for example, seven majority opinions (9.6%) from
among the Court’s seventy-three cases with full opinions4 use one or more
dictionaries to justify the chosen construction of a disputed statute,5
constitutional provision,6 or other binding legal text.7 Nor is the October
2. Lawrence Solan, When Judges Use the Dictionary, 68 AM. SPEECH 50, 50 (1993).
Professor Solan, a law professor with a Ph.D. in linguistics and the author of The Language
of Judges (1993), is currently the Director of the Center for the Study of Law, Language and
Cognition at Brooklyn Law School. See also SIDNEY I. LANDAU, DICTIONARIES: THE ART &
CRAFT OF LEXICOGRAPHY 6 (2d ed. 2001). “Dictionary is a powerful word. Authors and
publishers have found that if they call a reference book a dictionary it tends to sell better
than it would if called by another name because the word suggests authority, scholarship,
and precision.” Id.
3. HERBERT C. MORTON, THE STORY OF WEBSTER’S THIRD: PHILIP GOVE’S
CONTROVERSIAL DICTIONARY AND ITS CRITICS 215 (1994) (facing page). The ad itself is
reproduced infra in App. A.
4. Linda Greenhouse, The Year Rehnquist May Have Lost His Court, N.Y. TIMES, July
5, 2004, at A1 (“The court decided 73 cases with full opinions during the term.”).
5. See Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276, 2285 n.3 (2004) (citing BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) in support of its construction of the term “assessment” in the
Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341); Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 124 S. Ct.
1836, 1845 & nn.15-16 (2004) (citing AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000),
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968), and OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989)
in support of its construction of “arising under” in the federal catchall statute of limitations,
28 U.S.C. § 1658); Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 124 S. Ct.
1756, 1761 (2004) (citing WEBSTER’S SECOND NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1945) in
support of its construction of the term “standard” in the Clean Air Act’s pre-emption
provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a)); United States v. Galletti, 124 S. Ct. 1548, 1553 (2004)
(citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) in support of its construction of the term
“assessment” in § 6502 of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 6502).
6. See Crawford v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1364 (2004) (citing NOAH WEBSTER,
AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828), in support of its construction
of “witnesses” in the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
7. See Olympic Airways v. Husain, 124 S. Ct. 1221, 1226 & n.6 (2004) (citing
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000), BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed.
1990), and WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1999) in support of its
construction of “accident” in the Warsaw Convention on injuries sustained during
international air travel); Virginia v. Maryland, 124 S. Ct. 598, 603 & n.2 (2003) (using
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) to define “low-water mark” in applying an 1877
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2003 Term unusual on this score. Over the past twenty years, the Supreme
Court has increasingly relied on dictionaries to explain its constructions of
legal text.8 The federal judiciary, as a whole, has also cited both general
purpose and law dictionaries more frequently in recent years.9
It should come as little surprise, then, that the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”), which hears all appeals arising
under the U.S. patent laws,10 has also turned increasingly to dictionaries
when explaining its constructions of disputed terms in patent claims. Court
reliance on dictionaries to construe disputed patent claim terms is, to be
sure, nothing new. The regional circuit courts of appeal heard patent
arbitrators’ decision to a present-day riparian rights dispute between Virginia and
Maryland).
8. The first two empirical studies of the phenomenon are Solan, supra note 2, at 51
(reporting data on Supreme Court citations to dictionaries from 1986 to 1991), and Note,
Looking It Up: Dictionaries in Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1438-40
(1994) (reporting data on Supreme Court citations to dictionaries from 1958 to 1992). The
most comprehensive study of the Supreme Court’s reliance on dictionaries, which covers
the entire body of the Court’s opinions through the 1997-98 term, is the magisterial Samuel
A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United
States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227 (1999) [hereinafter
Lexicon Fortress]. In this study, Thumma & Kirchmeier observed that, “at the Court’s
present rate, the decade of the 1990s will give rise to nearly half of all the opinions in the
Court’s two-century history where a Justice has relied on a dictionary.” Id. at 260
(emphasis in original). In an update to their study, they report that their “predictions [in
1999] were correct: the 1990s alone accounted for nearly half of all the opinions in
Supreme Court history in which the Court relied on a dictionary.” Samuel A. Thumma &
Jeffrey Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Remains a Fortress: An Update, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 51, 52
(2001) (emphasis in original).
9. For example, using the search term (dictionary /6 (“webster’s” or “american
heritage” or “random house” or college or collegiate or concise or unabridged or oxford)) in
Westlaw’s allfeds database, one observes the following total number of “hits” annually over
the last decade (reflecting a 37.2% increase from 1994 to 2003):
YEAR
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

NUMBER OF “HITS”
537
519
565
636
628

YEAR
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

NUMBER OF “HITS”
638
610
662
718
737

In addition, using the search term (“black’s law dictionary” or “bouvier’s law dictionary”
or “ballentine’s law dictionary”) in Westlaw’s allfeds database, one observes the following
total number of “hits” annually over the last decade (reflecting a 32.2% increase from 1994
to 2003):
YEAR
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

NUMBER OF “HITS”
515
559
517
602
549

10. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2002).

YEAR
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

NUMBER OF “HITS”
603
643
694
691
681
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infringement appeals until the Federal Circuit’s creation in 1982.11 The
Court of Customs & Patent Appeals heard appeals from Patent Office12
proceedings on patent applications until the Federal Circuit’s creation in
1982.13 These courts, from time to time, expressly used dictionaries and
similar reference sources to construe disputed claim terms.14 And the
Federal Circuit itself, before a key turning point in 1995, expressly relied
11. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(1982) (codified as amended in Title 28, U.S.C.) (establishing a United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit). For a definitive study of the Federal Circuit’s early years,
see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989).
12. The agency is formally called the “United States Patent and Trademark Office.” 35
U.S.C. § 1(a) (2002). This Article focuses on patent law questions and thus, as is common
in the literature, refers to the agency simply as the “Patent Office.” See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan,
Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 765 &
n.1 (2002) (using the term “Patent Office” instead of other acronyms to refer to patent
activities of the United States Patent and Trademark Office); Robert P. Merges, One
Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187,
2216-17 (2000) (describing the rise of Patent Office operations in the twentieth century).
13. See Dreyfuss, supra note 11, at 3-5 & n.9 (commentating on the creation of the
Federal Circuit to allow for specialization and to reduce incoherence and differentiation
between the circuits).
14. We found twelve such regional circuit cases spanning the period from 1900 to
1982: Saunders v. Air-Flo Co., 646 F.2d 1201, 1206, 1209, 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 337, 341,
344, (7th Cir. 1981); Dickstein v. Seventy Corp., 522 F.2d 1294, 1297, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
138, 141 (6th Cir. 1975); Gen. Tire & Rubber Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 F.2d
1105, 1110, 180 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 98, 101 (6th Cir. 1973); Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons
Prods. Co., 413 F.2d 89, 92, 162 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 449, 451 (8th Cir. 1969); Schmidinger v.
Welsh, 383 F.2d 455, 463, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289, 296 (3d Cir. 1967); Gomez v. Granat
Bros., 177 F.2d 266, 268, 83 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 197, 198 (9th Cir. 1949); Universal Oil Prods.
v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 137 F.2d 3, 6, 58 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1943); Cabot
v. J.M. Huber Corp., 127 F.2d 805, 807, 53 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 442, 443 (5th Cir. 1942);
Dernell Potato Prods. v. Snelling, 38 F.2d 788, 789, 4 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 194 (2d Cir.
1930); I.T.S. Rubber Co. v. Panther Rubber Mfg. Co., 260 F. 934, 938, 171 C.C.A. 576 (1st
Cir. 1919); Frey v. Marvel Auto Supply Co., 236 F. 916, 920, 150 C.C.A. 178 (6th Cir.
1916); Am. Can Co. v. Hickmott Asparagus Canning Co., 142 F. 141, 145, 73 C.C.A. 359
(9th Cir. 1905).
We found eleven such cases from the Court of Customs & Patent Appeals before 1982.
See In re Gaubert, 524 F.2d 1222, 1226, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 664, 667 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In
re Skoll, 523 F.2d 1392, 1395-96, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 481, 483 (C.C.P.A. 1975); In re
Altenpohl, 500 F.2d 1151, 1157 & n.7, 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 38, 45 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re
McCue, 475 F.2d 1200, 1203, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 393, 395 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re
Wakefield, 422 F.2d 897, 902-03, 164 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 636, 640 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re
Markert, 396 F.2d 477, 480, 158 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 39, 41-42 (C.C.P.A. 1968); Liebscher v.
Boothroyd, 258 F.2d 948, 951 & n.2, 119 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 133, 136 & n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1958);
In re Gabrielsen, 213 F.2d 545, 546, 102 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 120, 121 (C.C.P.A. 1954); In re
Tamarin, 187 F.2d 160, 162, 88 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 490, 492 (C.C.P.A. 1951); In re Ripper,
171 F.2d 297, 299, 80 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 96, 98 (C.C.P.A. 1948); In re Curley, 158 F.2d 300,
304, 72 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 116, 118-19 (C.C.P.A. 1946). In addition, we found two such
cases in appeals from Patent Office proceedings that were taken to what is now the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See Chapman v. Beede, 296 F. 956, 959-60 (D.C.
Cir. 1924); Swain v. Booth, 295 F. 236, 237-38 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
To put in context the total number of such pre-Federal Circuit cases that we have found—
twenty-five, or about one every three and one quarter years—consider that the Federal
Circuit has issued twenty-three or more such opinions every year since 2000. See infra Tbl.
4.
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on dictionaries in explaining some of its claim construction rulings.15 As
the data presented in this study show, however, the last nine years have
seen more than a ten-fold increase in the number of times per year that the
Federal Circuit, in its majority opinions, expressly relies on publicly
available reference sources such as dictionaries, encyclopedias, and learned
treatises16—compressed, for the remainder of this Article, to the more
handy tag “dictionaries.” The Federal Circuit, recognizing some of the
questions raised by its increasing reliance on dictionaries, granted en banc
review in a claim construction case in late July 2004.17 The court requested
briefing on, among other things, the question whether “the public notice
function of patent claims [is] better served by refer[r]ing primarily to
technical and general purpose dictionaries and similar sources to interpret a
claim term,” or rather “by looking primarily to the patentee’s use of the
term in the specification” of the patent.18
The Federal Circuit’s turn to dictionaries is a key part of the court’s
ongoing effort to set out a predictable method for establishing the scope of
a patent owner’s right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or
importing the invention established in the patent—the right that is the heart
of every patent.19 This effort began in 1995 with the court’s decision in
Markman v. Westview Instruments,20 where the court, en banc, held that it
is for judges—not juries—to construe disputed terms in patents and thereby
define patent rights.21 Because claim construction disputes frame nearly
15. See, e.g., Nike Inc. v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 43 F.3d 644, 647, 33
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep’t. Stores Co., 46
F.3d 1556, 1561 & n.2, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1227 & n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Lantech,
Inc. v. Keip Mach. Co., 32 F.3d 542, 547 & n.5, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666, 1670 & n.5
(Fed. Cir. 1994); Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., 9 F.3d 948, 951 & n.8, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1936, 1938 & n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1562 & n.6, 27
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1510, 1513 & n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Miles Labs., Inc. v. Shandon Inc.,
997 F.2d 870, 876, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Charles Greiner &
Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., 962 F.2d 1031, 1035, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526, 1528 (Fed. Cir.
1992); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1571, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
1137, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
16. See infra Tbl. 4.
17. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (en banc order).
18. Id. at 1383, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1766. The court posed a total of seven
questions, many of them compound, for additional briefing. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1766.
19. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2002) (providing that one who “without authority makes,
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into
the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes
the patent”); 35 U.S.C. § 281 (“A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for
infringement of his patent.”). As Chief Justice Taney long ago observed, “The franchise
which the patent grants, consists altogether in the right to exclude every one from making,
using, or vending the thing patented, without the permission of the patentee. This is all that
he obtains by the patent.” Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852).
20. 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
21. Id. at 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329. A year later, the Supreme Court affirmed
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every issue in a patent infringement dispute, from the question whether the
accused infringer has practiced the claimed invention to whether the patent
was validly issued to begin with,22 most post-Markman Federal Circuit
opinions in patent cases contribute to the court’s claim construction
jurisprudence. Systematic empirical study of the substance of this
jurisprudence—of the public explanations that the Federal Circuit provides
for the claim construction decisions it makes—is necessary to understand
fully the scope, and thus the value, that patents generally possess. There is,
however, almost no such systematic empirical study of the Federal
Circuit’s substantive claim construction case law.23
This Article helps to close that gap, presenting the first systematic
empirical study of the Federal Circuit’s use of dictionaries to help construe
the scope of disputed patent rights. Specifically, we present both (a) toplevel counts of yearly total dictionary citations in Federal Circuit and
district court patent cases for the last decade, and (b) detailed data from a
review of all Federal Circuit opinions, precedential and nonprecedential,
from April 5, 1995 (the date of the court’s Markman decision) to June 30,
2004, in which the majority opinion for the court expressly relied on one or
more dictionaries to help construe a word in a disputed patent claim. The
dataset from this detailed review, a copy of which we provide as Appendix
C to this Article, identifies all the cases reporting such dictionary use, the
specific sources the court used, the words it defined, and the judges who
authored each of the opinions in the study.
This Article also takes the next step that the data suggest, presenting the
normative case for integrating the choice of preferred reference sources
into the patent application and examination process at the Patent Office.
Starting from the Federal Circuit’s stated reasons for relying on
the Federal Circuit’s allocation of claim construction authority to judges. Markman v.
Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (“We hold that the construction of a
patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the
court.”).
22. See Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 147 F.3d 1358, 1362, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1027, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The first step in any invalidity or infringement
analysis is claim construction.”). As Professor Wagner and Mr. Petherbridge note in their
recent empirical study of Federal Circuit claim construction methodology, “Though the
precise magnitude of its role is a matter of considerable debate, it is clear that claim
construction plays a major—and perhaps the major—role in patent infringement litigation.”
R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical
Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1119 (2004) (footnote
omitted); see also JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 8 (2003) (“The
interpretation and scope of the claims will be the focal point of any litigation involving the
patent. The language of the claims is scrutinized intensely in analyzing both the validity of
the patent and whether it has been infringed.”).
23. Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 22, at 1110-11 & n.16, 1127 & n.83 (discussing
the outcome-based methodology used in nearly all empirical studies of the Federal Circuit).
Indeed, the Wagner & Petherbridge study is the first systematic empirical study of the
substance of the Federal Circuit’s claim construction methodology. See id. at 1110-11.
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dictionaries, which focus on the need for neutral reference materials that
can ground predictable claim scope analysis, we show that the court’s
desiderata cannot likely be achieved so long as courts remain effectively
free, as they are now, to choose whatever dictionaries they favor after
litigation has already begun.24 We further show that the Patent Office can
and should use its power to regulate patent examination proceedings25 to
mandate that all patent applicants identify the general purpose and
technical dictionaries to which parties should refer when construing the
words in their patent claims, and that the dictionaries so identified be listed
on the face of any resulting issued patent. Indeed, only the Patent Office, a
key player in the multi-institutional framework that is our patent system,26
is well-placed to bring about the predictable and neutral deployment of
dictionaries that the Federal Circuit envisions.
Part I begins with the top-level data about the rate at which the Federal
Circuit and the district courts cite dictionaries when construing patent claim
terms. Then, as a bridge to the data resulting from detailed case review,
Part I examines the Federal Circuit’s evolving rationale for using
dictionaries in the claim construction process—a rationale reflected in a
small number of milestone decisions in the post-Markman era. In these
cases, the Federal Circuit moves from a largely expertise-based rationale
for dictionaries (according to which one might predict more frequent
reliance on technical or specialized sources than on general purpose
English language dictionaries) to a neutrality-based rationale (according to
which one might predict no greater reliance on specialized than on general
purpose sources). Finally, Part I provides a detailed assessment of every

24. Our normative goal is not to show that the Federal Circuit’s reliance on dictionaries
to establish ordinary meaning is sound, but is rather to show how, given the commitment to
rely on dictionaries for this purpose, one can make the use of dictionaries more neutral and
predictable for all parties. The existing literature on the deeper normative question—is it
sound to use dictionaries to help establish a word’s ordinary meaning?—is substantial. The
interested reader should consult, in addition to the works cited already, supra note 8, the
following sources: Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the
Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998); Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning
and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561 (1994); Craig Hoffman, Parse the Sentence First:
Curbing the Urge to Resort to the Dictionary When Interpreting Legal Texts, 6 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 401 (2002-2003); Gary L. McDowell, The Politics of Meaning: Law
Dictionaries and the Liberal Tradition of Interpretation, 44 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 257 (2000);
Aaron J. Rynd, Dictionaries and the Interpretation of Words: A Summary of Difficulties, 29
ALBERTA L. REV. 712 (1991); and Lawrence M. Solan, Learning Our Limits: The Decline
of Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 235.
25. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2002) (giving the Patent Office the power to “establish
regulations, not inconsistent with law, which . . . shall govern the conduct of proceedings in
the Office”).
26. See generally Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional
Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1036-40 (2003) (discussing
the need for patent reforms that consider all patent system actors, including the Federal
Circuit, the Patent Office, the federal trial courts, and the Supreme Court).

MILLER.OFFTOPRINTER

2005]

10/7/2005 12:27 PM

PROVEN KEY

837

occasion, from its April 1995 decision in Markman to the end of June 2004,
that the Federal Circuit has reported relying on a dictionary or similar
source to construe the meaning of a word in a patent claim. The data show,
among other things, that the neutrality-based rationale more accurately
reflects the court’s actual dictionary citation behavior.
Part II explores existing constraints on a court’s choice of dictionary for
use in claim construction. At present, the constraints are minimal. Indeed,
in the milestone Telegenix case, the Federal Circuit emphasizes the absence
of such constraints as an apparent boon for the courts.27 Our discussion
reveals, however, that the courts’ unfettered discretion to choose whatever
dictionaries they may favor during the litigation process threatens to
undermine the Federal Circuit’s professed goals of greater neutrality and
predictability in claim construction. Part II closes with a demonstration
that this unfettered discretion presents a real jurisprudential and
institutional problem. It analyzes three recent cases where dictionary
selection had a palpable effect on the claim construction outcome.
Part III proposes a new approach to choosing dictionaries for claim
construction—an approach that preserves the neutrality of these sources by
eliminating the apparent arbitrariness that now attends their selection by the
courts. The key to this approach is to place dictionary selection squarely in
the patent applicant’s hands and push it back in time to the patent’s
examination phase at the Patent Office, i.e., before a concrete infringement
dispute skews one’s preferred construction. Indeed, it is precisely when a
would-be patentee files for patent protection that the applicant can most
readily match the background reference sources for claim word meaning—
whether ordinary or specialized—to the intended scope of the claim.
Thereafter, third parties and the courts would know which reference
sources to consult when construing words in the resulting patent, whether
for licensing, design-around, or litigation purposes. The enhanced
predictability and reduced cost of assessing the scope of the resulting
patent, which would benefit every member of the interested public for the
entire multi-year term of the patent, should more than offset the increased
cost to the applicant of determining which dictionaries he prefers.

27. See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-04, 64
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812, 1818-20 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“As resources and references to inform
and aid courts and judges in the understanding of technology and terminology, it is entirely
appropriate for both trial and appellate judges to consult these materials at any stage of a
litigation, regardless of whether they have been offered by a party in evidence or not.”)
(emphasis added).
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THE RISE AND RISE OF DICTIONARIES AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

Before discussing our empirical results, it is useful to review briefly the
basic way that patent claims define patent rights, as well as some of the
fixed stars that guide patent claim construction.
Every utility patent—the most common kind of patent,28 and the subject
of this study—ends with one or more separately numbered paragraphs,
known as “claims.”29 The Patent Act expressly requires the patentee to
provide these numbered claim paragraphs, the prescribed function of which
is to “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter which
the applicant regards as his invention.”30 Each of the claims gives the
patentee a separate right to exclude others,31 the scope of which is
28. U.S. law provides for three separate types of patents: utility patents, design patents,
and plant patents. See MUELLER, supra note 22, at 169 & n.1, 194-96. Utility patents cover
useful, new, and nonobvious products and processes. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103. This is the
sort of patent most people think of as, simply, a patent. Design patents cover new, original,
and ornamental designs for “article[s] of manufacture.” 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173. Plant patents
cover distinct and new varieties of plants that are asexually reproduced. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161164. The Patent Office grants many more utility patents than design or plant patents. For
example, during the eight years from 1994 to 2001 inclusive, the Patent Office granted
1,049,260 utility patents (or about 131,158 per year); 109,414 design patents (or about
13,677 per year); and 3,755 plant patents (or about 470 per year). See U.S. PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS, CALENDAR YEARS 1963-2001 (2004)
(reporting
annual
grant
totals),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf.
29. As Professor Mueller puts it, “A patent claim is a precision-drafted, single-sentence
definition of the patent owner’s right to exclude others.” MUELLER, supra note 22, at 37.
For example, U.S. Patent No. 6,263,732 (issued July 24, 2001), entitled “Measuring Cup,”
has a single claim. One of us used this patent as the basis for a semester-long writing
project in his basic Patent Law class. The sole claim of the patent provides as follows:
1. A measuring device, comprising:
a bottom wall and a generally vertical and encircling side wall having a lower
edge and an upper edge, said sidewall defining an upwardly opening cup with
an upper end;
a spout attached integrally to said side wall; and
a pair of continuously sloping ramps formed integrally with and radially
inward in relief from said sidewall, said ramps extending from about said
bottom wall generally opposite said spout toward said open upper end
generally adjacent said spout, wherein said ramp is coextensive with said
spout, said ramp having an upwardly directed surface and indicia located on
said upwardly directed surface being at least one of standard and metric units
of measurement providing a readily observable indication of the volume of the
contents contained within said cup.
Id. at col. 4, l. 59—col. 6, l. 3. As Figures 4 through 6 in the ‘732 patent suggest, and the
matching patent number molded into its plastic bottom confirms, the OXO-brand “Angled
Measuring Cup” (a picture of which you can call up in the Kitchen & Housewares section of
http://www.amazon.com) embodies the invention in this claim.
30. 35 U.S.C. § 112. The Patent Act has contained this claiming requirement since
1870. See Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (1870); see also William R.
Woodward, Definiteness and Particularity in Patent Claims, 46 MICH. L. REV. 755, 757-60
(1948) (tracing the history of the modern patent claim in U.S. patent law).
31. See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (providing that “[e]ach claim of a patent . . . shall be presumed
valid independently of the validity of other claims”); Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking
Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 301, 319 (1909) (discussing the legal separateness and viability of
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determined by the words in that claim. As the Federal Circuit put it in a
recent case, “the claims define the scope of the right to exclude; the claim
construction inquiry, therefore, begins and ends in all cases with the actual
words of the claims.”32
Patents are, of course, legal instruments. The rights they create,
however, involve varied, and sometimes quite complex, technologies. Of
necessity, then, patent claims often use a range of specialized technical
terms.33 When a generalist federal judge34 confronts a claim construction
dispute, she must both preserve the specialized meaning of claim terms and
ensure that her chosen construction preserves the patent’s internal
coherence as a legal instrument. The Supreme Court, in fact, emphasized
the need to ensure a patent’s integrity as a legal instrument when it
affirmed the Federal Circuit’s allocation of claim construction authority to
the judiciary.35
individual patent claims); MUELLER, supra note 22, at 37-39.
32. Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ Par Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248, 48
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1117, 1120 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122
F.3d 1019, 1023, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“the language of the
claim frames and ultimately resolves all issues of claim interpretation,” and “throughout the
interpretation process, the focus remains on the meaning of claim language”). In this
respect, the Federal Circuit is simply following a path cleared more than a century ago by
the Supreme Court. See also Yale Lock Mfg. v. Greenleaf, 117 U.S. 554, 559 (1886) (“The
scope of letters patent must be limited to the invention covered by the claim, and while the
claim may be illustrated it cannot be enlarged by language used in other parts of the
specification.”); Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877) (“When
the terms of a claim in a patent are clear and distinct (as they always should be), the
patentee, in a suit brought upon the patent, is bound by it.”).
33. For example, contrast the largely familiar terminology from the ‘732 patent, supra
note 29, with the more specialized terminology from claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866
(issued Apr. 12, 1988), entitled “Transgenic Non-Human Mammals”:
1. A transgenic non-human mammal all of whose germ cells and somatic cells
contain a recombinant activated oncogene sequence introduced into said mammal,
or an ancestor of said mammal, at an embryonic stage.
Id. at col. 9, l. 35—col. 10, l. 2. This patent is better known as the (in)famous Harvard
oncomouse patent. See Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the
Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76
WASH. L. REV. 1, 13 & nn.58-59 (2001) (discussing the importance of the oncomouse patent
in the context of patent-protected biomedical research tools); Dashka Slater, huMouseTM,
LEGAL AFFS., Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 20, 25 (discussing the oncomouse patent in the context of
debates over the patentability of living, genetically modified organisms); The Harvard
Mouse: A Short History, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 2003, at 30 (recounting Harvard’s
efforts to patent the oncomouse).
34. See John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Taming Patent: Six Steps for Surviving Scary Patent
Cases, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1413, 1417 (2003) (
There are no science prerequisites in Article III. Nothing in the process of
selecting federal judges screens for technologists. We therefore may fairly picture
the average district judge as a smart, accomplished, and legally sophisticated
person who is technologically ignorant: an able and successful lawyer before
appointment, but a person who might have been a history or English major and
who may never have taken a course in calculus or in any basic science at all.
).
35. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389-90 (1996) (“In the
main . . . any credibility determinations [regarding expert witnesses] will be subsumed
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How, then, do courts structure the claim construction inquiry to best
ensure both technological fidelity and documentary coherence? Two
overarching principles frame the claim construction process. First, a court
must construe claim terms as would a person of ordinary skill in the field of
art to which the patent pertains. As the Federal Circuit recently
summarized it,
It is the person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention through
whose eyes the claims are construed. Such person is deemed to read the
words used in the patent documents with an understanding of their
meaning in the field, and to have knowledge of any special meaning and
usage in the field.36

Taking on this perspective requires a judge to dip into the substance of the
pertinent art; litigation parties must thus find ways to deliver this substance
effectively.37
Second, a court must start with a baseline, a default meaning for the
words in a patent claim; the party who contends the default meaning is
inappropriate must carry the burden of proving that contention. The default
rule is, according to the Federal Circuit, a word’s “ordinary meaning”: “As
a starting point, we give claim terms their ordinary and accustomed
meaning as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art.”38 This “ordinary
within the necessarily sophisticated analysis of the whole [patent] document, required by the
standard construction rule that a term can be defined only in a way that comports with the
instrument as a whole. . . . The decisionmaker [now] vested with the task of construing the
patent [i.e., the judge(s)] is in the better position to ascertain whether an expert’s proposed
definition fully comports with the specification and claims and so will preserve the patent’s
internal coherence.”) (citations omitted).
36. Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1429, 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356,
1362, 1365, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[C]laim construction is
firmly anchored in reality by the understanding of those of ordinary skill in the art.”); Cole
v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (“The district court correctly recognized that words in a patent claim are construed as
they would be understood by a reader skilled in the relevant art unless it appears that the
inventor used the words differently.”).
There are, as experienced patent practitioners know, some words that have become terms
of patent law art. The court construes these not as a technically trained person would but
rather as a trained patent lawyer would. Thus, for example, the court construes the
transition word “comprising” to mean “including, but not limited to” and construes the
transition phrase “consisting of” to mean “including only.” See, e.g., Medichem, S.A. v.
Rolabo, S.L., 353 F.3d 928, 933, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1283, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2003); PPG
Indus. v. Guardian Indus., 156 F.3d 1351, 1354-55, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1351, 1353-54
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
37. See Wiley, Jr., supra note 34, at 1420 (“If judges do not begin with specialized
knowledge but must make difficult scientific and technical decisions, what is to be done?
Plainly they must gain a scientific and technical education if they are to perform their work
with competence.”).
38. Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d
1258, 1267, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1870 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also ResQNet.com, Inc.
v. Lansa, Inc., 346 F.3d 1374, 1378, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619, 1622 (Fed. Cir. 2003). “A
fundamental principle for discerning the usage of claim language is the ordinary and
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meaning” default for patent claim terms is a longstanding one: it originates
in regional circuit law,39 and the Federal Circuit has long observed it.40
In recent years, however, the Federal Circuit has strengthened this
principle by underscoring the way that it structures the process of proving
the meaning of a disputed claim term. Specifically, beginning in 1999 with
Johnson Worldwide Associates v. Zebco Corp.,41 the court has linked the
“ordinary meaning” default to that familiar proof-structuring device, the
presumption:42
The general rule is, of course, that terms in the claim are to be given their
ordinary and accustomed meaning. General descriptive terms will
ordinarily be given their full meaning; modifiers will not be added to
broad terms standing alone. In short, a court must presume that the
terms in the claim mean what they say, and, unless otherwise compelled,
give full effect to the ordinary and accustomed meaning of claim terms.
In order to overcome this heavy presumption in favor of the ordinary
meaning of claim language, it is clear that “a party wishing to use
statements in the written description to confine or otherwise affect a
patent’s scope must, at the very least, point to a term or terms in the
accustomed meaning of the words amongst artisans of ordinary skill in the relevant art at the
time of invention.” ResQNet.com, 346 F.3d at 1378, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622.
39. See Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 137 F.2d 3, 6, 58 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 504, 508 (7th Cir. 1943) (“[W]ords will be given their ordinary and accustomed
meaning unless it appears that the inventor used them differently.”).
40. See Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ Per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1249-50, 48
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1117, 1121-22 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Kegel Co. v. AMF Bowling, Inc., 127
F.3d 1420, 1427, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1123, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Bell Communications
Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Communications Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 620, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1816, 1819-20 (Fed. Cir. 1995); In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1671, 1674 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Nike Inc. v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 43 F.3d 644, 646, 33
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1038, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys.,
15 F.3d 1573, 1577, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836, 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Intellicall, Inc. v.
Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1383, 1386 (Fed. Cir.
1992); Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753, 759, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 473,
477 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
40. Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1607, 1610 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
41. Id. at 989, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610.
42. See Ronald J. Allen, The Explanatory Value of Analyzing Codifications by
Reference to Organizing Principles Other Than Those Employed in the Codification, 79
NW. U. L. REV. 1080, 1090 (1984-1985) (“Once the label is pierced, it becomes obvious that
the word ‘presumption’ is the label applied to the various methods of structuring the
process-of-proof at trial, in particular (but not limited to) allocations of burdens of
production and persuasion and judicial summary and comment on the evidence.”). It may
seem strange, in the context of a discussion about how one establishes a proposition of law
(i.e., the meaning of a disputed claim term), to invoke constructs familiar from the process
of proving facts. Standards of proof and presumptions, however, are just as useful—indeed,
necessary—in adjudicating law disputes as they are in adjudicating fact disputes. See
generally Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859 (1992) (discussing the
need for an appropriate standard of proof in legal interpretive theory). See also James R.
Barney, In Search of “Ordinary Meaning”, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 101, 109
(2003) (“By imposing a ‘heavy presumption’ . . . courts essentially impose a burden of
proof on whichever party opposes th[e] ordinary and accustomed meaning.”).

MILLER.OFFTOPRINTER

842

10/7/2005 12:27 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:829

claim with which to draw in those statements.”43

The Johnson Worldwide shift to a “heavy presumption” has stuck.
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has invoked this “heavy presumption” in at least
twenty-two of its precedential claim construction decisions in the past two
and one-half years.44
The heavy presumption of ordinary meaning for patent claim terms puts
a premium on identifying that ordinary meaning. How is a court to do so?
One key way appears to be by looking up the disputed claim word in a
dictionary: “Standard dictionary definitions indicate ordinary meaning.”45
In fact, it is hardly surprising that, in the midst of a decade of Supreme
Court statutory interpretation cases equating ordinary meaning with the
content of general purpose English language and law dictionaries,46 the
43. Johnson Worldwide, 175 F.3d at 989, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1610 (citations
omitted) (quoting Renishaw, 158 F.3d at 1248, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121).
44. See Goldenberg v. Cytogen, Inc., 373 F.3d 1158, 1164, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255,
1259 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d
1354, 1360, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1081, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2004); W.E. Hall Co. v. Atlanta
Corrugating, LLC, 370 F.3d 1343, 1350, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1135, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Housey Pharms., Inc. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 366 F.3d 1348, 1352, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1641, 1643 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1334, 70
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1508, 1518 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Golight, Inc. v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 355
F.3d 1327, 1332, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1485 (Fed. Cir. 2004); ResQNet.com, Inc. v.
Lansa, Inc., 346 F.3d 1374, 1378, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1619, 1622 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Genzyme Corp. v. Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 346 F.3d 1094, 1098, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1596, 1599 (Fed. Cir. 2003); E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364,
1368, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1947, 1950 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Sunrace Roots Enter. Co. v.
SRAM Corp., 336 F.3d 1298, 1302, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytech Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,
1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Apex Inc. v. Raritan Computers, Inc., 325 F.3d 1364, 1371, 66
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Northrup Grumman Corp. v. Intel Corp.,
325 F.3d 1346, 1355, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Riverwood Int’l
Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co., 324 F.3d 1346, 1357, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1331, 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2003); Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363, 1369, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1865, 1869 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Prima Tek II, L.L.C. v. Polypap, S.A.R.L., 318 F.3d 1143,
1148, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1818, 1821 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1327, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Tex.
Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812,
1817-18 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co.,
308 F.3d 1167, 1177, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Teleflex, Inc. v.
Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1325, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2002); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1658, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. Hickory Springs Mfg., 285 F.3d 1353,
1357, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
45. MSM Invs. Co. v. Carolwood Corp., 259 F.3d 1335, 1339 n.*, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1856, 1859 & n.* (Fed. Cir. 2001) (relying on Webster’s II New Riverside University
Dictionary for ordinary meaning of “feed”); see also Apex, 325 F.3d at 1371, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1449 (“[D]ictionary definitions may be consulted in establishing a claim term’s
ordinary meaning.”); CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1662
(“Sensibly enough, our precedents show that dictionary definitions may establish a claim
term’s ordinary meaning.”).
46. The Supreme Court used one or more dictionaries to provide an “ordinary meaning”
for a disputed statutory term at least thirteen times between 1991 and June 2004. See
Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1761 (2004);
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109 & n.5 (2002); Williams v. Taylor,
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Federal Circuit would turn to dictionaries to establish the ordinary
meanings of disputed claim terms. So comfortable is it with equating
ordinary meaning to dictionary content that the Federal Circuit, in its
milestone Telegenix case endorsing dictionaries as claim construction tools,
slips in the space of two pages from a “heavy presumption” of “ordinary
meaning”47 to “the presumption in favor of a dictionary definition.”48
Telegenix also expressly supports the use of dictionaries to provide the
ordinary meanings of claim terms by analogizing such use to reliance on
dictionaries for ordinary meanings in statutory construction cases.49
Importantly, as Telegenix itself takes pains to emphasize, consulting a
dictionary is simply the first step in a properly conducted claim
construction analysis, and it can never be the last step.50
529 U.S. 420, 431-32 (2000); United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757-58 (1997);
Ingalls Shipbuilding Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 519 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1997);
Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207-08 (1997); Bailey v. United States,
516 U.S. 137, 144-45 (1995); Asgrow Seed v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 187 (1995);
United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 357-58 (1994); F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510
U.S. 471, 476 (1994); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228-29 (1993); Pioneer Inv.
Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993); Chapman v. United
States, 500 U.S. 453, 461-62 (1991).
The Federal Circuit, for its part, has used the same ordinary meaning/dictionary
methodology in many of its statutory interpretation decisions since 1985. See Bayer AG v.
Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1371, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir.
2003); Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Alloy
Piping Prods., Inc. v. Kanzen Tetsu Sdn. Bhd., 334 F.3d 1284, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Info.
Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Liesegang v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 312 F.3d 1368, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Mudge v.
United States, 308 F.3d 1220, 1227-28 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Am. Express Co. v. United States,
262 F.3d 1376, 1381 & n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2001); AK Steel Corp. v. United States, 226 F.3d
1361, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp. v. United States, 201 F.3d 1367, 1372
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Aimcor v. United States, 141 F.3d 1098, 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1998); NSK Ltd.
v. United States, 115 F.3d 965, 975 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Cook v. Brown, 68 F.3d 447, 451
(Fed. Cir. 1995); Jones v. Brown, 41 F.3d 634, 638 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Koyo Seiko Co., Ltd.
v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1571 & n.9 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Sharp v. United States, 14 F.3d
583, 587-88 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Best Power Tech. Sales Corp. v. Austin, 984 F.2d 1172, 1177
(Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Canadian Pac. Ltd., 754 F.2d 992, 994, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 971,
973 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
47. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1812, 1818 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
48. Id. at 1204, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819.
49. See id. at 1203, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818 (providing examples of courts using
dictionaries to “aid in the interpretation of statutes and regulations” in cases involving tariff
terms and Internal Revenue Service regulations).
50. See id., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1819 (stressing that “[b]ecause words often have multiple
dictionary definitions, some having no relation to the claimed invention, the intrinsic record
must always be consulted to identify which of the different possible dictionary meanings of
the claim terms in issue is most consistent with the use of the words by the inventor”); id. at
1204, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1819 (insisting that “the intrinsic record also must be examined in
every case to determine whether the presumption of ordinary and customary meaning is
rebutted”). In one post-Telegenix case, the Federal Circuit further emphasized this
fundamental point:
While dictionaries and treatises are useful resources in determining the ordinary
and customary meaning or meanings of disputed claim terms, the correct meaning
of a word or phrase is informed only by considering the surrounding text. This is
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With this backdrop in mind, we are well-placed to appreciate the
stunning rise in the Federal Circuit’s reliance on dictionaries and similar
sources as claim construction tools. We begin with data that give a bird’s
eye view.
A. The Top-Level View of Dictionary Citation Rates in Patent Cases
It is not difficult, when surveying the post-Markman claim construction
case law, to sense the growing centrality of dictionaries as a claim
construction resource. At the same time, one might wonder whether the
apparent increase in courts’ reliance on dictionaries is simply an artifact of
an increase in the overall number of patent decisions or the overall number
of claim construction decisions. It is possible, by casting a broad net with
text-based searches in electronic case law databases, to approximate some
rough—but nevertheless informative—answers to these questions.
We used both broad and a narrow Boolean search strings in Westlaw’s
district court (dct) and Federal Circuit court (ctaf) databases to flag both
precedential and non-precedential opinions wherein the court likely used a
dictionary or similar source to construe a claim term, whether for an
infringement or a validity analysis. The search strings are as follows:
Narrow Search—patent! /s claim! /s (constru! or interpret!) /s (dictionar!
or encyclopedia! or treatise! or handbook!) and date([re-strictor])
Broad Search—patent! /p claim! /p (constru! or interpret!) /p (dictionar!
or encyclopedia! or treatise! or handbook!) and date([re-strictor])
The Narrow Search string looks for key words that occur within a
sentence and the Broad Search string looks for the same key words that
occur within a paragraph. We also used an even broader Baseline Search
string in the same two databases to flag both precedential and nonprecedential opinions where the court likely decided a claim construction
question. That search string is thus:
Baseline Search—patent! /p claim! /p (constru! or interpret!) and
date([restrictor])
In each of these searches, we adjusted the date restrictor term to reflect
why consulting dictionary definitions is simply a first step in the claim construction
analysis and is another reason why resort must always be made to the surrounding
text of the claims in question, the other claims, the written description, and the
prosecution history. Our precedent referencing the use of dictionaries should not
be read to suggest that abstract dictionary definitions are alone determinative. In
construing claim terms, the general meanings gleaned from reference sources, such
as dictionaries, must always be compared against the use of the terms in context,
and the intrinsic record must always be consulted to identify which of the different
possible dictionary meanings is most consistent with the use of the words by the
inventor.
Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 326 F.3d 1215, 1221-22, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1517, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).
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the time period of interest, whether a given year or a larger interval.
1.

Comparing the pre- and post-Markman eras
Before the Federal Circuit’s Markman decision, parties could opt to give
claim construction questions to the jury. Both district courts and the
Federal Circuit could review the resulting jury verdicts without elaborate
analysis. After Markman, detailed opinions on claim construction
questions cannot be avoided, except in the case of summary affirmances on
appeal.51
Our counts of the baseline number of apparent claim construction
opinions issuing from the U.S. district courts (considered as a group) and
the Federal Circuit show a sharp increase in claim construction opinions in
the nine years since the April 5, 1995 Markman decision, when compared
to the number of such opinions issued from 1983 (the first full year of the
Federal Circuit’s operation) to the day before Markman came down. This
increase is all the more notable when one considers that the pre-Markman
interval is twenty-five percent larger, measured in months, than the postMarkman interval. Table 1 presents the claim construction opinion counts.
TABLE 1
Number of opinions flagged by the Baseline Search

DISTRICT COURTS
FEDERAL CIRCUIT

1983 TO Markman
1,284
541

Markman TO 2003
2,478
1,032

Our counts also show an increase in the share of all claim construction
opinions that likely involved use of a dictionary or similar source to
construe a claim term. Table 2 presents the counts of district court
opinions using both the Narrow Search and Broad Search, expressed both
in absolute numbers and as proportions of the Baseline Search results for
the same time interval.
The proportional data effectively allow
comparisons that control for the increase in the overall number of claim
construction opinions. Additionally, they show a greater rate of dictionary
citation in the post-Markman period.
Specifically, the (Narrow
Search/Baseline Search) proportion increased more than 27-fold from the
pre- to the post-Markman period. The (Broad Search/Baseline Search)
proportion increased more than six-fold.
51. See Fed. R. App. P. 36 (mandating that the court must provide a copy of its opinion
to all parties to the litigation or a copy of the judgment where no such opinion was written).
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TABLE 2
Number of district court opinions flagged by the Narrow and Broad
searches in total and as a percentage of Baseline Search cases

NARROW
SEARCH
BROAD SEARCH

1983 TO Markman (%)
4 (0.3%)

Markman TO 2003 (%)
206 (8.3%)

43 (3.3%)

492 (19.9%)

Table 3 presents analogous counts of Federal Circuit opinions, again
expressed in absolute numbers and as proportions of the Baseline Search
results. As was true for the district court opinions, the Federal Circuit
opinions show a greater rate of dictionary citations in the post-Markman
period. Specifically, the (Narrow Search/Baseline Search) proportion
increased more than five-fold from the pre- to the post-Markman period.
The (Broad Search/Baseline Search) proportion increased more than threefold.
TABLE 3
Number of Federal Circuit opinions flagged by the Narrow and Broad
searches in total and as a percentage of Baseline Search cases

NARROW
SEARCH
BROAD
SEARCH

1983 TO Markman (%)
4 (0.7%)

Markman TO 2003 (%)
39 (3.8%)

18 (3.3%)

130 (12.6%)

In sum, to the extent that our chosen search strings do a good job of
capturing actual claim construction output and actual dictionary use within
claim construction opinions, the first nine years after Markman (Apr. 1995Dec. 2003) have witnessed a marked increase in the rate at which the U.S.
district courts and the Federal Circuit use dictionaries as claim construction
tools.
2.

Annual dictionary citation rates from 1993 to 2003
We augmented the aggregated pre- and post-Markman data with annual
counts for the U.S. district courts (again considered as a group) and the
Federal Circuit using the same three search strings—Baseline Search,
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Narrow Search, and Broad Search—for each year from 1993 to 2003,
inclusive.
Figure 1 presents the results of the Baseline Search for both the district
courts and the Federal Circuit. From 1993 to 2003, annual Federal Circuit
claim construction opinion output tripled from 49 to 151 cases, while
district court opinion output more than tripled from 125 to 406 cases. Not
surprisingly, the raw number of opinions from the district courts was
greater than the raw number of opinions from the Federal Circuit
throughout this period.
FIGURE 1
Annual number of opinions flagged by the
Baseline Search from 1993 to 2003
Baseline Count of Claim Construction Opinions
450
400
350

Count

300
250
200
150
100
50
0
1993

1994

1995

1996

1997
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1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Year
Fed Cir

Dist Ct

Figure 2 focuses on the results of the Narrow and Broad searches in the
district court opinion database. The datapoints in this figure reflect the
proportions (Narrow Search/Baseline Search) and (Broad Search/Baseline
Search) for each year in the decade. As with the aggregated data discussed
above, the use of proportions effectively allows us to control for the rise in
dictionary use that is attributable simply to the general rise in claim
construction opinion output. Figure 2 shows that the rate of dictionary
citation in claim construction opinions in the district courts increased
markedly from 1995 to 1999, in both the Narrow Search (from 0.8% to
11.3%) and Broad Search (from 4.8% to 25.3%) categories. After dips in
2000 and 2001, the 2002 and 2003 levels for both the Narrow Search
(10.4%, 9.1%) and Broad Search (22.6%, 23.2%) categories are close to
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the 1999 level.
FIGURE 2
Annual number of district court opinions flagged by the Narrow and Broad
searches, expressed as percentages of Baseline Search cases
District Courts - % Claim Construction Cases Citing
Dictionaries

% Cases Citing Dictionaries
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Figure 3, like Figure 2, focuses on annual proportions, but this time in
the Federal Circuit. Specifically, Figure 3 shows the dictionary citation
rates reflected by the Narrow Search and Broad Search. The Narrow
Search proportions show a nearly steady rise, from zero percent in 1993 to
9.3% in 2003. In addition, the rise in citation rates from 2.6% in 2000 to
9.3% in 2003 represents an increase of over 350%. The Broad Search
proportions show two periods of marked increase, the first from 3.3% in
1995 to 11.3% in 1998 and the second from 8.7% in 2000 to 26.5% in
2003. The second burst in citation rates is especially sharp, with a one-year
jump from 14.6% in 2002 to 26.5% in 2003. It is interesting to note, in
connection with this tripling in annual dictionary citation rates from 2000
to 2003 in the Broad Search and the more-than-tripling in the Narrow
Search, that two of the six most active claim construction dictionary citers
on the Federal Circuit revealed by our data, Judges Dyk and Linn, began
their active service on the court in the first half of 2000.52
52. Infra Tbl. 7, App. B. Judge Linn began active service on January 1, 2000 and Judge
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FIGURE 3
Annual number of Federal Circuit opinions flagged by the Narrow and
Broad searches, expressed as a percentage of Baseline Search cases
Federal Circuit - % Claim Construction Cases Citing
Dictionaries

% Cases Citing Dictionaries
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In sum, to the extent that our chosen search strings provide good
measures of claim construction and dictionary reliance activity (an
important qualification on the data presented in this section of the paper),
the period from 1993 to 2003 witnessed marked increases in the annual
rates at which the U.S. district courts and the Federal Circuit used
dictionaries as claim construction tools. Indeed, at the Federal Circuit, the
2000 to 2003 time period saw a dramatic increase in dictionary citation
rates, tripling from 8.7% to 26.5% in the (Broad Search/Baseline Search)
proportions and more than tripling from 2.6% to 9.3% in the (Narrow
Search/Baseline Search) proportions. The impression of more frequent
reliance on dictionaries in claim construction opinions should not be
dismissed as an artifact of the general increase in claim construction
opinions.
To achieve a deeper understanding of dictionary citation rate growth, one
must examine in detail the Federal Circuit cases wherein the court used one
Dyk began active service on June 9, 2000. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL
CIRCUIT, JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHIES, at www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.html (last modified Jan. 25,
2005) (on file with the American University Law Review).
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or more dictionaries to help determine the meaning of a word in a contested
patent claim. After touching briefly on three milestones in the Federal
Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence—Markman, Vitronics, and
Telegenix—we present data from just such a detailed examination.
B. “Unbiased Reflections of Common Understanding”
We know that one factor driving the Federal Circuit to use dictionaries in
claim construction more often is the heavy presumption in favor of giving a
claim term its ordinary meaning to those of skill in the pertinent art,
combined with the identification of ordinary meaning with dictionary
content.53 As an additional backdrop against which to assess the data from
our detailed review of all dictionary-citing Federal Circuit cases from April
1995 to June 2004, it is helpful to explore the Federal Circuit’s avowed
rationale for relying on dictionaries. The rationale has evolved, shifting
from a stance rooted in the need generalist judges have to learn background
information about the disputed technology, to one rooted in the greater
neutrality of publicly available reference sources that predate a given
dispute. The shifts in rationale are readily apparent upon close review of a
small number of milestone claim construction cases, beginning with the
Markman case.
Markman v. Westview Instruments
The Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc.54 is best known for its holding that “the court”—that is,
the judge, not the jury—“has the power and obligation to construe as a
matter of law the meaning of language used in the patent claim.”55
However, just as important as this bare holding is the Federal Circuit’s
assessment in that case of the sources on which judges should rely when
construing disputed patent claim terms.
In keeping with many of its prior cases, the court began with a focus on
sources internal to the patent document itself, including the claims in the
patent, the specification that supports those claims (also called the written
description of the patent), and the patent’s prosecution history before the
Patent Office.56 The court then discussed sources aimed specially at
helping a generalist judge learn enough about the pertinent technological
1.

53. See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
54. 52 F.3d 967, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S.
370 (1996).
55. Id. at 979, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
56. Id., 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
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field to construe the disputed claim language properly, grouping the
materials under the rubric “extrinsic evidence.”57 According to the court,
[e]xtrinsic evidence consists of all evidence external to the patent and
prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony,
dictionaries, and learned treatises. This evidence may be helpful to
explain scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and terms of
art that appear in the patent and prosecution history. Extrinsic evidence
may demonstrate the state of the prior art at the time of the invention. It
is useful to show what was then old, to distinguish what was new, and to
aid the court in the construction of the patent.58

The court thus approved extrinsic evidence, including dictionaries and
treatises, as claim construction resources while at the same time tethering
use of such materials to the need for specialized technological information.
Time has weakened this link between reliance on dictionaries and the
need for specialized information. The next case was the first step in the
attenuation process.
Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.
A little over a year after its own Markman decision, and shortly after the
Supreme Court’s affirmance of Markman, the Federal Circuit handed down
an opinion that drew special attention to the utility of dictionaries in claim
construction. The case is Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc.,59 and it
“place[s] technical treatises and dictionaries near the top of the extrinsic
evidence hierarchy.”60
In Vitronics, the Federal Circuit reversed a trial court’s erroneous
construction of the phrase “solder reflow temperature” in a patent claim
directed to a method for mounting chips on circuit boards.61 The
undermining vice in the trial court’s approach to claim construction was
undue reliance on the testimony of the accused infringers’ expert witness.62
In explaining the trial court’s error, the Federal Circuit rehearsed the list of
permissible extrinsic sources—“expert testimony, inventor testimony,
2.

57. Id. at 979-81, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329-31.
58. Markman, 52 F.3d at 980, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1330 (emphasis added) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
59. 90 F.3d 1576, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
60. Ben Hattenbach, Chickens, Eggs and Other Impediments to Escalating Reliance on
Dictionaries in Patent Claim Construction, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 181, 183
(2003); see also Edward G. Poplawski, Selection and Use of Experts in Patent Cases, 27
AIPLA Q.J. 1, 29 (1999) (opining that “Vitronics established a hierarchy for types of
extrinsic evidence”).
61. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1578-79, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573-74.
62. See id. at 1581, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575 (describing testimony from defense
expert, Dr. Rothe); id. at 1585, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578 (“Unfortunately, here the trial
judge did use the extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the manifest meaning of the
claims.”).
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dictionaries, and technical treatises and articles.”63 It then passed beyond
mere rehearsal in a footnote—footnote 6—that has changed the face of
claim construction:64
Although technical treatises and dictionaries fall within the category of
extrinsic evidence, as they do not form a part of an integrated patent
document, they are worthy of special note. Judges are free to consult
such resources at any time in order to better understand the underlying
technology and may also rely on dictionary definitions when construing
claim terms, so long as the dictionary definition does not contradict any
definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.65

Two important things happened here. First, the court directly encouraged
judges to consult dictionaries and similar sources to learn about the
technology at issue in a dispute, stating they are available “at any time.”66
Second, and quite apart from the ‘technology backgrounder’ point, the
court approved “rel[iance] on dictionary definitions when construing claim
terms,”67 foreshadowing the identification of dictionary definition with
ordinary meaning that has since become so pronounced in the court’s
cases.68
Why this special solicitude for dictionaries in Vitronics? The court
highlighted the utility of such sources by contrasting them with the partisan
slant that expert witnesses provide—and remember, the root of the trial
court’s error in this case was over-reliance on inapposite expert
testimony.69 Specifically, after distinguishing “expert testimony . . . on the
proper construction of a disputed claim term” from background “testimony
on the technology,”70 the court urged that
63. Id. at 1584, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578.
64. The Federal Circuit, in the time between the Vitronics case and the Telegenix case
(the next milestone case in this line of development), has at least nine times squarely relied
on footnote 6 in Vitronics to support its use of dictionaries as claim construction tools,
including in Telegenix itself. See, e.g., Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d
1193, 1202, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812, 1818 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Union Carbide Chems. &
Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 308 F.3d 1167, 1177 & n.4, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1545, 1552 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2002); CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359,
1366, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1658, 1662 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v.
Covad Communications Group, Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1267, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865,
1870 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., Ltd., 257 F.3d 1364, 1373,
59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1614 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Optical Disc Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics,
208 F.3d 1324, 1334-35, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Cybor Corp. v.
FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1459, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(en banc); Circle R, Inc. v. Trail King Indus., Inc., 21 Fed. Appx. 894, 898 & n.3 (Fed. Cir.
2001); Rival Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., Nos. 98-1198, 98-1199, 1999 WL 96416, at *5 (Fed.
Cir. Feb. 23, 1999).
65. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n.6, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1578 n.6 (emphasis added).
66. Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d. (BNA) at 1578.
67. Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d. (BNA) at 1578.
68. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text.
69. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1581, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1575.
70. Id. at 1585, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579. The court continues to approve the use
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prior art documents and dictionaries, although to a lesser extent, are
more objective and reliable guides [than expert testimony]. Unlike
expert testimony, these sources are accessible to the public in advance of
litigation. They are to be preferred over opinion testimony, whether by
an attorney or artisan in the field of technology to which the patent is
directed. Indeed, opinion testimony on claim construction should be
treated with the utmost caution, for it is no better than opinion testimony
on the meaning of statutory terms.71

Opinion testimony on the meaning of a disputed claim term is thus
inherently disfavored, relative to publicly available “objective” documents,
such as prior art references and dictionaries that predate the litigation. It
warrants a judge’s “utmost caution.”72 The court’s central message here, in
combination with footnote 6, is unmistakable: dictionaries are better than
expert testimony.
Vitronics, like Markman, links the use of dictionaries to the need for
specialized technological information.
Unlike Markman, however,
Vitronics also approves the use of dictionaries to define claim terms,
praising these sources as superior to expert witnesses because they are
“more objective and reliable guides.” This theme—that dictionaries are
preferred because they are not avowedly partisan in content—took center
stage in the next milestone case.

of expert testimony to teach trial judges background information about the pertinent
technology. See, e.g., Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716, 48
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911, 1917 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that “trial courts generally can hear
expert testimony for background and education on the technology implicated by the
presented claim construction issues, and trial courts have broad discretion in this regard”).
The court also approved a district court’s decision, in a case involving highly complex
microprocessor technology, to appoint a “technical advisor” to help the court better cope
with the scientific and technical information in the case. TechSearch, L.L.C. v. Intel Corp.,
286 F.3d 1360, 1377-79, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449, 1460-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
71. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1585, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579 (emphasis added).
72. Id., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579. The court has recently commented on this need
for objectivity in claim construction:
The inquiry into the meaning that claim terms would have to a person of skill in the
art at the time of the invention is an objective one. This being the case, a court
looks to those sources available to the public that show what a person of skill in the
art would have understood disputed claim language to mean. Those sources
include the words of the claims themselves, the remainder of the specification, the
prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning relevant scientific
principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art.
Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1116, 72
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (emphasis added); see also Bell & Howell
Document Mgmt. Prods. Co. v. Altek Sys., 132 F.3d 701, 706, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1033,
1038 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Once a dispute over claim construction arises, ‘experts’ should also
not be heard to inject a new meaning into terms that is inconsistent with what the inventor
set forth in his or her patent and communicated, first to the patent examiner and ultimately
to the public. Patents should be interpreted on the basis of their intrinsic record, not on the
testimony of such after-the-fact ‘experts’ that played no part in the creation and prosecution
of the patent.”).
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Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.
A little over six years after Vitronics, the Federal Circuit handed down
its decision in Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc.,73 which
reframed its rationale for using dictionaries in claim construction. The
court had, of course, continued to use dictionaries after Vitronics to help
construe claims.74 In Telegenix, however, the court discussed the benefits
of recourse to dictionaries more elaborately than in any other case. One
commentator has called it “a momentary high water mark” in the line of
dictionary cases.75
Before plunging into detailed analyses of the eleven separate claim
construction disputes requiring resolution,76 of which only three used a
dictionary to help construe the term,77 the Telegenix court provided a
spirited encomium to dictionary use.78 Specifically, and with greater
emphasis than Vitronics, the court identified the benefit of dictionaries with
their freedom from the taint of litigation advocacy masquerading as
expertise. According to the court,
3.

[d]ictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises, publicly available at the time
the patent is issued, are objective resources that serve as reliable sources
of information on the established meanings that would have been
attributed to the terms of the claims by those of skill in the art. Such
references are unbiased reflections of common understanding not
influenced by expert testimony or events subsequent to the fixing of the
73. 308 F.3d 1193, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
74. In two cases that Hattenbach highlights, see supra note 60, at 186, the Federal
Circuit emphasized the vital role dictionaries can play in providing evidence of a word’s
ordinary meaning. See Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp., 308 F.3d 1167, 1177
n.4, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1552 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Although technically a form of
extrinsic evidence, dictionaries hold a special place in claim construction, and judges
‘may . . . rely on dictionary definitions when construing claim terms, so long as the
dictionary definition does not contradict any definition found in or ascertained by the
reading of the patent document.’.”) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d
1576, 1584 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); Dow Chem. Co. v. Sumitomo Chem. Co., 257 F.3d 1364,
1373, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609, 1614 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]echnical terms often have an
‘ordinary meaning’ as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, although these same
terms may not be readily familiar to a judge, or may be familiar only in a different context.
Thus, in determining the ordinary meaning of a technical term, courts are free to consult
scientific dictionaries and technical treatises at any time.”).
75. Hattenbach, supra note 60, at 181.
76. See Telegenix, 308 F.3d at 1205-16, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820-29 (setting out
the eleven disputed claim terms, including “repeatedly substantially simultaneously
activating,” “selectively controlling the durations of the time intervals of activation,” “color
control means,” “display areas” and “background areas,” “display areas arranged in a
pattern,” “means for selectively activating said display light sources,” “converter means,”
and “control means for selectively coupling said light sources”).
77. See id. at 1206, 1209, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1821, 1823 (construing claim
limitation “repeatedly substantially simultaneously activating” with the aid of MODERN
DICTIONARY OF ELECTRONICS (6th ed. 1984) and “display area” and “background area” with
the aid of ILLUSTRATED DICTIONARY OF ELECTRONICS (3d ed. 1985)).
78. Id. at 1202-05, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818-20.

MILLER.OFFTOPRINTER

2005]

10/7/2005 12:27 PM

PROVEN KEY

855

intrinsic record by the grant of the patent, not colored by the motives of
the parties, and not inspired by litigation. Indeed, these materials may
be the most meaningful sources of information to aid judges in better
understanding both the technology and the terminology used by those
skilled in the art to describe the technology.79

And gone is the careful parsing of extrinsic from intrinsic evidence. The
court rejected categorizing dictionaries as “extrinsic evidence” or even a
“special form of extrinsic evidence.”80 After Telegenix, dictionaries are,
quite literally, in a category by themselves.
The court also quite openly equates a word’s ordinary meaning with its
dictionary definition, moving from mention of “a ‘heavy presumption’
79. Id. at 1202-03, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818 (emphasis added). If one were to take
“unbiased” in this passage to refer to the complete absence of prejudice or personal interest,
the Federal Circuit has stumbled badly here. Dictionary-writing is a decidedly human
enterprise; the people who write dictionaries, like the rest of us, bring their individual
judgments and points of view to their work. As Sidney Landau, an eminent lexicographer
with over forty years’ experience, has stated, “[e]very established dictionary reflects,
however it may strive to be impartial, the prevailing biases of its times, because the biases
often inhere in the very manner of expression used in its definitions.” LANDAU, supra note
2, at 421. Landau argues that “[d]ictionaries act as a conservative force on the language
because they tend to overrepresent the volume of conservative speech and writing, which is
that of the educated classes, and underrepresent the volume of speech and writing by and for
people who are relatively uneducated.” Id. at 207. For example, Landau discusses the
range of approaches, across books and over time, to the inclusion of sexual and scatological
taboo words in dictionaries.
Id. at 228-31; see also HENRI BÉJOINT, MODERN
LEXICOGRAPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 124-36 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing the range of ways in
which dictionaries reflect the ideology of the dominant culture); Anne Curzan, The Compass
of the Vocabulary, in LEXICOGRAPHY AND THE OED: PIONEERS IN THE UNTRODDEN FOREST
96, 96 (Lynda Mugglestone ed., 2000) (commenting that “[t]he apparent objectivity of
dictionaries rests on a series of subjective judgments” because “dictionaries and dictionary
makers define what constitutes ‘the language’ as much as they do any individual word in the
lexicon”). In a similar vein, David Foster Wallace, a successful novelist and astute observer
of literary culture, recently observed that “claims to objectivity in language study are now
the stuff of jokes and shudders.” David Foster Wallace, Tense Present: Democracy,
English, and the Wars Over Usage, HARPER’S MAG., Apr. 1, 2001, at 39, 46. He continues
that “[t]o presume that dictionary-making can somehow avoid or transcend ideology is
simply to subscribe to a particular ideology, one that might aptly be called Unbelievably
Naïve Positivism.” Id.
If, however, one takes “unbiased” in the narrower sense of “disinterested” that the
passage as a whole suggests—namely, not reflecting any stake in the outcome of the case at
hand—then the Federal Circuit is on solid ground. An expert witness, retained by a party in
a particular dispute, surely has a stake in the success with which she persuades the
decisionmaker in the case and crafts her testimony accordingly; hence the common knock
on expert witnesses is that too often they are biased mouthpieces for the parties who hire
them. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Judicial Control Over Expert Testimony: Of Deference
and Education, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1156, 1162-65 (1993). By contrast, a team of
professional dictionary writers, who toiled at their work before the patent in dispute (much
less the lawsuit about it) ever existed, almost certainly cannot have had any stake in the
scope of a later-issued patent or the outcome of a later-filed infringement case as they wrote
the definitions that a dictionary contains. Dictionaries are, for the most part, published in
the hopes of turning a profit, and they cannot do so unless they attract as wide a range of
consumers as possible; writing skewed definitions to curry favor with a single individual or
firm would, in these circumstances, be self-defeating.
80. Telegenix, 308 F.3d at 1203, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819.

MILLER.OFFTOPRINTER

856

10/7/2005 12:27 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:829

that” claim words “have the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to
those words by persons skilled in the relevant art,”81 at the outset of the
discussion, to “the presumption in favor of a dictionary definition”82 toward
the close of the discussion. It is thus not surprising that, at the conclusion
of its general discussion of dictionary use, the court suggests a standard
claim construction procedure in which using relevant dictionaries to obtain
possible meanings that would have been attributed to the words of the
claims by those skilled in the art is effectively a universal first step.83
Markman’s more narrowly drawn link between resort to dictionaries and
the occasional need for specialized technological information has far
receded.
The road from Markman to Telegenix, then, is one from the occasional
reference to a specialized dictionary of technological arcana to routine
reliance upon numerous definitions from neutral reference sources.
Dictionaries admittedly have not assumed this central role without some
controversy.84
The court’s decision in Telegenix, however, hails
dictionaries as the primary tools for identifying ordinary meanings of
disputed claim terms as they would be understood by those skilled in the
art—a step that must be taken to resolve any claim construction dispute,
81. Id. at 1202, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1817.
82. Id. at 1204, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819.
83. Id. at 1205, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1820. However valuable a first step in claim
construction, consulting a dictionary can never be the final step. See supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
84. For example, the court occasionally expresses some skepticism about reliance on
dictionaries. See Kinik Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 362 F.3d 1359, 1365, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1300, 1304-05 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Newman, J.) (indicating that a court should not rely
on a dictionary to provide the meaning of a common word where the working definition of
that word within a patent document is peculiar to the context of that document); AFG
Indus., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 239 F.3d 1239, 1248, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1776, 1783
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (Michel, J.) (emphasizing that courts should turn to dictionaries only when
patent documents fail to define terms of art, particularly since standard dictionaries can fail
to distinguish two words treated as distinct within the patent documents); Toro Co. v. White
Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1299-1300, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065, 1067-68 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (Newman, J.) (suggesting that the general nature of dictionary definitions renders
dictionaries unable to settle disputes over the specific scientific meanings of words in patent
documents); Anderson v. Int’l Eng’g & Mfg., Inc., 160 F.3d 1345, 1348-49, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1631, 1633-34 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, J.) (noting that where dictionaries provide
more than one meaning for the same word, the technical meaning of the word must be taken
from the context of the patent documents at issue); Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam,
Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1478, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, J.)
(cautioning courts against using dictionaries to provide “legal, not linguistic, significance”
to patent document terms); see also Housey Pharms., Inc. v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 366 F.3d
1348, 1356-60, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1647-50 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing both the heavy presumption in favor of ordinary meaning and the use
of dictionaries as claim construction tools). Judge Newman authored all but one of the
court’s opinions expressing skepticism about dictionary use, and, as our detailed data show,
Judge Newman used dictionaries as claim construction tools only twice from April 1995 to
June 2004. See infra Tbl. 7, App. B. Among the judges still in active service on the court,
only Chief Judge Mayer used dictionaries on fewer occasions. Id.
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given the heavy presumption in favor of ordinary meaning for the words in
a claim.
The change in rhetoric from dictionary as occasional reference
(Markman) to basic tool (Telegenix) accompanies a correlative change in
the court’s avowed rationale for using dictionaries, from one rooted in the
need to educate the court about technology to one rooted in the need to
establish a word’s ordinary meaning with a neutral resource. Which
rationale, one might query, better comports with the Federal Circuit’s
actual use of dictionaries? Does the court, as the Markman rationale might
lead one to predict, use specialized dictionaries more often than general
purpose English language sources? Or rather does the court, as the
Telegenix rationale might lead one to predict, use general purpose English
language sources just as often—or perhaps even more often than—
specialized sources, for the simple reason that the quality that makes
reference sources attractive is their neutrality rather than any specialized
content? Only detailed data on the Federal Circuit’s actual use of
dictionaries can answer these questions.
C. The Federal Circuit’s Use of Dictionaries for Claim Construction
Our top-level data show that, while the number of written Federal Circuit
claim construction decisions roughly tripled from 1993 to 2003, the rate at
which the Federal Circuit appeared to cite dictionaries in aid of its claim
construction analysis increased about nine-fold in the same period.85 And a
close reading of the Federal Circuit’s post-Markman caselaw shows that
the court’s rationale for using reference sources such as dictionaries shifted
from a focus on gaining helpful background information about disputed
technology (in Markman and, to a lesser extent, in Vitronics), to a focus on
the greater neutrality offered by such reference works (in Telegenix).86
Which rationale, then, better comports with the Federal Circuit’s use of
dictionaries? Our data show that the Telegenix rationale explains the
court’s actual use of dictionaries far better than does the Markman
rationale.
1.

Methodology
We created a dataset describing all occasions from April 5, 1995 to June
30, 2004, where the Federal Circuit used one or more dictionaries or
similar sources to help define a word or phrase in a contested patent

85. See supra Figure 1 (showing a three-fold increase in claim construction decisions),
Figure 3 and accompanying text (showing that Broad Search proportion increased from
3.3% in 1993 to 26.5% in 2003).
86. See supra Part I.B.
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claim.87 The unit of analysis in this dataset is not an individual case; rather,
it is the use of a reference source to define a word or phrase in a claim.
Thus, for example, the case captioned Yamaha Corp. v. ESS Technology,
Inc.,88 involving a dispute over the claim limitation “a stored waveshape
table,” yielded three entries for our dataset—one for each word that the
court defined with the aid of a dictionary (i.e., “stored,” “waveshape,” and
“table”).89 Similarly, the case captioned Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp.,90
involving a dispute over the claim limitation “coherence length of the
beam,” yielded one entry for our dataset—an entry reflecting the phrase
that the court defined by consulting a reference source (i.e., “coherence
length”).91 It is also important to note that we counted only majority
opinions for the court; individual judges’ citations to dictionaries in
concurring or dissenting opinions are not counted here.
To create this dataset, we first used broad searches to flag all arguable
candidates in Westlaw’s database of Federal Circuit opinions (ctaf).92 With
the help of research assistants, we read the cases to winnow the group to
those that arguably involved use of at least one dictionary or similar source
to help define a word in a disputed patent claim. At that stage, we read the
smaller group of cases in close detail, collecting the relevant information
about each occasion where the Federal Circuit did, in fact, use a dictionary
to help define a contested claim term. The dataset in Appendix C describes
each of these occasions. We identified only four cases (two precedential
and two nonprecedential) in which the Federal Circuit first identified
dictionary definitions for claim words with specificity and then expressly
rejected any reliance on the dictionaries.93 We excluded these cases from
our dataset. We also identified, and excluded from the dataset, ten cases in
which the Federal Circuit used a dictionary to define a word from the
written description portion of the patent, rather than from a claim.94
87. See infra App. C (providing the dataset).
88. No. 95-1362, 1996 WL 146499 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 29, 1996).
89. See infra App. C, at rows 12-14.
90. 79 F.3d 1563, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
91. Id. at 1565 & n.1, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1282 & n.1; see infra App. C, at row 17.
92. We used search terms such as (patent! and (infringe! or valid!) and (dictionar! or
treatise! or encyclopedia! or handbook!)) and (patent! and claim! and dictionar!). Because
we are analyzing the reasons the court provides in its written decisions, our data do not
include—and we know nothing about the role of dictionaries in—cases in which the Federal
Circuit summarily affirmed the trial court’s claim construction without writing its own
opinion.
93. See Kumar v. Ovonic Battery Co., 351 F.3d 1364, 1367-68, 1372 & nn.3-5, 69
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1220, 1222-23, 1226 & nn.3-5 (Fed. Cir. 2003); AFG Indus., Inc. v.
Cardinal IG Co., 239 F.3d 1239, 1247-49, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1776, 1782-84 (Fed. Cir.
2001), vacated by 375 F.3d 1367, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1678 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Ultratech
Stepper, Inc. v. ASM Lithography, Inc., 97 Fed. Appx. 914, 919-20 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Lizardtech, Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc., 35 Fed. Appx. 918, 924 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
94. See Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 375 F.3d 1328, 1335-36, 71
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650, 1656-57 (Fed. Cir. 2004); 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery
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2.

Results
From April 5, 1995 to June 30, 2004, the Federal Circuit used one or
more dictionaries to help construe a disputed claim term 209 times.95 Table
4 presents annual totals, separating precedential from nonprecedential
decisions. Annual dictionary use increased by a factor of fourteen from
1995 to 2003.
TABLE 4
Number of times the Federal Circuit relied on at least one dictionary
definition of a patent claim word to help construe an element of that claim
YEAR
1995*
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004*
TOTAL
* Partial year

Published
Decision
2
9
8
4
4
13
19
22
34
25
139

Unpublished
Decision
1
5
6
5
6
10
9
10
8
9
69

TOTAL
3
14
14
9
10
23
28
32
42
34
209

In using dictionaries to help construe claim words 209 times, the Federal
Circuit used 268 individually identified sources, i.e., 1.28 sources per
term.96 Specifically, the Federal Circuit relied on one, and only one, source
Dennison Corp., 350 F.3d 1365, 1371, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1050, 1054-55 (Fed. Cir.
2003); Genzyme Corp. v. Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 346 F.3d 1094, 1099, 68
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1600 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel,
Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1345, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1408-09 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Electro
Scientific Indus., Inc. v. Dynamic Details, Inc., 307 F.3d 1343, 1350, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1781, 1785 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1382, 60
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1124, 1126-27 (Fed. Cir. 2001); In re Baker Hughes Inc., 215 F.3d 1297,
1303, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1149, 1153 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Lizardtech, 35 Fed. Appx. at 924;
G&S Metal Prods. Co. v. Ekco Housewares, Inc., 152 F.3d 944, Nos. 97-1188, 97-1210,
1998 WL 121472, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 17, 1998); Storz Instrument Co. v. Alcon Labs.,
Inc., 135 F.3d 777, No. 97-1149, 1998 WL 50947, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 26, 1998). The
Novartis case, decided in July 2004, is also outside the temporal scope of this study.
95. See infra App. C.
96. See infra App. C.
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167 times (79.9%), on two sources thirty-three times (15.8%), on three
sources four times (1.9%), on four sources three times (1.4%), and on five
sources and six sources one time each (0.5%).
General purpose English language sources dominate the dataset.97
Specifically, out of the 268 sources used, the court used 189 (70.5%)
general purpose English language sources and seventy-nine (29.5%)
specialized sources. Tables 5 and 6, contained in Appendix B, list all the
general purpose English language sources cited and all the specialized
sources cited, respectively, including the number of times the court cited
each source. Of the six most-often cited sources,98 the top five are general
purpose sources.
Several facts stand out immediately upon review of Tables 5 and 6.
First, citations to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Webster’s
Third) dominate the dataset. The court cited various printings of Webster’s
Third sixty-eight times;99 Webster’s Third was originally published in 1961
and is still Merriam-Webster’s flagship dictionary. This represents 25.4%
of all citations to any source (general or specialized), and 36.0% of all
citations to a general purpose English language source. The Federal Circuit
is, in this respect, like the Supreme Court, where Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary and its predecessor, Webster’s New International
Dictionary, Second Edition, are the two most frequently cited
dictionaries.100
Second, the Merriam-Webster family of dictionaries—comprising
Webster’s Third, its two immediate predecessors, and four different
editions of its New Collegiate series (all of which share a common editorial
core with the New International series)101—accounts for 38.4% of the
97. See infra Tbls. 5-6, App. B.
98. These are Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (cited sixty-eight times);
Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (cited eighteen times); Webster’s New World
Dictionary (cited fifteen times); American Heritage Dictionary (cited twelve times);
Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary (cited ten times); McGraw-Hill
Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms (cited nine times). See infra Tbls. 5-6, App. B.
99. See infra App. C.
100. Lexicon Fortress, supra note 8, at 262-63 (reporting statistics); id. at 533-55 (listing
cases); Lexicon Remains, supra note 8, at 52 (summarizing results); id. at 66-68 (listing
cases).
101. See WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 6 (1985) (describing itself as
“the latest in the Collegiate line of Merriam-Webster dictionaries which began in 1898”);
WEBSTER’S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 4a (1972) (“For many years MerriamWebster dictionaries have formed a series in which the unabridged dictionary is the parent
work and the Collegiate Dictionary the largest abridgment. From each successive revision
of the unabridged work new abridged books have sprung. . . . The definitions [herein] are
for the most part based on the most recent available information contained in the parent
work, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, with such modifications or
adaptations as are required by the smaller scope of the Collegiate.”); WEBSTER’S NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY iv (6th ed., 1949) (providing the language quoted in the 1972
publication of Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, citing the “parent work,”

MILLER.OFFTOPRINTER

2005]

10/7/2005 12:27 PM

PROVEN KEY

861

citations to any source, and 54.5% of the citations to any general purpose
source. Considering families of editorially related dictionaries, Houghton
Mifflin’s American Heritage Dictionary family takes second place with
twenty four citations (9.0% of all citations).102 Oxford University Press’s
family of dictionaries, which includes both the Oxford English Dictionary
and the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, comes in third with eighteen
citations (6.7% of all citations). Random House’s family of dictionaries,
the last identifiable family among the general purpose sources, takes fourth
place with eleven citations (4.1% of all citations).
Third, citations to specialized sources are considerably more spread out
among different titles than citations to general purpose sources. For
example, thirty-three of the forty-four specialized titles (74.4%) are cited
once and only once during the period of the study, and only three of them
(6.7%) are cited more than five times. By contrast, sixteen of the twentysix general purpose titles (61.5%) are cited more than once, and eight of
them (30.8%) are cited more than five times.
We also observed an interesting phenomenon not easily captured in any
of the data tables. Specifically, in six different cases during the period of
the study, all of them precedential, the Federal Circuit both used a
dictionary to define a word from a disputed claim and then used a
dictionary to define a word from the dictionary definition it had just
quoted.103 Four of these six cases were issued in just the last two and onehowever, as “Webster’s New International Dictionary, Second Edition”); see also
WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, FIFTH EDITION (1936) (“The publication in 1934 of
Webster’s New International Dictionary, Second Edition, another complete revision of the
unabridged dictionary, inaugurated a new Merriam-Webster series to which this present
work belongs.”).
102. See infra Tbl. 5, App. B. The American Heritage family remains in second place,
with thirty-five (13.1%) of the citations to any source, even if one extends it to include two
other Houghton Mifflin dictionaries—Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary and
its successor title Webster’s II New College Dictionary.
The American Heritage college dictionaries, like the Merriam-Webster college
dictionaries, share a common editorial core with the much larger American Heritage
Dictionary. See AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY vii (3d ed. 1997) (calling
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (3d ed.) “[t]he immediate predecessor of the College
Dictionary,” and asserting that the College Dictionary “displays the[] same virtues and
assets [as its parent] in a more compact form”); AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, SECOND
COLLEGE EDITION 6 (1985) (describing itself as “the first complete revision of the American
Heritage Dictionary”).
103. See Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., 363 F.3d 1306, 1308-10, 70
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438, 1440-41 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (tracing a long series of dictionary
definitions of words in other dictionary definitions); Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp.,
361 F.3d 1363, 1372-74, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209, 1215-17 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (defining
“annular,” then “ring,” then “band”; and defining “adjoining,” then “adjacent”); Union
Carbide Chems. & Plastics Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 308 F.3d 1167, 1177, 64
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1551-52 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (defining “characterizable,” then
“characterize”); Beckson Marine, Inc. v. NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d 718, 723-24, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1031, 1033-34 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (defining “groove,” then “channel”); Moore U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1114, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1241 (Fed.
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half years. Interestingly, the second-order dictionary is not always the
same as, or even the same type as, the first-order dictionary. Perhaps the
most vivid instance of the phenomenon is the Novartis case, where the
court forged a five-step chain of dictionary definitions of words appearing
in other dictionary definitions: “hydrosol” (the claim term), to “sol,” to
“solution,” to “medicinal,” to “medicine,” to “preparation.”104 The first
four words were defined using two different general purpose dictionaries,
and the last word was defined using three different specialized medical
dictionaries.105
Who on the Federal Circuit has cited dictionaries when authoring claim
construction opinions for the court? Table 7, contained in Appendix B,
provides comprehensive data on this question. The Federal Circuit has
twelve judges in regular active service and a number of senior judges.
During the period studied here, from April 1995 to June 2004, sixteen
judges were in regular active service on the Federal Circuit for at least
some months; Table 7 notes the different periods of service for each of
these sixteen judges. Every one of the judges authored at least one
majority opinion for the court in which the court used at least one
dictionary to help construe a disputed claim term.106 Six of the sixteen
judges (37.5%) each account for 10% or more of the 209 occasions on
which the Federal Circuit has used one or more dictionaries to help
construe a claim term. They are, in descending order of frequency of
contribution, as follows:
Judge Linn, with 27 of 209 (12.9%)
Judge Rader, with 26 of 209 (12.4%)

Cir. 2000) (defining “along,” then “by”); Great N. Corp. v. Henry Molded Prods., Inc., 94
F.3d 1569, 1574, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1997, 2001 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (defining “flexural,”
then “flexure”).
104. Novartis, 363 F.3d at 1308-09, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440-41.
105. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1440-41. The dissenting judge in Novartis, with some
justification, calls the majority’s reasoning a “chase through the dictionary.” Id. at 1315 n.7,
70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1444 n.1 (Clevenger, J., dissenting). Indeed, one could well call it
a chase through five dictionaries.
106. Another indication of the pervasiveness of dictionary use is that, from August 1,
2003 to June 30, 2004, all twelve judges in active service on the court joined at least one
panel opinion in which the court used one or more dictionaries to help construe a disputed
claim term. See Goldenberg v. Cytogen, Inc., 373 F.3d 1158, 1165-66, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1255, 1260-61 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Schall, Gajarsa, & Prost, JJ.); Housey Pharms., Inc.
v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 366 F.3d 1348, 1353, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1645 (Fed. Cir.
2004)) (Mayer & Clevenger, JJ.); Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc.,
362 F.3d 1367, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Linn, Dyk, & Archer, JJ.);
Int’l Rectifier, 361 F.3d at 1363, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1209 (Newman, Linn, & Prost,
JJ.); Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1996 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, Bryson, & Prost, JJ.); Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys.,
Inc., 357 F.3d 1340 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1815 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Lourie & Bryson, JJ.);
Abbott Labs. v. Syntron Bioresearch, Inc., 334 F.3d 1343, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (Mayer, Michel, & Dyk, JJ.).
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Judge Clevenger, with 24 of 209 (11.5%)
Judge Lourie, with 23 of 209 (11.0%)
Judge Dyk, with 22 of 209 (10.5%)
Judge Gajarsa, with 21 of 209 (10.0%)
Together, they account for 68.4% of the entries in the dataset. And of
the six, three—Judges Dyk, Gajarsa, and Linn—joined the court after both
Markman and Vitronics had already been decided.
It also appears from our data that, during the period of the study, the
Federal Circuit judges who had patent law or technical backgrounds before
joining the court cited a greater proportion of specialized reference sources
than did the judges who did not have such backgrounds. The data are in
Table 8. Using information from the judges’ biographies,107 we separated
all the judges who were in active service on the court from April 1995 to
June 2004 into two groups: the judges who had a patent law or technical
background,108 and the judges who did not.109 Using the opinion authorship
data in Appendix C, we also counted the number of occasions a given
judge cited one or more general purpose sources to help define a claim
term, and the number of occasions a given judge cited one or more
specialized sources to do so. When a given judge cited one or more general
sources and one or more specialized sources to help define the same term,
we counted the event in both columns of our table.110 As Table 8 shows,
the judges with a patent law or technical background cited specialized
sources 36.1% of the time, whereas the judges without a patent law or
technical background did so 21.7% of the time. The difference in citation
rate to specialized sources is statistically significant using the conventional
test for whether two variables are independent.111
TABLE 8
Number of citations to one or more general or specialized references,
grouped by Federal Circuit judge background
GENERAL

SPECIALIZED

107. See U.S. COURT FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, JUDICIAL
BIOGRAPHIES (reporting biographical information for active and senior judges), at
http://www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.html (last revised Jan. 25, 2005) (on file with the American
University Law Review).
108. Six judges have a patent law or technical background: Judges Gajarsa, Linn,
Lourie, Newman, Nies, and Rich.
109. Ten judges do not have a patent law or technical background: Judges Archer,
Bryson, Clevenger, Dyk, Mayer, Michel, Plager, Prost, Rader, and Schall.
110. There were ten such instances in the full dataset.
111. Specifically, the likelihood that this different rate is due to chance alone, as
measured by the χ2 statistic, is 0.02.
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JUDGES WITH PATENT LAW OR
TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
JUDGES WITHOUT PATENT LAW
OR TECHNICAL BACKGROUND

SOURCES
63.9%
(53/83)
78.3%
(101/129)
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SOURCES
36.1% (30/83)
21.7% (28/129)

In sum, the data from our detailed review of individual cases show that
(a) the Federal Circuit uses dictionaries to construe words in claims more
often with each passing year; (b) it most often identifies only one reference
source per word; (c) it uses general purpose English language dictionaries
more than twice as often as specialized sources, consistent with the “neutral
sources”-based Telegenix rationale (and not the “specialized knowledge”based Markman rationale) for dictionary use; (d) it uses Webster’s Third
most of all; (e) just over a third of the judges who have served on the
Federal Circuit since the Markman decision account for more than two
thirds of the occasions where the court has used dictionaries to construe
disputed claim terms; and (f) judges with a patent law or technical
background cite specialized reference sources at a greater rate than those
without such a background. Both general purpose and specialized
dictionaries and similar reference sources have become central to the
Federal Circuit’s claim construction jurisprudence.
II. BIAS THROUGH THE BACK DOOR? DICTIONARY
SELECTION AT COURT
The Federal Circuit’s cases firmly establish both that one should begin
the claim construction process by presuming that a term has its ordinary
meaning to a person of skill in the art, and that one can use a dictionary or
similar objective reference source to help establish this ordinary meaning.
The Federal Circuit’s actual dictionary citation behavior over the last nine
years just as firmly shows that, when the court uses a dictionary to establish
the ordinary meaning of a disputed claim term, it most often does so by
reference to a single general purpose English language dictionary. And
although a full theoretical critique of judicial use of dictionaries to help
establish ordinary meaning is beyond the scope of this Article,112 common
experience suggests both that one interprets a new document by using one’s
prior understandings of word meanings, and that it is entirely wholesome to
augment one’s untutored understanding of a word’s meaning by consulting
a dictionary, professionally prepared at great effort, to remind oneself of
112. See supra note 24 (distinguishing the question whether the Federal Circuit should
use dictionaries from the question of how the Federal Circuit can best use dictionaries,
having chosen to do so).
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the full range of ordinary meanings that a given word possesses. Indeed,
the Supreme Court highlighted this very use of dictionaries in the context
of legal disputes over a century ago.113
It is not enough, however, simply to note that dictionaries can be helpful.
There is an important middle step between the act of writing a definition
for a word (back in the publishing house’s lexicography shop) and the act
of quoting a definition (in a judicial opinion or a lawyer’s brief)—namely,
choosing which dictionary (or dictionaries) to use from among the
available candidates.
The court often uses Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary, but not always. The Federal Circuit’s increasing
reliance on dictionaries thus raises an important question: how does the
court select the dictionary it uses in any given case?114
The selection question is a critical one because the court now justifies its
use of dictionaries primarily by reference to the neutrality with which
professional lexicographers write dictionary definitions.115 This neutralitybased justification for favoring dictionaries rings quite hollow, of course, if
the way the court picks the dictionary it uses in a given case is not itself
neutral. Put another way, to achieve the full measure of neutrality, and thus
predictability, that the Federal Circuit has set as its claim construction goal,
one should be able to state in advance some rule or principle that guides
dictionary selection without regard to the merits of the case in which the
dictionary will be used. Sadly, the cases suggest a large share of judicial
caprice in dictionary selection. One cannot, moreover, dismiss the
arbitrariness in dictionary selection as inconsequential. We consider, in
turn, both the lack of formal constraints on court choice of dictionaries in
claim construction, and the demonstrable difference in case outcome that
the choice among dictionaries can make.
A. Dictionary Choice Unchained—The Dark Side of Telegenix
A court confronting a claim construction dispute today can, after the
dispute is well under way and the parties’ general positions on the merits
are clear, effectively pick whatever dictionary it prefers to help construe the
113. See Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1893) (categorizing tomatoes as
“vegetables,” rather than as “fruit,” for purposes of a tariff schedule). “Of that [ordinary]
meaning the [C]ourt is bound to take judicial notice, as it does in regard to all words in our
own tongue; and upon such a question dictionaries are admitted, not as evidence, but only as
aids to the memory and understanding of the [C]ourt.” Id.
114. As one commentator has observed, “[t]he first step toward claim interpretation
using a dictionary should be selecting an appropriate dictionary, a step that was not
addressed by the Telegenix court and which is neither straightforward nor inconsequential.”
Hattenbach, supra note 60, at 187.
115. See Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1812, 1818 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (praising dictionaries because they are “not influenced
by expert testimony or events subsequent to the fixing of the intrinsic record by the grant of
the patent, not colored by the motives of the parties, and not inspired by litigation”).
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words in the claim. The only apparent constraint is a temporal one: the
reference source should have been publicly available as of the filing date of
the application that matured into the patent in suit.116 Importantly, a court
is not bound by the parties’ evidentiary submissions in the litigation. The
Federal Circuit took pains to emphasize the point in the Telegenix case:
As resources and references to inform and aid courts and judges in the
understanding of technology and terminology, it is entirely proper for
both trial and appellate judges to consult these materials [i.e.,
dictionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises] at any stage of a litigation,
regardless of whether they have been offered by a party in evidence or
not.117

To the extent one views a publicly available reference work’s content as an
adjudicative fact, Telegenix is consistent with the Federal Rules of
Evidence governing judicial notice of such facts,118 which empower courts
to take notice on their own initiative119 both at trial and on appeal.120
116. See Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1383, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1124, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[W]hen a claim term understood to have a narrow
meaning when the application is filed later acquires a broader definition, the literal scope of
the term is limited to what it was understood to mean at the time of filing.”); Schering Corp.
v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1353, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1650, 1654 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(“Rather, the [claim] term ‘IFN-α’ in the patent has a specialized meaning limited to the
particular leukocyte interferon that Dr. Weissman supported in his original application. In
sum, this court must determine what the term meant at the time the patentee filed the ‘901
application.”). The principle that a claim term forever has the same meaning it had on the
date the application was filed is a longstanding one. See Universal Oil Prods. v. Globe Oil
& Ref. Co., 137 F.2d 3, 6, 58 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 504, 504 (7th Cir. 1943) (“Moreover, the
meaning which the inventor gives to his words can not be made to depend upon subsequent
events, but should appear when the application is filed.”).
The Federal Circuit has, in some recent cases, sown needless confusion on this point. The
cases just cited establish that, as a doctrinal matter, the key date for fixing the meaning of a
claim term is the application’s filing date. Even if this were not already a matter of settled
doctrine, the filing date is the only date that makes any sense in view of patent law
requirements regarding a given written disclosure’s ability to properly support a given set of
claims. See infra Part III.B. It is thus quite strange that in the Telegenix case the court
speaks of reference sources that are “publicly available at the time the patent is issued.”
Telegenix, 308 F.3d at 1203, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818 (emphasis added). After
Telegenix, the Federal Circuit has twice stated that its “decisions have not always been
consistent as to whether the pertinent date is the filing date of the application or the issue
date of the patent.” Inverness Med. Switz. GmbH v. Princeton Biomeditech Corp., 309 F.3d
1365, 1370 n.1, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1926, 1930 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Inverness Med.
Switz. GmbH v. Warner Lambert Co., 309 F.3d 1373, 1378 n.2, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1933, 1936 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2002). There is no cause for the court to be coy: the filing date is
the one that matters, and the Telegenix court erred on this point.
117. Telegenix, 308 F.3d at 1203, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1819 (emphasis added).
118. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(a)-(b). See generally CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 2.7, at 80-81 & n.9 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing judicial notice of
such “verifiable facts” as “language or word usage”).
119. Fed. R. Evid. 201(c) (“A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not.”).
120. Fed. R. Evid. 201(f) (“Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the
proceeding.”); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 118, § 2.10, at 90. The Federal Circuit
has taken judicial notice of facts in reliable documents in a number of cases. See
Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 497 n.1, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1608, 1609
n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., 9 F.3d 948, 954 n.27, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d

MILLER.OFFTOPRINTER

2005]

10/7/2005 12:27 PM

PROVEN KEY

867

Historically, judicial notice has been the ground on which the Supreme
Court based its own use of dictionaries.121 To the extent one views
dictionary content as a legislative rather than an adjudicative fact,122 the
Federal Rules of Evidence do not regulate the situation at all.123
The lack of formal constraints does not, of course, mandate that a judge
simply indulge her personal preference when choosing a dictionary to help
define a word in a patent claim. The Federal Circuit, however, has not
stated any rules or principles for how a judge should choose a dictionary in
this context—not how to decide between using a general purpose or a
specialized reference source, or how to decide precisely which (or how
many) reference source(s) to use from among several candidates, or how to
distill some core ordinary meaning from multiple definitions in multiple
sources.124 Judges, both trial and appellate, are thus left with little more to
guide them than personal preference—preference for one dictionary over
another, or preference for one internal, unstated guideline over another.
For example, one judge might opt to rely on the dictionary cited by the
party he finds more persuasive on other grounds, converting dictionaries
from useful tools for reaching sound conclusions into post hoc
rationalizations. Another judge might opt consistently for unabridged over
collegiate dictionaries. Yet another judge might opt to stick with the
dictionary she has at hand in her chambers, or in the courthouse library,
(BNA) 1936, 1941 n.27 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus.,
Inc., 897 F.2d 511, 514 n.3, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2029, 2031 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
121. See Lexicon Fortress, supra note 8, at 246-48.
122. On the distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts, see BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 610-11 (7th ed. 1999) and MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 118, §§ 2.22.3, at 65-72.
123. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 118, § 2.3, at 66 (“The Federal Rules of
Evidence do not regulate the process of noticing legislative facts.”).
124. The Federal Circuit, tacitly acknowledging its failure thus far to provide any
guidance on these critical questions, requests, in its en banc order in Phillips, see supra
notes 17-18 and accompanying text, additional briefing on, among others, the following two
questions: “What use should be made of general as opposed to technical dictionaries? How
does the concept of ordinary meaning apply if there are multiple dictionary definitions of the
same term?” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 376 F.3d 1382, 1383, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1765,
1766 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Question #2).
In fairness to the Federal Circuit, the court is hardly alone in failing to give meaningful
guidance on dictionary selection. The Supreme Court, too, has failed to state any rules or
principles governing how courts should choose dictionaries when construing statutes and the
like, and scholars have criticized the Court accordingly. See Lexicon Fortress, supra note 8,
at 264-76 (providing extended critique of the “confusion” resulting from the fact that,
“[a]lthough the Court has relied on dictionaries for nearly 170 years, there are few
articulated principles to provide guidance to the Court’s use of dictionaries”); Rickie
Sonpal, Note, Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177, 2197-2201
(2003) (reviewing critiques of the Supreme Court’s unpredictable dictionary selection
practices); Looking It Up, supra note 8, at 1447-48 (“Yet there has been no apparent pattern
to (or discussion of) the Justices’ choices of [dictionary] volume or vintage. . . . If the Court
is serious about its quest for ordinary meaning, it should not continue to employ dictionaries
in such a chaotic fashion.”).
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when it is time to make a decision. Indeed, given the lack of guidance from
the Federal Circuit, one cannot be surprised at the following exchange,
involving an experienced federal trial judge, at a three-day patent law
conference in September 2003:
Returning to the notion that claim construction should begin with the
dictionary meaning of the disputed term, a conference participant
suggested that different dictionaries may provide inconsistent
definitions, leaving a judge with the need to decide which dictionary to
rely upon. [U.S. District] Judge [T.S.] Ellis [E.D. Va.] shot back, “I use
the dictionary in my library.”125

Such an approach to dictionary choice is neither neutral nor predictable.
Indeed, to the degree that cases are assigned to judges at random, the “it’s
in my library” method amounts to random dictionary selection. This state
of affairs is, from a systemic perspective, highly undesirable.
Dictionary selection by judicial caprice is not merely the stuff of
anecdote. Our detailed review of dictionary-citing cases from April 1995
to June 2004 reveals two troubling phenomena that underscore the chaotic
way in which the Federal Circuit itself appears to choose dictionaries for
claim construction. First, we identified four cases in which the Federal
Circuit used a dictionary different from the dictionary it reported the trial
court had used in the same case.126 In none of these four cases does the
Federal Circuit explain, in any way, why it chose a dictionary different
from the one the trial court used. The dictionary switches in these cases are
made all the more puzzling by the fact that the Federal Circuit has, in other
cases, used all the dictionaries it rebuffs from the trial judges in these four
cases. Why the inter-court switch? A Federal Circuit preference for
unabridged over college dictionaries (which could explain three of the four
cases)? The chosen book’s ready availability in a chambers or court

125. Judge Lourie Defends CAFC Reversals, PTO Chief Rogan Promises Patent Quality,
66 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 580, 581 (Sept. 26, 2003), available at
http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/PTC.NSF. It is not clear from the report whether Judge Ellis
was referring to a library in his chambers or instead to a general library at the courthouse
where he works.
126. Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp., 379 F.3d 1311, 1324, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065, 1073 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Linn, J.) (shifting from Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary to help define a
claim term); Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363, 1370-74, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1209, 1214-17 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Linn, J.) (shifting from Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary to help define three
separate claim terms); Inverness Med. Switz. GmbH v. Warner Lambert Co., 309 F.3d 1373,
1378, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1933, 1936 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Dyk, J.) (shifting from MerriamWebster’s New Collegiate Dictionary to both Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
and Shorter Oxford English Dictionary to help define two separate claim terms); Johnstown
Am. Corp. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., Nos. 97-1070, 97-1071, 1997 WL 291956, at *1-3 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (Archer, J.) (shifting from American Heritage Dictionary to Dictionary of
Architecture & Construction to help define a claim term).
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library? The personal preference of an opinion’s authoring judge? Some
other reason? The court does not say.
Second, we identified four cases (separate from those just discussed) in
which the Federal Circuit uses different dictionaries to define two different
words from the very same disputed phrase in the claim.127 In the most
recent of the cases, for example, the court construes the claim phrase
“opening for connecting” by, among other things, looking up the definition
of “opening” in the Oxford English Dictionary and the definition of
“connect” in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.128 In none of
these four cases does the Federal Circuit explain, in any way, why the
dictionary used to define one word in the phrase is inadequate or
inappropriate when defining the other word in the very same phrase. Why
the mid-phrase switch? Did the parties themselves cite the dictionaries in
this pattern? If so, what about this citation pattern was persuasive? Was
one dictionary more comprehensive on the desired term than the other?
Some other reason? Again, the court does not say.
It thus appears to the outside observer that the Federal Circuit effectively
chooses dictionaries at random. To be sure, both the sweeping mandate of
Telegenix (licensing any dictionary at any time) and the freewheeling
approach to dictionary selection that its own cases reveal maximize the
Federal Circuit’s freedom to obtain the objective reference(s) that it finds
most helpful—whatever that means—at a given moment. When a court
chooses a dictionary according to this approach, it knows, of course, its
own dictionary predilections, the bottom-line positions of each party
offering any other dictionary, and the final conclusion it favors based on
the other materials in the case.129 This approach, which replaces judicial
127. TI Group Auto. Sys. (N. Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126, 1138,
71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1328, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Linn, J.) (using two different general
purpose dictionaries for two different words); Housey Pharms., Inc. v. AstraZeneca UK
Ltd., 366 F.3d 1348, 1353, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1645 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Clevenger,
J.) (using two different specialized dictionaries for two different words); Anchor Wall Sys.
v. Rockwood Retaining Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298, 1311, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865,
1869-70 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Gajarsa, J.) (using two different general purpose dictionaries for
two different words); Karlin Tech., Inc. v. Surgical Dynamics, Inc., 177 F.3d 968, 971, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (using a general purpose dictionary for one
word and a specialized dictionary for another).
128. TI Group, 375 F.3d at 1138, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337.
129. In a thoughtful discussion of the Federal Circuit’s “ordinary meaning” cases,
Barney posits that judicial selection of a dictionary is preferable to litigant selection of a
dictionary. See Barney, supra note 42, at 126. Specifically, Barney argues, “unlike [with]
other sources of extrinsic evidence, a judge can pull a dictionary from his or her own shelf
and find a definition of a disputed term free from any influence by the litigants.” Id.
(emphasis in original). First, we disagree that a judge who has heard the parties’ arguments
on claim construction is “free from any influence by the litigants.” Second, even if Barney
is right about the absence of litigant influence, a “let the judge choose” strategy provides no
guidance to parties who are attempting in good faith to avoid litigation in the first place,
either by licensing the patent or designing around the claimed invention. Surely our goal
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caprice for party bias, is thus quite at odds with the neutrality that
Telegenix praises as the reason to prefer dictionaries over resources such as
expert testimony.130 The price of the courts’ freedom is the costly
uncertainty the court imposes on all other actors in the patent system—
patentees, potential licensees, accused infringers, the Patent Office—who
are simply left to guess, for good or ill, what dictionary a trial court may
choose when litigation arises and what dictionary (perhaps a different one)
the Federal Circuit may choose on appeal. Nor is the guessing game mere
sport. The dictionary that a court chooses to help define a claim term can
have a demonstrable effect on the case’s outcome.
B. The Difference a Different Dictionary Can Make
One might posit, in response to the apparent caprice in dictionary
selection just discussed, that there is no harm in such caprice because
dictionaries do not differ enough in content for the choice among them to
materially affect a case’s outcome. There is doubtless some common sense
appeal to this notion. After all, professional lexicographers, whether
writing a general purpose English language dictionary or a specialized
dictionary, strive to define the words in a common lexicon, e.g., standard
American English, or standard medical terminology. All dictionary writers
are under enormous pressure to be concise,131 and concision leaves less
room for differing creative expressions. All reputable dictionary writers
use extensive evidence of common usage132 and, in the case of specialized
terms, copious input from accomplished experts in the relevant field.133
should be to develop a claim construction methodology that helps opposing interests
accurately assess their respective likelihoods of success were litigation to occur and thus
dispense with the need actually to litigate at all.
130. See Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1812 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (dictionaries are helpful because they are “not influenced by
expert testimony or events subsequent to the fixing of the intrinsic record by the grant of the
patent, not colored by the motives of the parties, and not inspired by litigation”).
131. See LANDAU, supra note 2, at 173 (“Almost every defining characteristic common
to dictionaries can be traced to the need to conserve space.”).
132. The “chief sources of definitions” for modern dictionaries are “the citation file and
the electronic corpus.” Id. at 189. According to Landau, a “citation file is a selection of
potential lexical units in the context of actual usage, drawn from a variety of written sources
and often some spoken sources, chiefly because the context illuminates an aspect of
meaning.” Id. at 190 (emphasis in original). And a “corpus . . . is a collection of different
texts or of recorded speech, nowadays stored electronically on a computer and indexed so
that any particular word can be found quickly in the context in which it has been used.” Id.;
see also id. at 192-93 (contrasting electronic corpora from citation files). Landau provides
both exemplar citation slips and sample corpus printouts. See id. at 196-99 (citation slips in
Figs. 8-13); id. at 194 (corpus printout in Fig. 7); see also BÉJOINT, supra note 79, at 97-99
(discussing usage-based evidence for definitions). All lawyers are, of course, familiar with
the corpora known as Westlaw and LexisNexis.
133. See LANDAU, supra note 2, at 168 (“Although usage in scientific terminology is
given much weight when it is available, in general imposed definitions are determined by a
consensus of experts.”); id. at 191 (noting that general purpose dictionaries “rely on
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Finally, competing lexicographers have, since the birth of the English
language dictionary, aggressively monitored (and sometimes avidly
borrowed from) one another’s published definitions.134 The hunch that
different dictionaries often converge in their definitions is thus consistent
with actual lexicography practice.
At the same time, important differences among competing dictionaries
exist alongside convergence in some definitions.
First, different
dictionaries approach crafting the body of a definition differently.
Consider the flagship dictionaries of the two groups that the Federal Circuit
cites most often, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary and
American Heritage Dictionary. A definition in Webster’s Third, for
example, is consciously designed to be “a single coherent and clearly
expressed phrase that need[s] no punctuation except where commas [are]
essential to separate words or groups of words in a series.”135 In addition,
specialists to define the large percentage of scientific and technical terms.”); id. at 213
(“Most scientific and technical terms must be defined by specialists on the basis of their
judgments about preferred scientific usage.”). Consulting experts (or, at least, claiming to)
is as old as Edward Phillips’ The New World of English Words (1658), in which the author
vouched “for the accuracy of his definitions by naming specialist sources of information, for
example ‘Dr Sparks’ for ‘physicks’, ‘Mr Molins’ for ‘botanicks’, and ‘Dr Wybard’ for
geometry.” Michael Rand Hoare & Vivian Salmon, The Vocabulary of Science in the OED,
in LEXICOGRAPHY AND THE OED: PIONEERS IN THE UNTRODDEN FOREST 156, 156, 171
(Lynda Mugglestone ed., 2000).
134. As Landau succinctly states, “[m]odern lexicographers look very carefully at each
other’s work.” Id. at 43. The practice is dictated, in part, by the profit motive: “Few
modern commercial publishers have an instinct for scholarship so pure that they will spend
millions of dollars to redo what other, better scholars have done before them.” Id. at 44. As
a result, when a new dictionary project begins, one scrutinizes existing sources. According
to Landau,
Dictionary makers acquire every significant new dictionary as soon as it is
published. One’s direct competitors’ works are examined with due care to see what
new terms they have included—or failed to include. . . . Another dictionary’s
definition must be considered along with other citations for the word being
defined. . . . [C]ommercial dictionaries are now loath to admit having relied on a
competitor. For marketing reasons, every dictionary is represented as being
unaffected by every other. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Id. at 214. Even so, not all dictionaries are equal: “the Merriam-Webster dictionaries in
America and the Oxford dictionaries in the UK are less influenced by other dictionaries than
other dictionaries are by them.” Id. at 402. For an engaging discussion of detailed
examples of verbatim definition borrowing, in dictionaries both modern and antique, see
Robert Burchfield, The Genealogy of Dictionaries, in UNLOCKING THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
147 (1989).
Borrowing a competitor’s handiwork verbatim is as old as English lexicography. Robert
Cawdrey’s A Table Alphabeticall (1604), “most often accepted as the first [English
monolingual] dictionary,” copied liberally from two Latin-English works. LANDAU, supra
note 2, at 46, 48. Cawdrey’s work was in turn copied liberally by “[t]he next English
dictionary,” John Bullokar’s An English Expositor (1616). Id. at 48. In short, “[t]he earliest
English lexicographers by and large copied the definitions of their predecessors.” Id. at 190.
135. MORTON, supra note 3, at 87. This defining style, pioneered by Philip Babcock
Gove, the Editor-in-Chief of Webster’s Third, was “Gove’s most distinctive innovation” in
the work. Id. The style produced some clunkers and thus had its critics. Id. For example,
Webster’s Third broadly defines the noun “door” as follows:
1 a: a movable piece of firm material or a structure supported usu. along one side
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the definitions in Webster’s Third carry only minimal status and usage
labeling.136 A definition in American Heritage, by contrast, is not confined
to the single-statement defining style of Webster’s Third,137 and American
Heritage provides both copious status labeling and usage advice from a
200-member “usage panel.”138 These differences are, in fact, rooted in the
great controversy that erupted with the publication of Webster’s Third in
1961: both the American Heritage Dictionary, first published in 1969, and
the “usage panel” device it inaugurated, were direct responses to what its
publisher viewed as the radical descriptivism of Webster’s Third.139
Second, when defining a word with multiple senses, different
dictionaries order the several senses differently.
There are two
conventional approaches to ordering these senses: chronologically (or
historically), ranging from earliest to most recent sense; and logically,
ranging from more to less important or frequent sense. A given dictionary
and swinging on pivots or hinges, sliding along a groove, rolling up and down,
revolving as one of four leaves, or folding like an accordion by means of which an
opening may be closed or kept open for passage into or out of a building, room, or
other covered enclosure or a car, airplane, elevator, or other vehicle—see kalamein
door, panel door
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 674 (2002).
136. MORTON, supra note 3, at 135 (“The most striking of Gove’s policies on usage was
his decision to cut back on the use of the slang label, eliminate the label colloquial entirely,
and put greater reliance on illustrative quotations and usage notes to indicate the status of
words that were on the borderline of standard English.”). As Morton recounts in
comprehensive detail, Gove’s choice to minimize status and usage labeling in Webster’s
Third was savaged by many reviewers and hailed by others in the two years following the
book’s first publication. Id. at 153-214. See also Robert Burchfield, Words and Meanings
in the Twentieth Century, in UNLOCKING THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 61, 76 (1989) (“The
publication of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary in 1961 was greeted with
immense pleasure by most academic reviewers and with implacable hostility by nearly
every journalist who reviewed it. University teachers loved its inclusiveness and its up-todateness. Journalists spoke of ‘sabotage at Springfield’: they judged it to be a work of
deplorable linguistic permissiveness.”).
So spirited were the so-called “prescriptivist/descriptivist” debates attending the
publication of Webster’s Third, the controversy yielded an anthology of detractors’ and
supporters’ reviews. See DICTIONARIES AND THAT DICTIONARY: A CASEBOOK ON THE AIMS
OF LEXICOGRAPHERS AND THE TARGETS OF REVIEWERS 50-250 (James Sledd & Wilma R.
Ebbitt eds., 1962). Gove later defended his policy on status and usage labels. See also
Philip B. Gove, Usage in the Dictionary, in THE ROLE OF THE DICTIONARY 51 (Philip B.
Gove ed., 1967).
137. For example, American Heritage broadly defines the noun “door” as “[a] movable
structure used to close off an entrance, typically consisting of a panel that swings on hinges
or that slides or rotates.” AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 536 (4th ed. 2000).
138. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY viii (4th ed. 2000) (“The Usage Notes are
based on periodic surveys of the Usage Panel, a group of some 200 distinguished writers,
scholars, scientists, and other respected users and students of the English language.”); id. at
xiii-xv (listing members of the usage panel); see also LANDAU, supra note 2, at 93 (“The
one extraordinary feature of the American Heritage dictionaries apart from their [graphic
and color illustration] design has been the introduction of a usage panel of putative ‘good
writers’ whose judgments about disputed usages are supposed to provide guidance for the
rest of the benighted English-speaking world.”).
139. See LANDAU, supra note 2, at 93-94 (discussing the early history of the American
Heritage Dictionary); MORTON, supra note 3, at 223-25, 228-32 (same).
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usually states its approach to ordering senses in its “front matter,” which
most users rarely, if ever, consult.140 Funk & Wagnalls pioneered ordering
senses by frequency of usage in its Standard Dictionary (1893) and New
Standard Dictionary (1913),141 and logical ordering is now the more
common way to organize senses.142 Both Merriam-Webster and Oxford
University dictionaries order senses chronologically.143 Both American
Heritage and Random House dictionaries, by contrast, order senses from
more to less central usage.144
These important differences among different dictionaries can, in turn,
generate different claim construction analyses. First, when a court uses
only one dictionary in aid of its claim construction, the dictionary’s content
may differ from others in a way that hits hard at the patentee’s core
disagreement with the accused infringer. Second, these content-based
effects may be compounded by the fact that, when a court uses multiple
dictionaries to derive a unified ordinary meaning for a disputed word, it can
select from among varied approaches to forging one definition from many
sources. A brief review of three Federal Circuit cases from the last year
amply demonstrates the substantive difference that selecting different
dictionaries can make.
1.

The usage note case
In International Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp.,145 the Federal Circuit

140. See LANDAU, supra note 2, at 148 (“The trend in recent years has been to cut back
on front matter because it is widely believed among lexicographers that no one reads it.”).
141. See id. at 86.
142. See BÉJOINT, supra note 79, at 50.
143. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 17a, ¶ 12.5 (2002) (“The
order of senses is historical: the one known to have been first used in English is entered
first.”); 1 SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY xvii-xviii, ¶ 4.10 (5th ed. 2002)
(explaining chronological ordering of senses); 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY xxix (2d ed.
1989) (“[T]hat sense is placed first which was actually the earliest in the language: the
others follow in the order in which they appear to have arisen.”); WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 19 (1985) (“The order of senses within an entry is historical: the
sense known to have been first used in English is entered first. . . . When a numbered sense
is further subdivided into lettered subsenses . . . their order is likewise historical: subsense
1a is earlier than 1b, 1b is earlier than 1c, and so forth.”). For a lucid and detailed account
of the way in which James A.H. Murray and his assistants crafted definitions for the first
edition of the Oxford English Dictionary, see Penny Silva, Time and Meaning: Sense and
Definition in the OED, in LEXICOGRAPHY AND THE OED: PIONEERS IN THE UNTRODDEN
FOREST 77 (Lynda Muggleston ed., 2000).
144. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY xxxiv (4th ed. 2000) (“Entries containing
more than one sense are arranged for the convenience of contemporary dictionary users with
the central and often the most commonly sought meaning first. Senses and subsenses are
grouped to show their relationships with each other.”); AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE
DICTIONARY xxv (3d ed. 1997) (same); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE xxxii (2d ed. 1987) (“In each part of speech group, the most frequently
encountered meanings generally come before less common ones.”); RANDOM HOUSE
WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY xviii (2d ed. 1997) (same).
145. 361 F.3d 1363, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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confronted a claim construction dispute involving a patented
semiconductor chip structure. The claimed structure included both a
“wafer of semiconductor material having a relatively lightly doped major
body portion” and “a further region of opposite conductivity type adjoining
[the] lightly doped major body portion.”146 The accused infringer’s liability
for infringement of the claims using the word “adjoining” turned entirely
on whether or not “adjoining” requires that the major body portion and the
further region touch each other.147
The district court, quoting defining language from Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary, concluded that “two objects need not be in physical
contact to be ‘adjoining.’”148 IXYS, the accused infringer, conceded that it
could not avoid infringement of the claims under the district court’s
construction of “adjoining.”149
What does this dictionary actually say? The Ninth New Collegiate
defines “adjoin” as “to lie next to or in contact with” and “to be close to or
in contact with one another,” and defines “adjoining” as “touching or
bounding at a point or line.”150 The definition of “adjoining” also directs
the reader to the definition of “adjacent,” which it labels a synonym.151 The
Ninth New Collegiate defines “adjacent” as “not distant,” “having a
common endpoint or border,” and “immediately preceding or following.”152
All these definitions suggest that one can, consistent with ordinary usage,
use both adjoining and adjacent to describe two items that are close to each
other but not touching. Most importantly for our discussion here, the
definition of “adjacent” in the Ninth New Collegiate further includes a
usage note contrasting adjoining and adjacent, a note to which the district
court made no apparent reference:
ADJACENT, ADJOINING, CONTIGUOUS, JUXTAPOSED mean
being in close proximity. ADJACENT may or may not imply contact
but always implies absence of anything of the same kind in between;
ADJOINING definitely implies meeting and touching at some point or
line; CONTIGUOUS implies having contact on all or most of one side;
JUXTAPOSED means placed side by side esp. so as to permit
comparison and contrast.153

On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s construction
of “adjoining,” holding that this word in the claims requires physical
146. Id. at 1367, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1212 (quoting claim 19 of U.S. Patent No.
4,959,699 (issued Sept. 25, 1990)).
147. Id. at 1375, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
148. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
149. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
150. WEBSTER’S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 56 (1985).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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contact between the major body portion and the further region.154 It also
held that, as a matter of law, IXYS could not have infringed the claims
containing the “adjoining” requirement.155 First, and without explaining
why, the Federal Circuit switched from the Ninth New Collegiate to the
1966 printing of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.156 Second,
after quoting the definitions of “adjoining” and “adjacent” from Webster’s
Third, the court focused on the Webster’s Third version of the usage note
(appended to the definition of “adjacent”) that contrasts these two
synonyms.157
The usage note in Webster’s Third is quite a bit longer than the
corresponding note in the Ninth New Collegiate. It states, in relevant part,
as follows:
ADJACENT is sometimes merely a synonym for near or close to.
Applied to things of the same type, it indicates either side-by-side
proximity or lack of anything of the same nature intervening.
ADJOINING is quite similar to ADJACENT in meaning and suggestion
but may more strongly indicate existence of common bounding lines or
lines or points of junction.158

The Federal Circuit, after quoting this usage note, concludes that the
district court erred by ignoring its teaching. According to the Federal
Circuit,
[T]he district court was not free to disregard this usage note. . . . [T]he
district court’s adoption of a definition [for “adjoining”] attributed to
“adjacent,” a synonym of the claim term, disregards entirely the
distinction between the two terms set forth in the usage note. Had the
inventor meant “adjacent,” he could have used that word.159

The court betrays no hint of irony at faulting the district court for
“disregarding” a usage note in a dictionary that the district court never
consulted.
Putting the unexplained dictionary switch to one side, it seems sensible
at first blush to conclude that, having decided to consult a dictionary, one
154. Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363, 1375, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1209, 1218 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
155. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1218.
156. Id. at 1374, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217.
157. Id., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217.
158. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 26 (1966) (illustrative
quotations omitted). The 2002 printing of Webster’s Third contains the very same
definitions and usage note. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 26-27
(2002). In addition, the Addenda Section of the 2002 printing, id. at 55a-144a, which
contains new words and new senses of words that have entered the lexicon since 1961, does
not provide any additional information for “adjacent” or “adjoining.” See id. at 55a. We
suspect that many who use post-1961 printings of Webster’s Third do not know about the
existence of, much less the importance of consulting, the Addenda Section. The Federal
Circuit appears never to have cited it.
159. Int’l Rectifier, 361 F.3d at 1374, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1217.
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must take all that one finds there—both the bitter and the sweet, as it were.
And the Ninth New Collegiate, like Webster’s Third, includes a usage note
for “adjacent” that tilts decidedly in favor of the Federal Circuit’s
construction of “adjoining.” Then one wonders, do other dictionaries draw
precisely the same distinctions between “adjoining” and “adjacent” that the
Merriam-Webster sources do? If not, perhaps more weight has been put on
these usage notes than they can bear.
As it turns out, the American Heritage dictionaries—which as a group
take second place among the Federal Circuit’s most commonly cited
general purpose dictionaries—distinguish “adjoining” from “adjacent” far
less tidily than do the Merriam-Webster sources. The entire definitions of
“adjoining” and “adjacent” from the three American Heritage sources are
as follows:

American
Heritage
Dictionary 21 (4th
ed. 2000)
American
Heritage College
Dictionary 16 (3d
ed. 1997)
American
Heritage
Dictionary 79 (2d
college ed. 1985)

“ADJOINING”
Neighboring;
contiguous.
Neighboring;
contiguous.
Neighboring;
contiguous;
next to.

“ADJACENT”
1. Close to; lying near;
adjacent cities. 2. Next to;
adjoining: adjacent garden
plots.
1. Close to; lying near;
adjacent cities. 2. Next to;
adjoining: adjacent garden
plots.
1. Close to; lying near.
2. Next to; adjoining.

None of these three dictionaries has any usage note for either word. Nor
do any of them even point from the word “adjoining” to the word
“adjacent.” The definition of “adjacent” merely uses the word “adjoining.”
It thus appears that, had the Federal Circuit switched to an American
Heritage dictionary rather than switching to Webster’s Third, it might well
have affirmed the district court’s construction of “adjoining” and the
concomitant infringement liability judgment. Instead, it reversed the claim
construction and the liability judgment. Dictionary selection seems to have
made the difference between liability and no liability.
2.

The high frequency and wood board cases: Making one from many
Two recent cases expose an important methodological choice that arises
when one tries to use definitions from multiple dictionaries to create a
single statement of a word’s ordinary meaning. One option is to take as the
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word’s ordinary meaning only the select material that is common to all the
definitions; another option is take as the word’s ordinary meaning the
totality of the material from all the definitions.160 The first approach, which
extracts material common to all the definitions, has the virtue of identifying
the meaning of the target word that is most widely and well-established in
the relevant language community. And it is the settled nature of ordinary
meaning that makes ordinary meaning—and the use of a dictionary to
identify it—attractive as a default rule for claim construction.161 The
second approach, which embraces all material found in any definition, has
the virtue of identifying the broadest possible range of ordinary meaning
for the target word. And it is the promise of a comprehensive reminder
which augments one’s untutored understanding that makes consulting a
dictionary a helpful exercise.162 Both methods, then, are consonant with
some of the policy bases for relying on dictionaries. Choosing between the
methods, one must note, also interacts with one’s choice of dictionaries,
given that dictionaries vary in content. Which method should a court use
when creating one definition of a disputed claim term from many
dictionaries? Interestingly, each of the two Federal Circuit cases to which
we now turn uses a different one of these two methodologies.
In Intellectual Property Development, Inc. v. UA-Columbia Cablebvision
of Westchester, Inc.,163 the Federal Circuit construed the phrase “high
160. We owe this point to John Duffy.
161. Thus, for example, the Federal Circuit recently rejected the efforts of both a
patentee and an accused infringer to rely on reference sources that reflected changing, rather
than settled, meanings of the claim term under dispute. In the case, captioned ACTV, Inc. v.
Walt Disney Co., 346 F.3d 1082, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1516 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the parties
disputed the scope of the claim term “uniform resource locator.” Each party urged the court
to rely on one of two dueling reference documents, called Requests for Comments or RFCs,
from the internet standard setting body known as the World Wide Web Consortium. Id. at
1088-89, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1520-21. The Federal Circuit rejected both reference
documents on the ground that they did not reflect a settled meaning for the target term:
The purpose of the RFCs is . . . to collect commentary and to select language to
facilitate a common understanding, or to select a standard, from a variety of
competing technologies and vocabularies and from a variety of potentially
competing interests. . . . This purpose is in sharp contrast to the role of dictionaries
and treatises, which aim not to select or give meaning to a word or phrase, but to
report the meaning already established and commonly understood by those skilled
in the art. . . . Because the RFCs were not designed to reflect common usage, but
rather to assign language to facilitate further conversation, and because of the
seeming contradictions between RFC 1738 and RFC 1808, we conclude that both
documents are extrinsic evidence . . . [and] we decline to rely on them in our claim
construction analysis.
Id., 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
The reader interested in learning more about the role of RFCs in developing internet
standards should consult Scott Bradner, The Internet Engineering Task Force, in OPEN
SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION 47, 50 (Chris DeBona et al. eds.,
1999).
162. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
163. 336 F.3d 1308, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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frequency carrier” in a patent claim covering a wired broadcasting
system.164 The district court, relying on both the McGraw-Hill Dictionary
of Scientific and Technical Terms and Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate
Dictionary, construed “high frequency” to mean between three and thirty
MHz.165 The Federal Circuit, for its part, affirmed this construction of
“high frequency,” relying on the same dictionaries as the district court.166
In reaching this conclusion, the Federal Circuit rejected the patentee’s
contention that it was improper to define “high frequency” so narrowly
given the existence of dictionaries that define the phrase more broadly.
Specifically, the patentee presented broader definitions from both the
Oxford English Dictionary and the Dictionary of Electronics.167 The
Federal Circuit resolved the apparent problem with the broader definitions
by pointing out, with the help of extended quotations from them, that they
also included the narrower equation of “high frequency” with “3 to 30
megahertz.”168 In other words, without expressly stating it, the court used
the first of the two methodologies described above: take as the ordinary
meaning only that which is common to multiple dictionary definitions. The
narrower construction of “high frequency” precluded infringement
liability.169 Less than a year later the court shifted ground to the other
methodology.
In Nystrom v. TREX Co.,170 the Federal Circuit construed the noun
“board” in a patent claim covering a flooring board with a top surface
designed to slope gradually off to either side of the center.171 The patentee
contended that the word “board” covered both wood boards and synthetic
boards; the accused infringer, who made synthetic boards that otherwise
fell within the scope of the patent claims, contended that “board” covered
only wood boards.172 The district court, agreeing with the accused
infringer, construed “board” to mean “a piece of elongated construction
material made from wood cut from a log.”173 The Federal Circuit reversed
this construction, defining “board” as “an elongated, flat piece of wood or
other rigid material.”174

164. Id. at 1310-12, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388.
165. Id. at 1314-15, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
166. Id. at 1315-16, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389-90.
167. Id. at 1315, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390.
168. Id. at 1316 n.7, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390 (quoting from Oxford English
Dictionary and Dictionary of Electronics).
169. Id. at 1317, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391.
170. 374 F.3d 1105, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
171. Id. at 1107-08, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1243.
172. Id. at 1110-11, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245.
173. Id. at 1110, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245.
174. Id. at 1113, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247.
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Just as in UA-Columbia, the Federal Circuit confronted multiple,
differing dictionary definitions of the critical term. Specifically, Webster’s
Third New International Dictionary and American Heritage Dictionary
define “board” differently, and the difference is precisely the ‘wood only v.
wood and synthetic’ distinction. Webster’s Third defines “board,” in
relevant part, as “a piece of sawed lumber of little thickness but
considerable surface area usu. being rectangular and of a length greatly
exceeding its width.”175 American Heritage, by contrast, defines “board,”
in relevant part, as both “[a] long flat slab of sawed lumber; a plank” and
“[a] flat piece of wood or similarly rigid material adapted for a special
use.”176 The court quoted both definitions, noting that “[w]hile some
dictionaries define ‘board’ solely in reference to its material composition,
not all dictionaries are so constrained.”177
Had the Nystrom panel followed the same methodology as the UAColumbia panel, the court would have distilled from these disparate
definitions that which is common to both and thus defined “board” to mean
“a slab of sawed lumber.”178 Under that construction, it would have
affirmed the district court’s judgment of no liability. Instead, the court
adopted the opposite methodology—combining material mentioned in any
definition, rather than extracting material mentioned in all definitions.
According to the Federal Circuit, the differing Webster’s Third and
American Heritage definitions “show that the ordinary meaning of the
word ‘board’ encompasses both a piece of cut wood or sawn timber and a
similarly-shaped item made of rigid material.”179 The court did not cite,
much less discuss, the UA-Columbia case.
In the foregoing cases, the court’s dictionary selections and methods for
using dictionaries directly affected the liability outcome. It is, of course,
possible that in most other instances in which the Federal Circuit used one
or more dictionaries to help construe a claim term, the court would have
reached the very same outcome no matter what dictionary it used. But it is
not likely. Dictionary choice matters. And thus the need remains for a
principled, predictable dictionary selection method that shares the
neutrality of dictionary writing, i.e., that helps one get dictionary content
that is free from the biasing influence of the parties’ position-dictated views
175. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 243 (2002) (sense 3a). The
Addenda Section defines additional senses for the noun “board,” id. at 65a, but none of them
is relevant here. It is interesting to note that, had the Federal Circuit used one dictionary
alone (which is the more common technique), and that dictionary had been Webster’s Third
(which it cites most often, see Apps. B & C), the case could well have come out the opposite
way.
176. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 203 (4th ed. 2000).
177. Nystrom, 374 F.3d at 1111-12, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246.
178. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246.
179. Id., 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1246.
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or the judge’s purely personal preferences. The method we propose
achieves this predictability and neutrality by mandating that dictionary
selections be made before the parties to a dispute can know which
reference sources best favor the outcomes they desire—indeed, before the
patent, at the heart of a later dispute, even exists.
III. MOVING DICTIONARY CHOICE TO THE PATENT OFFICE
The presumption of ordinary meaning has great merit. A person of
ordinary skill in the art to which a patent pertains is knowledgeable about
both the art itself and the ways that people in the art talk and write about
their work. As a result, when a person of ordinary skill in the art reads a
patent, she looks at the words that the patentee has used in light of the
ordinary meaning that those words have to people skilled in the art.
Patentees surely know this about their readers. Only nonce words—words
that are coined for a single occasion180—often lack an ordinary meaning
outside the context of the patent. Patentees know this, too. It is thus quite
sensible to assume that, unless there is good evidence to the contrary, the
patentee has chosen the words in the written description and the claims of
the patent according to their ordinary meaning. The Federal Circuit’s
heavy presumption of ordinary meaning builds this insight into the claim
construction process.181
Consulting dictionaries and similar usage-based sources to determine
ordinary meaning also has great merit. Of course, even our most
comprehensive dictionaries cannot map all the linguistic terrain. As Robert
Burchfield, editor of the four-volume Supplement to the Oxford English

180. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1535 (2002) (defining
adjective “nonce” as “occurring, used, or made only once or for a special occasion”). The
highfalutin term is hapax legomenon. Id. at 1030. Nonce words can have an ordinary
meaning upon being coined if they are constructed using other well known words. For
example, no one who lived through or knew about the Nixon resignation had any trouble
understanding on first reading the popular press terms “travelgate” (the dustup over firings
at the White House Travel Office early in President Clinton’s first term), “nannygate” (the
sinking of President Clinton’s first nominee to be Attorney General, Zoë Baird, over her
having employed two illegal immigrants to work as nannies) or “zippergate” (a colorful
term for the Lewinsky scandal)—all of which are derived analogically from the Watergate
break-in scandal that destroyed the Nixon presidency. See generally Dieter Kastovsky,
Words and Word-Formation: Morphology in OED, in LEXICOGRAPHY AND THE OED:
PIONEERS IN THE UNTRODDEN FOREST 110, 113 (Lynda Mugglestone ed., 2000) (discussing
the ways in which “a nonce-formation can usually be satisfactorily interpreted by the
listener when he or she hears it for the first time”).
James A.H. Murray, the editor of the first edition of the Oxford English Dictionary,
coined the phrase “nonce word” to describe items that appeared in only one source. See 1
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY xxvii (2d ed. 1989) (“Words apparently employed only for
the nonce, are, when inserted in the Dictionary, marked nonce-wd.”); see also 10 OXFORD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 487 (2d ed. 1989) (definition 1, sense 4, of “nonce”).
181. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
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Dictionary from 1957 to 1986,182 put it, there is a “never-ending
raggedness, stretching away into the darkness, of our language at the
perimeter of what we can manage to put in our largest dictionaries.”183 All
the same, it is better to aid subjective memory with objective resources than
to rely on subjective memory alone. The Federal Circuit’s turn to
dictionaries as helpful reminders about the full range of a word’s ordinary
meaning to a person of ordinary skill follows, in this respect, a well-worn
judicial path.184 The empirical evidence discussed above, which shows that
all current members of the Federal Circuit have relied on dictionaries in
claim construction to at least a degree,185 strongly suggests that the court
will not stop using dictionaries altogether as a claim construction tool.186
The court’s dictionary selections in individual cases, however, remain
troublingly chaotic.
The Federal Circuit, having chosen to presume that patentees select
words for a claim according to their ordinary meaning, is right to seek out
this meaning in “unbiased reflections of common understanding” that are
“not colored by the motives of the parties, and not inspired by litigation.”187
The court cannot reach this goal, however, without identifying some
predictable basis upon which to deploy objective reference sources that
were publicly available to the patentee and others in the art at the time the
patent application was filed.
One might be tempted to conclude that the Federal Circuit can bring
about this predictability entirely on its own. We conclude otherwise. To
appreciate why, consider the following thought experiment: Imagine that
the court declares that, so far as it is concerned, (a) the definitive general
purpose English language dictionary is Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary, (b) it will consult one and only one general purpose English

182. See Robert Burchfield, Linguistic Milestones, in UNLOCKING THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 3, 3 (1989).
183. Id. at 19 (quoting a letter he wrote to Anthony Burgess, novelist and literary critic,
in 1986). One of the Federal Circuit’s predecessor courts made a similar point in discussing
the freedom the law gives every patentee to coin new words in a patent:
Often the invention is novel and words do not exist to describe it. The dictionary
does not always keep abreast of the inventor. It cannot. Things are not made for
the sake of words, but words for things. To overcome this lag, patent law allows
the inventor to be his own lexicographer.
Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697, 502 (Ct. Cl.
1967).
184. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
185. See infra Tbl. 7, App. B.
186. We concede that, as a formal matter, the en banc order in the Phillips case puts a
“no more dictionaries” option in play. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text. As a
practical matter, however, we do not think it is likely that the court will choose the “no more
dictionaries” option.
187. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203, 64 US.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1812, 1818 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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language dictionary, Webster’s Third, when determining a contested
claim’s ordinary meaning, and (c) it will consult the printing of Webster’s
Third that most closely precedes the disputed patent’s filing date. This
framework, which has the virtue of maximizing predictability (at least in
the short run), is far too brittle to survive. Its largest defect, apart from
grossly violating existing patentees’ settled expectations about the
acceptability of numerous dictionaries,188 is the failure to take any account
of the court’s preference, about thirty percent of the time, for specialized
reference sources.189
Imagine, then, that the court modifies the simple framework above to
include specialized reference sources. The court cannot limit itself to a
single specialized source because it reviews cases from numerous
technological domains. As the court tries to answer questions that
necessarily arise when it uses multiple sources, predictability quickly
begins to collapse. When should one use a specialized source rather than a
general purpose source? Should one use a single specialized source, or
multiple sources? Which source(s)?190 If one uses multiple sources, how
does one forge a single meaning from what they say as a group? Most of
these questions likely cannot be answered in a way that applies robustly
across a large number of patents, even within a single field of art.
Moreover, if the court somehow managed to provide answers that had
some staying power, the prior decision to permit use of only one general
purpose source (Webster’s Third in our hypothetical) would doubtless
come under relentless pressure from parties who stood to gain, in their
respective cases, from the use of a different general purpose dictionary
(e.g., American Heritage Dictionary). The task of drafting what amount to
complex dictionary citation regulations, in the guise of deciding cases,
would thus begin anew with the general purpose sources.191
188. This is not a small problem. The Supreme Court has cautioned the Federal Circuit
against violating patentees’ settled expectations with jarring retroactive changes to the rules
of the patent game. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S.
722, 739 (2002) (“[C]ourts must be cautious before adopting changes [to patent law] that
disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing community.”).
189. See supra Tbl. 8.
190. This question is probably the toughest for the court to answer. First, a single case is
simply not a good vehicle for issuing what amount to prospective regulations about
acceptable reference books. Second, even if it wanted to try to identify mandated reference
books case by case, the court does not have the institutional resources to determine, for any
given field at a given time, which specific reference books were the highest quality for claim
construction purposes. For example, which specialized reference is best for pharmaceutical
inventions made in the late 1980s? For computer software inventions made in the early
1990s? For semiconductor chip inventions made in 2000? Nor does the problem stand still.
As time rolls forward, the court would have to keep identifying the best reference sources
over and over again.
191. At least one commentator has concluded that choosing dictionaries for use in
statutory interpretation cases is better resolved by legislative than by judicial action. See
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV.
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This brief thought experiment should be enough to show that the Federal
Circuit, if forced to undertake the task alone, is ill suited to make dictionary
selection substantially more predictable. All the court alone can do, at least
at this time, is mandate a closed list of the reference sources it will consult.
Happily, the Federal Circuit is not alone.
The Patent Office, another key player in our patent system,192 is well
suited to deploy its power over patent examination procedure to render
dictionary selection far more predictable. And it can do so without relying
on closed source lists.193 Specifically, as we describe in detail below, the
Patent Office can and should require all patent applicants to state their
dictionary preferences, both general purpose and specialized, on the face of
their patent applications at the time of filing.194 In any subsequent claim
construction process, whether for licensing, design-around, or litigation
purposes, parties would look to the reference sources that the patentee
himself selected. The courts, including the Federal Circuit, would limit
themselves to the same patentee-selected resources when adjudicating a
claim construction dispute; they would do so in accordance with the
general principle that a patentee is bound in subsequent litigation by the
statements she made in the intrinsic patent record.195 The Patent Office
2085, 2143-48 (2002). According to Rosenkranz, “Congress could provide: ‘When Courts
have recourse to a dictionary in interpreting any federal statute enacted after this one, it shall
be the Oxford English Dictionary, second edition, and no other.’” Others, it must be said,
have criticized his proposals. See Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I?
Imposing Mandatory Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 20 CONST. COMMENT.
97 (2003).
192. See generally Rai, supra note 26.
193. Professor Wagner, in a recent article that wisely urges greater attention to the ex
ante effects of patent law doctrines, suggests that “a rule assigning the default meaning of
claim terms according to a standard dictionary would be beneficial,” at least “in the sense
that [the rule] would induce patentees to be clear about the meanings of the words they
choose for the claims.” R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration
and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 244 & n.312 (2002) (footnote omitted).
He notes, in connection with recommending “a standard dictionary,” that “the PTO could
promulgate an ‘official’ list of standard reference sources, related to technological field
where appropriate.” Id. at 244 n.311. Under this approach, “[c]laim terms would . . . be
presumed to take the meaning assigned in the standard source, unless the patentee clearly
designated a different meaning.” Id. The interim half of the proposal we describe below
resembles Professor Wagner’s approach, although we do not think it is advisable for the
Patent Office to devote resources to developing a consensus about which reference sources
merit inclusion on an official agency list. See infra Part III.C.3. We propose, instead, that
each patent examiner have the flexibility to specify, in the context of each separate patent
application, which reference sources will be consulted absent objection from the applicant.
See infra Part III.C.2.
194. See infra Part III.C.
195. See, e.g., Springs Window Fashions LP v. Novo Indus., L.P., 323 F.3d 989, 995, 65
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1826, 1830 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The public notice function of a patent and
its prosecution history requires that a patentee be held to what he declares during the
prosecution of his patent.”); Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d 1379, 1384, 49
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1144, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The public is entitled to rely upon the
public record of a patent in determining the scope of the patent’s claims.”); Key Pharms. v.
Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 716-17, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911, 1917 (Fed. Cir.
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would thus, in effect, add another facet to the longstanding practice of
allowing patentees to provide controlling express definitions for any claim
terms in the body of the patent.196 Put another way, patentees, who are
already empowered to be their own lexicographers, i.e., dictionary writers,
would also be their own dictionary choosers. Such an approach provides
courts with a way to use dictionaries that is both highly predictable and
tailored to each patent. This rule’s properly cognizable cost to the
applicant is small, and the benefit to those who must construe the patent in
the future is large.
Before elaborating on our proposed change to the Patent Office’s
procedural rules, we address two questions that might arise about the Patent
Office playing any role in dictionary selection: whether compelling
dictionary selection falls within the agency’s power over examination
procedure; and whether appropriate dictionary selections can be made at
the time the patent application is filed. The short answer to both questions
is, “Yes.”
A. Patent Office Power Over Dictionary Choice
The Patent Act grants the Patent Commissioner “broad powers” over
PTO practice.197 It is equally clear, however, that “Congress has not vested
the Commissioner with any general substantive rulemaking power.”198
1998) (“Competitors are entitled to rely on the public record of the patent, and if the
meaning of the patent is plain, the public record is conclusive.”); Vitronics Corp. v.
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(“[C]ompetitors are entitled to review the public record, apply the established rules of claim
construction, ascertain the scope of the patentee’s claimed invention and, thus, design
around the claimed invention.”); see also Riverwood Int’l Corp. v. R.A. Jones & Co., 324
F.3d 1346, 1354, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1331, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“This court and its
predecessor have held that a statement by an applicant during prosecution identifying certain
matter not the work of the inventor as ‘prior art’ is an admission that the matter is prior
art.”).
196. See 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 350 F.3d 1365, 1371,
1374, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1050, 1054-55, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565,
1569, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1137, 1140-41 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 441,
164 U.S.P.Q. 619, 622 (C.C.P.A. 1970); Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397,
155 U.S.P.Q. 697, 702 (Ct. Cl. 1967). The leading claim drafting guide recommends the
following technique: “When one wishes to impart a special meaning to a word or phrase
appearing in the claims, one should define that word or phrase in the specification; for
example, ‘As used in this description and in the appended claims, the word “__” means
“__.”’” ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 19, at III15 (4th ed. 2001).
197. Gerritsen v. Shirai, 979 F.2d 1524, 1528, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1912, 1915 (Fed.
Cir. 1992); see also id. at 1527 n.3, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1915 n.3 (“Congress thus
delegated plenary authority over PTO practice, including interference proceedings, to the
Commissioner.”); Stevens v. Tamai, 366 F.3d 1325, 1333, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1765, 1771 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (same).
198. Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1550, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347, 1351
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Specifically, the Patent Act gives the Commissioner the power to “establish
regulations, not inconsistent with law, which . . . shall govern the conduct
of proceedings in the Office,”199 i.e., to make procedural rules that bind
patent applicants. When the Patent Office promulgates a rule under this
grant of power, it must use notice-and-comment rulemaking in accordance
with the Administrative Procedure Act.200 The Federal Circuit, in turn,
gives such a procedural rule controlling weight unless it is “‘arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’”201 One might wonder,
against this backdrop, whether the Patent Office has the power to require
every patent applicant to state, on the face of her application, what publicly
available general purpose and specialized dictionaries she wants the Office
to use in the event it needs help from such sources to construe the scope of
her proposed claims. In short, is such a dictionary rule procedural? If it is,
the Patent Office has the power to promulgate it.
It is important, when analyzing the divide between procedural and
substantive rules in the patent law context, to keep in mind the Patent
Office’s primary task—to assess the patentability of the inventions put
before it by applicants. The Patent Act broadly provides that, when it
receives a patent application, the Patent Office “shall cause an examination
to be made of the application and the alleged new invention” to assess its
patentability under the Act.202 A patent issues to the applicant, upon
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (rejecting Patent Office’s contention that its gap-filling interpretation of
two complex patent term provisions was a substantive agency regulation entitled, if
reasonable, to controlling deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)); see also Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Quigg, 932
F.2d 920, 930, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1677, 1686 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (concluding that Patent
Office policy regarding the substantive reach of the Patent Act’s “patentable subject matter”
provision, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988), was merely an interpretive rule and thus not required to
be established through “notice and comment” rulemaking).
199. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(A) (2001). From 1952 to 1999, this grant of power was set
forth in 35 U.S.C. § 6. See Intellectual Property and Communications Omnibus Reform Act
of 1999, 113 Stat. 1501A-521 to 603, § 4712 (pp. 572-73, amending 35 U.S.C. § 2). The
Patent Office has had this power over examination procedure since 1870. See Act of July 8,
1870, ch. 230, § 19, 16 Stat. 198, 200 (“[T]he Commissioner, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior, may from time to time establish rules and regulations, not
inconsistent with law, for the conduct of proceedings in the patent office.”).
200. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2001) (establishing “notice and comment” rulemaking); 35
U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(B) (requiring that Patent Office procedural rules “shall be made in
accordance with section 553 of title 5, United States Code”). The current rules governing
the conduct of Patent Office proceedings are codified in Title 37 of the Code of Federal
Regulations. For a concise description of notice-and-comment rulemaking in federal
agencies, see 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.3 (4th ed. 2002).
There is no question that the Patent Office is an “agency” for purposes of the Administrate
Procedure Act. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999).
201. In re Sullivan, 362 F.3d 1324, 1328, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1145, 1149 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984)) (rejecting challenge to validity of Patent Office procedural rule); Tamai, 366 F.3d at
1333-34, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1771-72 (upholding reasonableness of Patent Office
procedural rule).
202. 35 U.S.C. § 131. As the Federal Circuit has succinctly stated, “It is the PTO’s duty
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payment of the proper fees,203 “if on such examination it appears that the
applicant is entitled to a patent under law.”204 To assess a claim’s
compliance with each of the Patent Act’s substantive patentability
requirements—utility,205 novelty,206 nonobviousness,207 and an adequately
supporting written disclosure208—a patent examiner must establish the
scope of the claim under review.209 The Patent Act alone, however,
provides only sparsely phrased general requirements for what an applicant
must do to present a proper patent application.210 To flesh out the details of
this minimalist statutory framework, the Patent Office has promulgated
detailed regulations governing the manner in which an applicant must
present her materials.211
Many of the Patent Office’s regulations governing patent applications
appear designed to facilitate an examiner’s prompt and efficient
comprehension of the scope of the applicant’s proposed claims. For
example, to implement the Patent Act’s broadly framed requirement of a
to assure that the statutory requirements for patentability are met.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d
1048, 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
203. 35 U.S.C. § 151.
204. Id. § 131.
205. Id. § 101; see also MUELLER, supra note 22, at 155-59 (discussing utility
requirement).
206. 35 U.S.C. § 102; see also MUELLER, supra note 22, at 91, 93 (discussing novelty
requirements).
207. 35 U.S.C. § 103; see also MUELLER, supra note 22, at 131-34 (discussing
nonobviousness requirement).
208. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1; see also MUELLER, supra note 22, at 65-67 (discussing best
mode, enablement, and written description requirements).
209. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103, 112 (referring throughout to “the invention”); see also
Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 147 F.3d 1358, 1362, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1027,
1029 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The first step in any invalidity or infringement analysis is claim
construction.”); In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 494, 496
(C.C.P.A. 1970) (“All words in a claim must be considered in judging the patentability of
that claim against the prior art.”). It is thus no surprise that the Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure, the Patent Office’s official “set of instructions to the examining corps,” In re
Kaghan, 387 F.2d 398, 401, 156 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 130, 132 (C.C.P.A. 1967), includes a
lengthy discussion of important claim construction principles. See U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE §§ 2111, 2173.05(a) (8th ed. 2001, rev. ed. 2003) [hereinafter MPEP], available
at http://www.uspto.gov/ web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html; see also Refac Int’l, Ltd. v.
Lotus Dev. Corp., 81 F.3d 1576, 1584 n.2, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1665, 1671 n.2 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (“The MPEP does not have the force and effect of law; however, it is entitled to
judicial notice as the agency’s official interpretation of statutes or regulations, provided that
it is not in conflict with the statutes or regulations.”).
210. 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(2) (requiring that an application contain “a specification as
prescribed by” 35 U.S.C. § 112, “a drawing as prescribed by” 35 U.S.C. § 113, and “an oath
by the applicant as prescribed by” 35 U.S.C. § 115). A special preliminary application,
called a “provisional application,” can be filed without including any separately numbered
claim paragraphs. Id. § 111(b)(2); see also MUELLER, supra note 22, at 378. The existence
of this sort of preliminary patent does not alter the points discussed here.
211. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.51-1.59 (2004) (application); §§ 1.63-1.69 (inventor’s oath); §§
1.71-1.79 (specification); §§ 1.81-1.85 (drawings); §§ 1.97-1.98 (information disclosure
statement); §§ 1.801-1.825 (biotechnology invention disclosures).
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specification that describes the invention and ends with numbered
claims,212 the Patent Office details both the materials the specification must
contain213 and the order in which those materials must be arranged.214
Similarly, to implement the Patent Act’s broadly framed provision about
illustrative drawings,215 the Patent Office maintains highly detailed
regulations governing the form and content of patent drawings.216 All these
regulations, which no doubt have some incidental effect on the substance of
applicants’ resulting patent rights, are framed with the primary goal of
structuring the patent examination process to facilitate accurate and
efficient assessment of claim patentability. These rules are thus procedural,
in that they are designed not to shape the primary behavior of inventors
(e.g., inventors’ decisions to invent new solutions to problems or, instead,
use known solutions), but rather to improve the accuracy and efficiency of
inventors’ engagement with government officials who assess their legal
rights.217
Most interestingly, for our purposes, the Patent Office has already
promulgated a regulation directly targeted at helping an examiner readily
understand the words in the claims. Specifically, the Patent Office
expressly requires that a patent application “[b]e in the English language or
be accompanied by a translation of the application . . . into the English
language together with a statement that the translation is accurate.”218 This
procedural rule, by making the meaning of an applicant’s claim words
more readily accessible to the patent examiner, helps the Office more
accurately and efficiently determine the scope of the claim to which the
applicant asserts an entitlement.

212. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶¶ 1, 2.
213. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.71-1.75.
214. § 1.77(b).
215. 35 U.S.C. § 113.
216. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.83-1.84.
217. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding
that one can distinguish substantive and procedural rules “by inquiring if the choice of rule
would substantially affect . . . primary decisions respecting human conduct”); S.A. Healy
Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewarage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 310 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.)
(asserting that a state rule has a substantive goal if it is “designed to shape conduct outside
the courtroom and not just improve the accuracy or lower the cost of the judicial process”).
We owe this formulation to LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 19-21 & n.49 (U.
San Diego, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 04-02, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=508282. See also Thomas W. Merrill,
The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 46 n.200 (1985)
(“Substantive rules . . . guide the conduct of persons outside the courtroom, before they are
drawn into litigation. By negative implication, ‘procedural’ rules are those that would not
affect behavior in . . . ‘everyday, prelitigation life.’”).
218. 37 C.F.R. § 1.52(b)(ii); see also § 1.52(d) (requiring English translations of nonEnglish applications). There is also a similar provision requiring translation of any nonEnglish documents that parties submit in an interference proceeding at the Patent Office.
See § 1.647.
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Our proposed rule, by mandating that all applicants identify on the face
of their applications their preferred general and specialized reference
sources for defining claim terms, is akin to the “use English or translate”
rule. If promulgated, it would help the examiner better understand the
scope of the claim that an applicant seeks to patent. Specifically, if an
examiner were in doubt about the meaning of a claim word, and thus about
the scope of the proposed claim, she could consult the applicant-identified
reference sources for assistance. Indeed, such dictionary consultation is
fully consistent with the established Patent Office practice of giving a claim
term its broadest reasonable construction during examination.219 The
Federal Circuit has, in at least three post-Markman cases on direct review
from Patent Office rejections, used dictionaries to help establish the
broadest reasonable construction of a claim term.220 The examiner could
also use the reference sources to help explain to the applicant her
evaluation of the claim’s patentability. Of course, if none of the claim
words raised doubts for the examiner that consulting an applicant-identified
source would resolve, she might not consult the applicant-identified
dictionaries at all. In any event, the dictionaries would have been identified
for later use in design-around, licensing, and litigation settings.
We know anecdotally that examiners sometimes cite and quote
dictionary definitions in their interactions with patent applicants.221 Our
proposed rule would thus simply transform a sporadic practice into a
regularized one. The rule is procedural because it is aimed at regulating
patent applicants’ engagement with the machinery of the patent system, not
their innovation behavior outside the patent system. Nor would our rule, if
adopted, be the first time that the Patent Office has adjusted the application
process to take account of the Federal Circuit’s post-Markman claim
construction jurisprudence. Specifically, in June 2003, the Patent Office
219. See MPEP, supra note 209, § 2111, at 2100-46; see also In re Morris, 127 F.3d
1048, 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[A]s an initial matter, the
PTO applies to the verbiage of the proposed claims the broadest reasonable meaning of the
words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the
art”). The policy justification for this approach is that, if the broadest reasonable
construction of a claim term creates a patentability problem for the applicant, the applicant
has the opportunity to respond to the problem with an appropriate change in claim language.
See In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664, 1667 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Indeed, this approach “promotes the development of the written record before the PTO that
provides the requisite written notice to the public as to what the applicant claims as the
invention.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1027.
220. In re Thrift, 298 F.3d 1357, 1364, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2002, 2006 (Fed. Cir.
2002); Hyatt, 211 F.3d at 1371, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1666; In re Morris, 127 F.3d at
1056, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1029.
221. See, e.g., Cordis Corp. v. Medtronics AVE, Inc., 339 F.3d 1352, 1359, 67
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1876, 1879 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (during reexamination prosecution, the
examiner used the definition of the claim word “slots” from Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary to help explain to the applicant how a prior art reference showed the claimed
structure).
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modified its regulation requiring an “Abstract” in every application,222 first
promulgated in 1966,223 to conform the rule to the Federal Circuit’s claim
construction case law.224 From 1966 to 2003, the rule requiring an abstract
had ended with the statement that “[t]he abstract will not be used for
interpreting the scope of the claims.”225 In Hill-Rom Co. v. Kinetic
Concepts, Inc., however, the Federal Circuit concluded that,
notwithstanding the text of the Office’s abstract rule, there was “no legal
principle that would require [it] to disregard [a] potentially helpful source
of intrinsic evidence as to the meaning of claims.”226 The Patent Office
expressly relied on Hill-Rom to explain its deletion of the final sentence in
its 2003 revision to the rule.227 Given the far greater number of times the
Federal Circuit has cited a dictionary, compared to a patent abstract, a
Patent Office rule regularizing dictionary selection by patent applicants
would be even better grounded than this recent change to the abstract
requirement.
In sum, a rule mandating that all applicants specify their preferred
general purpose and specialized reference sources on the face of their
applications falls well within the ambit of the Patent Office’s plenary
power over examination procedure.
B. There’s No Time Like the Filing Date
It might seem odd, at first blush, to suggest that one should improve a
litigation technique by making a change to the start of an administrative
process that begins several years earlier.228 Upon reflection, however, it is
clear that the best time to regularize the selection of objective reference
sources for claim construction is the time a patent application is first filed.

222. 37 C.F.R. § 1.72(b).
223. 31 Fed. Reg. 12922, 12922 (Oct. 4, 1966) (adopting § 1.72(b)).
224. 68 Fed. Reg. 38611, 38614 (June 30, 2003) (describing new rule); id. at 38621
(Comment 18); id. at 38628 (text of new version of 37 C.F.R. § 1.72(b)).
225. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 1.72(b) (1967); 37 C.F.R. § 1.72(b) (1983); 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.72(b) (2003).
226. 209 F.3d 1337, 1341 n.*, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437, 1440 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
227. 68 Fed. Reg. at 38614, 38621. Interestingly, this brings the abstract rule full circle:
when it was first proposed in 1966, the rule did not include the statement that the Patent
Office would not use the abstract for claim construction. 31 Fed. Reg. 4412, 4412 (Mar. 15,
1966) (providing language of proposed Rule 1.75).
228. It takes an average of just over two years for a patent application to mature into an
issued patent.
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2003 19 [hereinafter
PERFORMANCE REPORT] (reporting average total pendency time of 26.7 months for fiscal
year 2003), available at http://www.ustpo.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2003/ index.html. In
addition, patentees who sue on their patents typically do so within two to four years of a
patent’s issue date. See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 454
(2004) (Figure 1). Adding these two typical time periods together, the filing date of a patent
application is likely to precede the filing date of a patent suit by about four to six years.
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First, a dictionary selection policy implemented at the time of filing is
comprehensive. All patents result from the examination process.229 It is
therefore certain that any patent that is in litigation today was the subject of
an examination process at some point in the past. In light of this basic fact
about patent administration, the best way to ensure that an informationforcing rule such as the one proposed here provides the greatest public
benefit is to make it part of the patent examination process.230
Second, an application’s filing date is one of the key touchstones of
every patentability analysis. As has already been noted, the Office cannot
evaluate the patentability of a claim without construing the scope of that
claim.231 The claim itself must therefore be sufficiently definite to make it
amenable to construction, and the Patent Act expressly requires that claims
be definite.232 Claim definiteness is assessed as of the application’s filing
date.233 Similarly, all three doctrines that test a written disclosure’s
adequacy to support the applicant’s claims—best mode, enablement, and
written description—are assessed as of the application’s filing date.234
Finally, the content of the prior art that is used to assess both novelty and
nonobviousness is expressly tied, in part, to the application’s filing date.235
229. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2001) (requiring an application); id. § 131 (requiring examination
of the application).
230. See Wagner, supra note 193, at 198-209 (explaining the great importance of
information-forcing rules that are put in place at the patent examination stage).
231. See id. at 204 (“Patent scope determinations occur during patent prosecution and
during litigation (possibly years apart).”) (footnote omitted).
232. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention.”); see also MUELLER, supra note 22, at 40-45 (discussing claim
definiteness requirement). As the Federal Circuit explained in its recent decision in
Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 35 U.S.C. § 112 “requires ‘that the claims be
amenable to construction, however difficult that task may be.’” 341 F.3d 1332, 1338, 68
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v.
United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1272, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
233. See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1556-57, 220
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 303, 316 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (overturning trial court’s conclusion that claims
were invalid for indefiniteness, on the ground that “subsequently developed and therefore
irrelevant formulae cannot be used to render non-enabling or indefinite that which was
enabling and definite at the time the application was filed”).
234. Transco Prods. Inc. v. Performance Contracting Inc., 38 F.3d 551, 557, 32
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1077, 1082 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (best mode); Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar,
935 F.2d 1555, 1563-64, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1111, 1116-17 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (written
description); Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384, 231
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (enablement); see also MUELLER, supra note 22, at
68 (“The patent application must comply with the disclosure requirements when it is
filed.”).
235. The content of the prior art is determined according to 35 U.S.C. § 102, both for
novelty and nonobviousness purposes. See MUELLER, supra note 22, at 94, 139. Subections
(b) and (d) are expressly tied to the filing date of the application under review. And
subsections (a), (e), and (g), although tied to the invention date of the application under
review, often rely on the filing date as a proxy for the invention date: the Patent Office
“presumptively treats the applicant’s filing date as her invention date (based on a
constructive reduction to practice theory) for purposes of applying [subsections] (a), (e), and
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It is plainly appropriate, in light of the filing date’s central role in all
patentability analysis, to require that a patent applicant identify at that time
her preferred objective reference sources for use in claim construction.
Third, mandating that an applicant express his dictionary preferences on
the filing date comports with two separate temporal restrictions on a
patent’s written content. The Patent Act expressly provides that, in the
course of amending claims and correcting the supporting disclosure in
response to points raised by the patent examiner, an applicant cannot make
any substantive addition to the patent disclosure. In the words of the Patent
Act, “[n]o amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the
invention.”236 The Patent Act similarly restricts changes to drawings
included in a patent. Specifically, section 113 of the Act provides that an
applicant “shall furnish a drawing where necessary for the understanding of
the subject matter sought to be patented.”237 The courts have long looked
to drawings for whatever help they provide in construing disputed claim
terms.238 Importantly, section 113 expressly precludes consulting a postfiling drawing to help construe claim terms: “Drawings submitted after the
filing date of the application may not be used . . . to supplement the original
disclosure thereof for the purpose of interpretation of the scope of any
claim.”239 Augmenting these filing-date based restrictions on patent
content with a dictionary selection requirement will help keep the focus of
the claim construction process on the content of the originally filed patent
document.
Fourth, requiring an applicant to name her preferred dictionaries is not,
in fact, all that dramatic a departure from current patent drafting or
examination practice. For example, experienced patent drafters already
advise those who are learning the trade to consult dictionaries and similar
sources to ensure a high-quality patent.240 Patentees sometimes expressly
(g), unless and until the applicant proves an earlier actual invention date.” MUELLER, supra
note 22, at 95 (footnote omitted).
236. 35 U.S.C. § 132(a). According to Professor Mueller, “The fundamental principle
underlying the new matter prohibition is that ‘the invention described in the original patent
[or application] must not be changed.’” MUELLER, supra note 22, at 68 n.14 (quoting In re
Oda, 443 F.2d 1200, 1203, 170 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 268, 270-71 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
237. 35 U.S.C. § 113.
238. Autogiro Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 398, 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697, 703
(Ct. Cl. 1967) (“In those instances where a visual representation can flesh out words,
drawings may be used in the same manner and with the same limitations as the
specification.”); Kemco Sales, Inc. v. Control Papers Co., 93 F. Supp. 2d 563, 570 (D.N.J.
1998) (same), aff’d, 208 F.3d 1352, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Indeed,
drawings may be sufficient, by themselves, to provide a written disclosure that supports
claims. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1565, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(“[U]nder proper circumstances, drawings alone may provide a “written description” of an
invention as required by § 112.”).
239. 35 U.S.C. § 113(ii).
240. See, e.g., FABER, supra note 196, § 19, at III-16 (“In most cases, the inventor or a
mechanical dictionary can supply the precise name for a part in any specific embodiment.”);
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rely on particular dictionaries in their patents to help explain the meaning
of claim terms.241 In addition, we know that examiners sometimes cite
dictionaries to applicants to help explain why a claim term should be
construed in a particular manner.242 It is safe to conclude, on the basis of
these informal, occasional practices, that patent practitioners will readily
adapt to the dictionary selection requirement we propose.
Fifth, and finally, one might still object that dictionary selection at the
filing stage is unworkable because, at that time, the applicant lacks the
context necessary to make a meaningful choice among competing reference
sources—context that a live dispute with another party about claim scope
would provide. However, this objection simply denies the wisdom in the
Federal Circuit’s view that it is better to enrich claim construction with
reference sources that are “not colored by the motives of the parties” to a
dispute, “and not inspired by litigation.”243 If reference sources are to be
more than mere props in a post hoc justification game, patentee pleas for
“more context” should be set aside.
C. Changing Patent Office Rules to Regularize Dictionary Choice
To make dictionary consultation more predictable, for design-around,
licensing, and litigation purposes, the Patent Office should require all
patent applicants to state their dictionary preferences (general purpose and
specialized) on the face of their patent applications at the time they file
them. Such a rule is well within the Patent Office’s regulatory power over
examination procedure,244 and the time of filing is an appropriate one at
which to require applicants to state their preferences.245
The new regime we propose would be more predictable than the
effectively random approach to choosing dictionaries that the courts,
including the Federal Circuit, use now. There will, of course, be a cost to
achieving this increased predictability. Is this cost offset by at least as
JEFFREY G. SHELDON, HOW TO WRITE A PATENT APPLICATION § 6.3.5.1.3, at 6-32 (PLI
Press, 2001) (“A thesaurus and a dictionary are indispensable tools for the practitioner and
should be frequently referred to when preparing the claims.”).
241. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,972,909 (issued Nov. 27, 1990) at col. 1, ll. 50-60
(citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (G&G Merriam 1967) to help
define claim term “caulk,” spelled “caulk” in the dictionary), at http://www. uspto.gov (on
file with the American University Law Review); U.S. Patent No. 6,708,400 (issued Mar. 23,
2004) at col. 7, ll. 32-40, at http://www.uspto.gov (on file with the American University
Law Review) (quoting Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary to help define claim term
“particulate”),
242. See In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1664, 1667 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (discussing the examiner’s use of Webster’s New International Dictionary to give the
term “sharing” its broadest common meaning).
243. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1203, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1812, 1818 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
244. See supra Part III.A.
245. See supra Part III.B.
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large a savings in patent licensing and litigation costs, such that our
proposed change yields a net social benefit? We think it is. Admittedly, as
is usually the case in such patent reform discussions, we can offer only the
roughest estimates of our proposal’s costs and benefits.246 These estimates,
however, make quite a persuasive case.
The primary cost of implementing our proposal, apart from the initial
cost of promulgating the regulation itself, would be the increased cost of
preparing a patent application for initial filing. Specifically, the patent
drafter would take some time to determine which reference sources are
preferable for the application at hand and pass along the cost of this time to
her client.247 In estimating this cost, one must keep in mind two important
background facts.
First, the drafter’s additional cost of choosing reference sources for a
single application is likely to be very low. Above an obvious minimum
quality threshold, the precise identity of the reference sources named
matters far less than the simple fact that some specific sources are named
(thereby eliminating uncertainty about which sources the courts will
consult if litigation occurs). That this is so becomes plain when one
considers the fact pattern that prompts one to turn to dictionaries in the first
place: namely, the inevitable occasion where one wants more guidance on
the meaning of a claim term than the patent itself provides, because the
drafter did not foresee the need to choose a more precise word or phrase to
cover the point in question. Of course, where the drafter did foresee the
need for a precise word or phrase, she consulted the appropriate reference
sources to ensure proper word choice or, alternatively, drafted express
definitions for inclusion in the body of the patent. The cost of thoroughly
addressing foreseeable scenarios is already a cost of patent preparation
today, and it would continue to be a cost of patent preparation were our
proposal adopted. Given that we turn to dictionaries to cope with the
unforeseeable, it makes little sense for a patent applicant to invest more in
choosing dictionaries than it takes to identify one or two sources with a
good, solid reputation. So, for example, a rational patent drafter will not
246. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U.
L. REV. 1495 (2001) (arguing that revising the patent review procedures to require a more
thorough examination of all patent applications is unnecessary given that litigation occurs
for only a minority of patents and that most patents are never licensed). Only rough
estimates are possible concerning our proposal because there are no reliable data on (a) how
many patents are licensed, (b) how much it costs, on average, to negotiate a patent license,
(c) how many patents, whether licensed or not, are the subject of formal infringement or
validity analysis, or (d) how much it costs, on average, to conduct such a formal analysis.
Id. at 1507-08.
247. In the context of in-house counsel, who do not bill the client in this manner, the cost
is born in the form of a reduced number of applications the drafter can prepare in a given
unit of time.
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choose a dictionary by looking up every word in a draft claim in several
dictionaries in an effort to see which one is “best.”
Second, however high or low the drafter’s additional cost of reference
source selection may be for a single application, the drafter spreads that
cost over a large number of patent applications involving similar
technology. As a result, the average cost of dictionary selection will be far
lower than the cost of dictionary selection for the first application a drafter
prepares in a given technology.
It is possible, against this backdrop, to give a rough estimate of the
annual increased patent preparation cost that our proposal entails.
According to the American Intellectual Property Law Association’s
(“AIPLA”) most recent biennial survey of, among other things, patent
prosecution and litigation costs, the national median costs of preparing and
filing “relatively complex” applications in the three main technological
areas are as follows:
(a) biotechnology/chemical, $10,001; (b)
electrical/computer, $9,995; and (c) mechanical, $8,001.248 The average
median cost across these technologies is $9,332.33. Assume, for purposes
of this analysis, that selecting reference sources increases the average
preparation cost by 1%, or $93.32, per application.249 The Patent Office
receives just over 330,000 utility patent applications a year,250 about 28%
of which are continuation applications,251 i.e., applications that simply reinitiate the examination process on an application that was filed at least
once before.252 Of course, an application will entail the dictionary selection
248. AIPLA, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 88 tbl. 21 (2003) [hereinafter SURVEY].
249. We think this estimate is actually far higher than would likely be the case, and thus
overstates the cost of our proposal. If, however, the benefits of the proposal outweigh even
this overstated cost, we can be confident that the proposed change produces a net social
benefit.
250. See PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 228, at 106 tbl. 1 (providing a summary of
patent examining activities for the fiscal years 1999-2003). In particular, from 2001-2003,
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office received over 330,000 patent applications per year.
Id. However, in 1999 and 2000, the Patent Office received under 330,000 patent
applications. Id.
251. The principal empirical study of these applications reports that, during fiscal years
1993-1998, “28.4% of the utility, plant, and reissue (UPR) applications in those years were
not new or original applications, but were continuing applications claiming the benefit of the
filing dates of previously filed applications.” Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. & Ogden H. Webster,
Continuing Patent Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
11 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 3 (2001); see also id. at 16 tbl.1. The Quillen & Webster data group
utility patent applications with plant and reissue applications. Id. at 3. Only the utility
applications, however, are of interest in this study. Their 28% figure remains a good
estimate for continuing applications for utility patents alone because reissue and plant patent
applications make up such a small portion of the total number of applications filed in a
given year. For example, in fiscal year 2003, the Patent Office received 331,729 utility
applications, 785 plant applications, and 938 reissue applications. PERFORMANCE REPORT,
supra note 228, at 106 tbl. 1. Similarly, in fiscal year 2002, the Patent Office received
331,580 utility applications, 1,134 plant applications, and 974 reissue applications. Id.
252. For a concise explanation of continuation applications in U.S. patent practice, see
Quillen, Jr. & Webster, supra note 251, at 4-6.
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cost only the first time it is filed. Using the one percent increase
assumption, then, we estimate the annual increase in preparation cost to be
$22,172,832.253
Would making dictionary selection part of the patent examination
process save at least $22.2 million a year? We think it would. One source
of savings would be court cases that are not filed at all because greater
agreement on the likely construction of an arguable claim term makes
litigation unnecessary. According to the AIPLA’s most recent biennial
survey, the national median cost of a full patent trial in which $1 to $25
million is at risk is $2 million per side, i.e., $4 million.254 If six such trials
are avoided every year, the new rule has both paid for itself and yielded a
small social benefit; additional avoided trials are pure benefit. Given that
about 1,900 utility patent infringement cases are filed every year,255 and
that about ninety-five of these cases are fully tried,256 avoiding six trials
does not seem like that tall an order. Alternatively, the national median
cost of taking through discovery a patent infringement case in which $1 to
$25 million is at risk is $1,001,000 per side, i.e., $2 million.257 If twelve
such cases are avoided every year, the new rule has both paid for itself and
yielded a small social benefit. Again, this is not too high a hurdle, given
the 1,600 cases filed annually. Given that the Federal Circuit used
dictionaries to help construe claim terms in twenty-six separate appeals in
2003, and another twenty separate appeals in the first half of 2004, it seems
safe to conclude that the annual litigation savings that our proposal would
generate would more than cover the cost of requiring all applicants to state
their dictionary preferences.
Another source of savings would be less costly license negotiations. The
savings mechanism in licensing, as in avoided litigation, is greater
agreement among the parties on the likely construction of an arguable
claim term. There are virtually no reliable data about how many of the
roughly 180,000 patents that issue each year258 are licensed for revenue.259
253. (330,000 applications per year) x (72% originally filed) x ($93.32 per application) =
$22,172,832.00 per year.
254. SURVEY, supra note 248, at 93 tbl. 22.
255. See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic
Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 903 tbl. 1 (2001) (indicating that, from
1995 to 1999, district courts resolved about 1,900 utility patent infringement cases per year).
256. See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Piece
Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 384 & tbl. 1 (2000) (reporting that from 1983
to 1999, the annual number of full patent trials ranged from a low of seventy-three to a high
of 112, with an average of ninety-five).
257. SURVEY, supra note 248, at 93 tbl. 22.
258. See PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 228, at 106 tbl. 1 (reporting the annual
number of allowed patents for the fiscal years 1999-2003, however failing to note how
many of those patents were licensed for revenue). From 1999-2003, the number of allowed
patent applications rose from year to year, averaging out to 186,607 applications per year.
Id.
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Professor Lemley, in his study of the costs and benefits of various patent
law reform proposals, estimates that about 3.5% of issued patents are
licensed for revenue, and that the cost to an industry of negotiating a
license with the patentee is $100,000.260 Using these assumptions, along
with an estimate that the identification of dictionaries on the face of the
patent lowers the licensing cost by one percent, the annual savings is
$6,300,000.261 This licensing savings alone covers twenty-eight percent of
the increased patent preparation cost of our proposal. Using a licensing
cost discount of 5%, which we think is more likely, our proposed rule
generates an annual licensing cost savings of $31,500,000,262 i.e., 142% of
the estimated increase in annual patent preparation costs.
Finally, a key source of savings would be avoided dead weight loss,
achieved through more effective competition against patentees from those
who have designed around their patents. Dictionaries named on the face of
all patents will reduce the uncertainty of a competitor’s analysis of the
scope of the claim; the reduced uncertainty will, in turn, facilitate more
rapidly achieved and more numerous design-arounds. Competition from
these design-arounds will help drive down the patentee’s price to marginal
cost, thereby helping trim dead weight loss. It is impossible to estimate the
size of this effect, but it seems hard to imagine that it would fall below
$22.2 million per year in an economy as vast as our own. This savings
from enhanced certainty, moreover, takes nothing from a patentee that she
is entitled to keep. One of the core policies underlying the public notice
function that clear claim language serves is the desirability of facilitating
design-arounds by the patentee’s competitors.263 As the Federal Circuit
observed more than a decade ago, “[d]esigning around patents is, in fact,
one of the ways in which the patent system works to the advantage of the
public in promoting progress in the useful arts, its constitutional
purpose.”264
It appears, from these three savings sources alone, that moving
259. See Lemley, supra note 246, at 1507 (noting the lack of accurate data regarding
patents licensed for revenue).
260. Id. at 1507-08.
261. (180,000 patents per year) x (3.5% licensed) x ($100,000 per license) x (1% savings
per license) = $6,300,000 savings per year.
262. (180,000 patents per year) x (3.5% licensed) x ($100,000 per license) x (5% savings
per license) = $31,500,000 savings per year.
263. See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations,
84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 95 n.126 (2004) (explaining that design-arounds benefit the public by
encouraging progress in the marketplace through the creation of new and innovative
advances and variations of the patented product); Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim
Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 40-43 (2000) (noting that when a competitor plans
to design around a patented product, he or she seeks to create a product that will not result in
an infringement suit).
264. Slimfold Mfg. v. Kinkead Indus., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1842,
1845-46 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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dictionary selection from the litigation stage (where it is effectively
random) to the examination stage (where it greatly reduces uncertainty for
every patent throughout its term) will generate important social benefits.
The Patent Office should make this change to the patent examination rules
without delay. It can do so in two stages. We discuss both in turn,
beginning with the long-term solution at which the Patent Office should
aim.265
1.

Changing the application content rule to require dictionary selection
We think the ultimate goal at which the Patent Office should aim is a
change to the existing rules governing what an applicant must include in
her application on the day it is filed. The existing rules, codified in Title 37
of the Code of Federal Regulations,266 are the result of notice-and-comment
rulemaking. The change we propose—a requirement that an applicant
name her preferred reference sources, both general and specialized, on the
face of the application—also requires notice-and-comment rulemaking,
such that it will have the force of law and bind all applicants.267
This new dictionary selection requirement need not limit applicants in
their choice of sources, either in name or number. If the applicant names a
source that the Patent Office does not yet possess, it can acquire the title in
keeping with its congressional mandate to maintain an effective library.268
In short order, any existing gaps in the Office’s reference library will be
filled. If the applicant wants to commit in advance to using many
dictionaries of a given type (e.g., by naming two or three general purpose
English language sources), we can think of no reason to disallow the
practice at the outset. Of course, the same tension that today sharpens the
choice between broad language (which covers more potential
infringements, and is also more vulnerable to prior art-based invalidity
265. The specific suggestions we make here are predicated on the current state of the
law. Depending on how the Federal Circuit resolves the Phillips case, see supra notes 1718 and accompanying text, some of the details of our proposal might require adjustment.
266. The most natural locus for our proposed change is 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.71-1.79 (2005), a
cluster of rules called “Specification.” A patent specification requires, among other things,
a written description of the invention or discovery (§ 1.71) setting forth what the applicant
seeks to patent in a manner that distinguishes it from other inventions (§ 1.71); a title of the
invention or discovery (§ 1.72); a summary of the nature and substance of the invention (§
1.73); and one or more claims that define the scope of the invention (§ 1.75). One could
also make our proposed change by modifying the rules governing the “information
disclosure statement,” a form that applicants use to tell the Patent Office about prior art
references of which she is aware. See §§ 1.97-1.98 (providing the guidelines that qualify an
applicant to issue an “information disclosure statement” and also explaining what the
“information disclosure statement” must include).
267. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text (explaining the Patent Office’s
power to promulgate binding procedural rules).
268. See 35 U.S.C. § 7 (2002) (“The Director shall maintain a library of scientific and
other works and periodicals, both foreign and domestic, in the Patent and Trademark Office
to aid the officers in the discharge of their duties.”).

MILLER.OFFTOPRINTER

898

10/7/2005 12:27 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:829

attacks) and narrow language (which covers fewer potential infringements,
and is also less vulnerable to prior art-based invalidity attacks) will also
sharpen the choice between naming more and fewer dictionaries. We think
it likely that most applicants will name one or two general purpose and one
or two specialized reference sources. If, after monitoring the practice for a
year or two, the Patent Office finds that applicants are overwhelming the
system with too many reference source designations, it can revisit the
question whether to cap the number of reference sources an applicant may
name.
2.

Changing examiner practice to require dictionary identification
In the interim, as the notice-and-comment process plays out, the Patent
Office should immediately change the Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure to direct all examiners to state, in the first response from the
Office that is sent to the applicant, the general purpose and specialized
reference sources the examiner will use to construe claim words should any
doubts about claim scope arise. This rule, which would bind examiners but
not applicants, can be implemented without notice-and-comment
rulemaking.269 Should an applicant object to the use of the reference
sources that the examiner chooses, the applicant can designate alternative
reference sources. In addition, the Patent Office should adapt the existing
rules ensuring that any prior art that the examiner identifies during the
examination process also appears on the face of the patent,270 so that the
examiner-identified reference sources (or their applicant-identified
substitutes) also appear on the face of any resulting patent.
3.

The undesirability of an official dictionary list
It is worth pausing for a moment, in this discussion of integrating
dictionary selection into the patent examination process, to consider why
the Patent Office should not prescribe a closed list of reference sources
after conducting a formal proceeding to determine which reference sources
are most reliable for each main technological area.271 First, this top-down
269. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2002) (providing that notice-and-comment rulemaking is
not required for “interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency
organization, procedure, or practice”). The Patent Office regularly relies on this exception
to the notice-and-comment rulemaking requirement when promulgating examination
guidelines that are directed at the examiner corps. See, e.g., U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office, Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001) (“Because
these Guidelines only govern internal practices, they are exempt from notice and comment
rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A).”).
270. See MPEP, supra note 209, § 707.05, at 700-12 (providing that the patent examiner
should consider and cite prior art which is related to the claims asserted in the patent
application); id. § 1302.12, at 1300-13 (encouraging the patent examiner to cite related art
for allowed patent applications).
271. See Wagner, supra note 193. As we noted earlier, Professor Wagner may have
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approach cuts against the general grain of the patent process, which is quite
applicant-driven.272 Second, a top-down approach is on the wrong side of a
basic information asymmetry: applicants, who know far more about the
current state of the art in their fields than do patent examiners,273 are in the
best position to choose the most up-to-date, high-quality dictionaries and
similar sources. Third, a centralized selection process would needlessly
divert resources from other Patent Office needs. Indeed, the more the
selection process sought to overcome the information asymmetry just
described, the more costly it would be. And the expense would be incurred
time and again as the Patent Office regularly updated its list of prescribed
reference sources. In short, this “official list” game would not be worth the
candle.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit has put dictionary consultation at the heart of its
claim construction jurisprudence. This practice is not likely to change. A
dictionary-friendly approach to claim construction has neutrality and
predictability goals that are both worthy and attainable. These goals cannot
be fully realized, however, until the choice of dictionary is made something
more than a capricious, post hoc exercise at the courthouse. The Patent
Office thus has a vital regulatory role to play in making dictionary selection
a routine applicant-driven, pre-dispute process. The Patent Office should,
in short, act quickly and decisively to make dictionary choice as central to
patent examination as it has already become to patent litigation.

suggested something along these lines. Id. However, because his proposal occupies only
two or three sentences, it is difficult to be certain. Id. at 244 & n.311.
272. For example, it is the applicant, not the Patent Office, who prompts examination by
drafting and filing an application. See 35 U.S.C. § 111 (indicating that it is the inventor or
someone authorized by the inventor who actually files the patent application). And it is the
applicant who, after receiving notice from the Patent Office of the problems with her
application, submits new claims and other amendments to correct the problems. 35 U.S.C.
§ 132(a).
273. See Wagner, supra note 193, at 206-09 (discussing the litigation process of patent
cases). During the “prosecution history phase,” the patentee provides information to the
Patent Office. Id. at 206-07. Because the patentee is required to provide the most accurate
information it has regarding the innovation, the prosecution history also tends to be an
accurate source of information. Id. at 207.
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POSTSCRIPT: THE DECISION IN PHILLIPS V. AWH CORP.
Just before this Article went to press, the Federal Circuit issued its en
banc decision on claim construction methodology in Phillips v. AWH
Corp.,274 concluding a rehearing that was ordered while this Article was in
draft.275 Phillips rejects the Telegenix decision’s use of dictionaries as a
universal, necessary first step in claim construction.276 After a brief review
of the court’s decision in Phillips, we consider the evidence that courts are
likely to continue to rely on dictionaries to construe claims. We also
conclude, given Phillips’ continued commitment to de novo review in
claim construction and utter silence about how courts should select from
among multiple pertinent dictionaries, that there is as great a need as ever
for the Patent Office to help make dictionary selection in claim
construction more predictable with regulations of the type we propose.
The Federal Circuit, capturing the essence of the several questions it had
posed in its order directing en banc review,277 framed the “principal
question in” Phillips as “the extent to which [courts] should resort to and
rely on a patent’s specification in seeking to ascertain the proper scope of
its claims.”278 Holding up its decade-old decisions in Markman279 and
Vitronics,280 as well as a more recent decision in Innova/Pure Water,281 for
special “reaffirm[ation],”282 the court emphasized that “the person of
ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim term not only in the
context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears, but in
the context of the entire patent, including the specification.”283 The two
overarching principles that frame the claim construction process, discussed
above,284 remain the same: “the words of a claim ‘are generally given their

274. Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en banc).
275. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
276. 2005 WL 1620331, at *11-*16. For our analysis of the Telegenix discussion about
using objective reference sources in claim construction, see supra notes 73-84 and
accompanying text.
277. See 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (setting forth seven groups of questions
for additional briefing).
278. 2005 WL 1620331, at *4.
279. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). For our analysis of Markman’s discussion about using
objective reference sources in claim construction, see supra notes 54-58 and accompanying
text.
280. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996). For our
analysis of Vitronics’ discussion about using objective reference sources in claim
construction, see supra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
281. See Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
282. 2005 WL 1620331, at *4; see also id. at *16.
283. Id. at *5.
284. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
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ordinary and customary meaning,’”285 and “the ordinary and customary
meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a
person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention,
i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.”286 According
to the court, a term’s ordinary and customary meaning “provides an
objective baseline from which to begin claim construction.”287 The
particularized context for the claim term that the patent specification and
prosecution history provide remains central to the process throughout.288
Indeed, the “specification’s virtue” is that it was “created at the time of
patent prosecution for the purpose of explaining the patent’s scope and
meaning.”289
What of dictionaries and other objective reference sources, which are
extrinsic to the particularized context of the specification and prosecution
history? Can courts continue to use such reference sources to help construe
claims? On this point, the court struck a more complex balance. On the
one hand, the court reaffirmed its basic approval of court use of objective
reference sources extrinsic to the patent, such as dictionaries and technical
treatises, for the background information they provide to generalist judges
facing unfamiliar technology. “Because dictionaries, and especially
technical dictionaries, endeavor to collect the accepted meanings of terms
used in various fields of science and technology,” the court opined, “those
resources have been properly recognized as among the many tools that can
assist the court in determining the meaning of particular terminology to
those of skill in the art of the invention.”290 Moreover, even “general
purpose dictionaries may be helpful” when, for example, “the ordinary
meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the art may
be readily apparent even to lay judges.”291 In short, so long as it “keep[s] in
mind the flaws inherent in each type of evidence,” a district court is
permitted “in its sound discretion to admit and use such [extrinsic]
evidence.”292 The result in Phillips is, in this respect, as we predicted.293
On the other hand, the Phillips court repudiated the more extrinsic285. 2005 WL 1620331, at *5 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d
1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at *6-*9.
289. Id. at *11.
290. Id. at *10; see also id. at *11 (“extrinsic evidence,” such as dictionaries, “can help
educate the court regarding the field of the invention and can help the court determine what
a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand claim terms to mean”).
291. Id. at *6. In such a case, claim construction “involves little more than the
application of the widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.” Id.
292. Id. at *11; see also id. at *15 (“As we have noted above, however, we do not intend
to preclude the appropriate use of dictionaries.”).
293. See supra notes 185-186 and accompanying text.
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directed, always-consult-a-dictionary-first methodology that the Telegenix
case had prescribed.294 After recounting the Telegenix methodology’s
focus on dictionaries, according to which “the specification should be
consulted only after a determination is made, whether based on a
dictionary, treatise, or other source, as to the ordinary meaning or meanings
of the claim term in dispute,”295 the court rejected the methodology as
“improperly restrict[ing] the role of the specification in claim
construction.”296 According to the court, “[t]he main problem with
elevating the dictionary to such prominence is that it focuses the inquiry on
the abstract meaning of words rather than on the meaning of claim terms
within the context of the patent.”297 As a result, “too often [the Telegenix]
line of cases has been improperly relied upon to condone the adoption of a
dictionary definition entirely divorced from the context of the [patent’s]
written description.”298 The compulsory methodology of Telegenix has
thus been rejected. The intrinsic patent materials, not extrinsic evidence
that may help one understand them, are restored as claim construction’s
touchstone. Interestingly, neither the authoring judge in Telegenix, Judge
Linn,299 nor any of the six heavy dictionary citers we identify in our
study,300 wrote separately in Phillips to take issue with this repudiation of
Telegenix.
The court in Phillips effectively dials its claim construction
jurisprudence back to October 15, 2002, just before Telegenix was decided.
And Telegenix itself is rejected as a dead end detour. In light of this result,
will district courts and the Federal Circuit continue to rely on dictionaries
to construe claims? Existing evidence suggests that they will, and at a
significant rate. First, as our own data show, by 2002 the Federal Circuit
was issuing, on average, more than two claim construction decisions a
month that relied on dictionaries and similar sources to construe claim
terms.301 The case law that preceded Telegenix was thus adequate to
support a significant rate of reliance on dictionaries. If litigation parties
and the judges who hear their cases continue to find dictionaries useful,
294. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
295. 2005 WL 1620331, at *13.
296. Id.
297. Id. at *14.
298. Id.
299. See Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1197 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
300. See infra Tbl. 7, App. B. Judge Lourie, who frequently cited dictionaries in his
claim construction opinions for the court, did write separately in Phillips. He did so,
however, to dissent from the court’s construction of the particular claim term in question,
not to take issue with the court’s general claim construction methodology. See 2005 WL
1620331, at *20-*22 (Lourie, J., dissenting in part). With regard to methodology, Judge
Lourie “fully join[ed]” Judge Bryson’s opinion for the court. Id. at *20.
301. See supra Tbl. 4.
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courts will continue to rely on them.
Second, two other claim construction decisions bracket the Phillips
decision—one just before, and one just after—and both make use of
dictionaries to construe claim terms. Thirteen days before Phillips, the
Federal Circuit issued its decision in Seachange International, Inc. v. CCor, Inc.302 In Seachange, written by Judge Linn (the author of Telegenix)
for a panel that includes Judge Bryson (the author of Phillips), the court
overturned a district court’s constructions of three disputed claim terms.303
In explaining its rationale for each of the three terms, the Federal Circuit
cited and quoted from The New IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical
and Electronics Terms (5th ed. 1993).304 Two days after Phillips, the
Federal Circuit issued its decision in North American Container, Inc. v.
Plastipak Packaging, Inc.305 In Plastipak, written by Judge Lourie for a
panel that includes Judge Bryson (the author of Phillips) and Judge Linn
(the author of Telegenix), the court affirmed a district court’s construction
of the claim term “generally convex.”306 The district court had relied on,
among other things, a definition for “generally” provided by the Oxford
English Dictionary Online.307 The Federal Circuit agreed, concluding that
“the court articulated a common-sense understanding of the term
[‘generally’] confirmed by a dictionary.”308 These cases show the truth in
Phillips’ insistence that it “do[es] not intend to preclude the appropriate use
of dictionaries.”309
Third, Phillips, like Vitronics before it, praises dictionaries for their
objectivity. According to Phillips,
Dictionaries or comparable sources are often useful to assist in
understanding the commonly understood meaning of words and have
been used both by our court and the Supreme Court in claim
interpretation. A dictionary definition has the value of being an unbiased
source “accessible to the public in advance of litigation.”310
302. Nos. 04-1375, 04-1498, 2005 WL 1523382 (Fed. Cir. June 29, 2005).
303. Id. at *1.
304. Id. at *4 (quoting defintion of “network”), *12 (quoting definition of “distributed
system”), *13 (quoting definition of “CPU”). According to our data, this is the third most
frequently cited technical source on which the Federal Circuit relied. See supra Tbl.6, App.
B.
305. Nos. 04-1306, 04-1307, 2005 WL 1645620 (Fed. Cir. July 14, 2005).
306. Id. at *1.
307. Id. at *5.
308. Id. at *10.
309. Nos. 03-1269, 03-1286, 2005 WL 1620331, at *15 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en
banc).
310. Id. (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1585 (Fed. Cir.
1996)) (citation omitted). As we discussed above, supra notes 69-72 and accompanying
text, Vitronics emphasized the relative objectivity and reliability of dictionaries to help
explain the court’s greater solicitude for dictionaries compared to expert testimony. By
reaffirming that premise in Phillips, the court once again invites greater reliance on
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Phillips, like Vitronics, also highlights the risk of partisan slant that
diminishes the value of expert testimony, observing that, because expert
testimony “is generated at the time of and for the purpose of litigation,” it
“can suffer from bias that is not present in intrinsic evidence.”311 Given
that ordinary and customary meaning must be determined, and that expert
testimony continues to bear the taint of comparatively greater bias, one
must expect some courts to prefer dictionaries as sources for ordinary
meaning.312 Both parties and courts can thus draw strong support from
Phillips itself to justify continued reliance on dictionaries in claim
construction, so long as they avoid the dictionary-first method of Telegenix,
now condemned for its perceived excess.
One cannot help but wonder whether, assuming courts do continue to use
dictionaries to help construe disputed claim terms at something like 2002
levels, the courts’ selections from among available reference sources will
become more predictable than the chaotic pattern that our study documents.
We think not. As we have explained, the pre-Phillips case law offers no
guidance on how to select from among multiple pertinent reference
sources, and offers conflicting signals on how to synthesize a single
definition using the content from multiple sources.313 Phillips, for its part,
offers no guidance on how courts or parties should select dictionaries or
other reference sources, other than expressing a mild preference for
technical over general purpose dictionaries314 and using the patent
application’s effective filing date as the relevant anchoring date.315 Phillips
also sidesteps the opportunity to reconsider whether the Federal Circuit
should engage in de novo review of lower court claim construction
rulings,316 a question on which it had ordered additional briefing.317 The
objective reference sources than expert witnesses.
311. 2005 WL 1620331, at *11; see also supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
312. See MSM Invs. Co. v. Carolwood Corp., 259 F.3d 1335, 1339 n.* (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(“Standard dictionary definitions indicate ordinary meaning.”); Dow Chem. Co. v.
Sumitomo Chem. Co. Ltd., 257 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Thus, in determining the
ordinary meaning of a technical term, courts are free to consult scientific dictionaries and
technical treatises at any time.”); Optical Disc Corp. v. Del Mar Avionics, 208 F.3d 1324,
1334-35 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“Without evidence in the patent specification of an express intent
to impart a novel meaning to a claim term, the term takes on its ordinary meaning. For such
ordinary meaning, we turn to the dictionary definition of the term.”) (citation omitted);
Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[W]e see no error in
the district court’s use of dictionary definitions to ascertain the ordinary meaning of the
relevant claim limitation.”).
313. See supra notes 116-130 and accompanying text, and notes 160-179 and
accompanying text.
314. 2005 WL 1620331, at *10.
315. Id. at *5.
316. Id. at *20.
317. See 376 F.3d 1382, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc order) (questioning “is it
appropriate for this court to accord any deference to any aspect of trial court claim
construction rulings?”).
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unpredictability of trial court use of dictionaries is thus compounded by
further unpredictability in Federal Circuit use of dictionaries on de novo
review.
Judge Mayer’s dissent in Phillips decries this very
unpredictability.318 Indeed, as Professor Wagner has observed,319 the rule
of Phillips is that, in claim construction, there are no rules. Phillips states
that “there is no magic formula or catechism for conducting claim
construction. Nor is the court barred from considering any particular
sources or required to analyze sources in any specific sequence, as long as
those sources are not used to contradict claim meaning that is unambiguous
in light of the intrinsic evidence.”320 This approach maximizes the Federal
Circuit’s flexibility in choosing and using objective reference sources in
light of all the other circumstances in a case. This flexibility, however,
comes at the price of the costly uncertainties now imposed all the more
clearly on other patent system actors—patentees, potential licensees,
accused infringers, and the Patent Office.
After Phillips, as before, dictionaries are bound to be used routinely for
claim construction. After Phillips, as before, the Federal Circuit provides
no rules or principles, other than “sound discretion,” for how a judge
should choose or use a dictionary in this context. After Phillips, as before,
the Patent Office has the power to make dictionary selection more
predictable, as we have explained at length.321 Nothing in Phillips stands in
the way of the regulatory solution we propose. Given the benefits that
would accrue from the truly objective and predictable use of objective
318. See 2005 WL 1620331, at *26 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (
If we persist in deciding the subsidiary factual components of claim construction
without deference, there is no reason why litigants should be required to parade
their evidence before the district courts or for district courts to waste time and
resources evaluating such evidence. . . . If the proceedings before the district court
are merely a tryout on the road, as they are under our current regimen, it is wasteful
to require such proceedings at all. Instead, all patent cases could be filed in this
court; we would determine whether claim construction is necessary, and, if so, the
meaning of the claims.
) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
319. See R. Polk Wagner, Phillips Analysis, Part 1: The New Rule Is There Are No
Rules, (July 15, 2005), at http://www.polkwagner.com (on file with the American
University Law Review). Judge Mayer, in his dissent in Phillips, makes a similar point:
[A]fter proposing no fewer than seven questions, receiving more than thirty amici
curiae briefs, and whipping the bar into a frenzy of expectation, we say nothing
new, but merely restate what has become the practice over the last ten years—that
we will decide cases according to whatever mode or method results in the outcome
we desire, or at least allows us a seemingly plausible way out of the case.
2005 WL 1620331, at *22.
320. 2005 WL 1620331, at *16; see also id. (“In Vitronics, we did not attempt to provide
a rigid algorithm for claim construction, but simply attempted to explain why, in general,
certain types of evidence are more valuable than others. Today, we adhere to that approach
and reaffirm the approach to claim construction outlined in that case, in Markman, and in
Innova.”).
321. See supra at notes 180-273 and accompanying text.
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reference sources in claim construction, the Patent Office should act to
make reference source selection a necessary step in obtaining a patent.
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APPENDIX A

From HERBERT C. MORTON, THE STORY OF WEBSTER’S THIRD: PHILIP
GOVE’S CONTROVERSIAL DICTIONARY AND ITS CRITICS 215 (1994)
(facing page).
Reprinted by permission of the publisher, Merriam-Webster,
Incorporated (www.Merriam-Webster.com).
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APPENDIX B
This Appendix contains all the tables and figures for this manuscript that
do not fit neatly in the manuscript’s main body.
TABLE 5
This table shows all the general purpose English language sources the
Federal Circuit used as resources in claim construction cases from April 5,
1995, to June 30, 2004.
SOURCE

CIT’N FREQUENCY (%)

American College Dictionary (Random House)

1 (0.4%)

American Heritage Dictionaries (Houghton Mifflin)

24 (9.0%)

American Heritage College Dictionary (3d ed.)

5 (1.9%)

American Heritage Dictionary

12 (4.5%)

American Heritage Dictionary Second College Edition

7 (2.6%)

Chambers Concise Dictionary (Chambers)

1 (0.4%)

Merriam-Webster Dictionaries (Merriam-Webster)

103 (38.4%)

Merriam-Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed.)

3 (1.1%)

Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (6th ed.)

7 (2.6%)

Webster’s New International Dictionary

1 (0.4%)

Webster’s New International Dictionary Second Edition

2 (0.7%)

Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary

18 (6.7%)

Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary

4 (1.5%)

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

68 (25.4%)

Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford University Press)

18 (6.7%)

Oxford English Dictionary

14 (5.2%)

Oxford Reference Dictionary

1 (0.4%)

Shorter Oxford English Dictionary

3 (1.1%)

Random House Dictionaries (Random House)

322

11 (4.1%)

Random House College Dictionary

1 (0.4%)

Random House Unabridged Dictionary

4 (1.5%)

Random House Webster’s College Dictionary

1 (0.4%)

Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary

5 (1.9%)

Strunk & White, The Elements of Style (4th ed. 2000)

1 (0.4%)

322. Percentages based on the total number of all dictionaries, encyclopedias, treatises,
and similar sources cited, i.e., 268.
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“the dictionary”

1 (0.4%)
324

Webster’s II New College Dictionary

(Houghton Mifflin)

Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary
325

(Riverside

909

1 (0.4%)
10 (3.7%)

)

Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary (Gramercy

1 (0.4%)

Books)
Webster’s New 20th Century Dictionary (Simon & Schuster)

2 (0.7%)

Webster’s New World Dictionary (various publishers)

15 (5.6%)

TOTAL

189 (70.5%)

Note: This table groups together all citations to differently dated
printings of the same title (e.g., the 1966, 1968, 1971, 1986, 1993, and
2002 printings of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary).

323. Tex. Instruments Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1564, 39
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492, 1497 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Although the dictionary broadly defines
‘conductor’ as any substance that conducts an electrical charge, the patent itself belies such
a broad construction.”). Judge Lourie, who authored Tex. Instruments, most often cites to
WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY (Riverside Publ’g Co. 1988) and
WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (3d ed., Simon & Schuster 1988).
324. This is the current edition of, and the successor title to, WEBSTER’S II NEW
RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY (Riverside Publ’g Co. 1994).
325. Riverside Publishing Co. has been a subsidiary of Houghton Mifflin since 1979,
prior to the first publication of Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary in 1984.
RIVERSIDE PUBLISHING:
A DISTINGUISHED HISTORY, at http://www.riverpub.com
/about/history.html (last visited July 19, 2004) (on file with American University Law
Review). Sidney Landau surmises that Houghton Mifflin may have established this
dictionary, which does not include taboo sexual or scatological words, to distinguish it from
the American Heritage Dictionary series, which does. LANDAU, supra note 2, 228-30, 443
n.15 (2d ed. 2001).
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TABLE 6
This table shows all the technical or specialized sources the Federal
Circuit used as resources in claim construction cases from April 5, 1995, to
June 30, 2004.
SOURCE

CIT’N FREQ’Y (%)

Annual Book of ASTM Standards (1996)

1

Maribeth Cuccinelli, The Art & Science of Footwear Manufacturing

1

326

(1974)
Barron’s Dictionary of Insurance Terms (4th ed. 2000)

1

Chambers Dictionary of Science & Technology (1999)

1

Serway & Faughn, College Physics (4th ed. 1995)

1

Michael Busby, Demystifying ATM/ADSL (Wordware 1998)

1

Cyril M. Harris, Dictionary of Architecture & Construction (2d ed.

1

1993)
Dictionary of Computing (4th ed. 1996)

3 (1.1%)

Dictionary of Electronics

1

Dictionary of Mechanical Engineering

2

Dictionary of Microbiology & Molecular Biology (2d ed. 1987)

1

Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary

4 (1.5%)

Encyclopedia of Computer Science (1976)

1

Encyclopedia of Polymer Science (1965)

1

Skoog et al., Fundamentals of Analytical Chemistry (7th ed. 1996)

1

Benjamin Lewin, Genes IV (1990)

1

Handbook of Chemistry & Physics (63d ed. 1982-83)

1

Michael & Irene Ash, Handbook of Pharmaceutical Additives

1

(1995)
Hawley’s Condensed Chemical Dictionary

3 (1.1%)

Henderson’s Dictionary of Biological Terms (11th ed. 1995)

1

IBM Dictionary of Computing (10th ed. 1994)

2

Illustrated Dictionary of Electronics (3rd ed. 1985)

2

G.B. Stringfellow & H.T. Hall, 43 Journal of Crystal Growth 47

1

(1978)
Knight’s American Mechanical Dictionary (1876)

1

Robert C. Faber, Landis on Mechanics of Patent Claim Drafting

1

(4th ed. 2000)

326. Percentages based on the total number of all dictionaries, encyclopedias, treatises,
and similar sources cited, i.e., 268. Percentage values less than one percent are omitted.
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1

Experiments (2d ed., Heath 1994)
Marks’ Standard Handbook for Mechanical Engineers (9th ed.

1

1987)
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific & Technical Terms

9 (3.4%)

McGraw-Hill Electronics Dictionary (5th ed. 1994)

1

McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science & Technology (7th ed. 1992)

1

A. Parish, Mechanical Engineer’s Reference Book (11th ed. 1973)

1

Melloni’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary (1979)

1

Microsoft Computer Dictionary

7 (2.6%)

Modern Dictionary of Electronics

5 (1.9%)

New IEEE Standard Dictionary of Electrical & Electronics Terms

6 (2.2%)

(5th ed. 1993)
Louis F. Feisner, Organic Experiments (Heath 1964)

1

Photonics Dictionary (2000)

1

Copper Development Association, Standards Handbook: Wrought

1

& Cast Copper and Copper Alloy Products (6th ed. 1994)
Stedman’s Medical Dictionary
E. Bryan Carne, Telecommunications Primer (2d ed., Prentice Hall

3 (1.1%)
1

1999)
Karl Drlica, Understanding DNA & Gene Cloning: A Guide for the

1

Curious (2d ed. 1992)
Van Nostrand Reinhold Dictionary of Information Technology (3d

1

ed. 1989)
Hala et al., Vapour Liquid Equilibrium (2d English ed. 1967)
Wordsworth Dictionary of Science & Technology
TOTAL

1
1
79(29.5%)

Note: This table groups together all citations to differently dated
versions with the same title (e.g., the 12th and 13th editions of Hawley’s
Condensed Chemical Dictionary).
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TABLE 7
Number of claim terms construed by reliance on a dictionary or similar
source, by Judge, by Year
327

Judge

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Total

Archer
(100%)

0

0

3

1

0

2

3

0

1

1

11 (5.3%)

Bryson
(100%)

0

1

2

0

0

2

0

1

0

1

7
(3.3%)

Clevenger
(100%)

0

4

4

1

1

1

5

3

3

2

24
(11.5%)

-

-

-

-

-

0

4

9

6

3

22
(10.5%)

-

-

0

0

1

1

2

0

13

4

21
(10.0%)

Linn
(49%)

-

-

-

-

-

0

5

7

4

11

27
(12.9%)

Lourie
(100%)

0

2

0

0

1

9

3

4

0

4

23
(11.0%)

Mayer
(100%)

0

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1
(0.5%)

Michel
(100%)

0

1

0

1

0

2

0

1

1

0

6
(2.9%)

Newman
(100%)

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

2
(1.0%)

0

1

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

1
(0.5%)

328

329

Dyk
(45%)

330

Gajarsa
(75%)

331

332

Nies
(15%)

327. The percentage measure beneath each judge’s name states the percentage of the 110
months between April 1995 (the date of the in banc Markman decision, supra note 190) and
June 2004 (the end of the study) that a judge was a member of the Federal Circuit.
328. Judge Archer took senior status on December 25, 1997. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHIES, at http://www.fedcir.gov/judg bios.html
(last modified Jan. 25, 2005) (on file with American University Law Review).
329. Judge Dyk entered service on June 9, 2000.
330. Judge Gajarsa entered service on Sept. 12, 1997.
331. Judge Linn entered service on Jan. 1, 2000.
332. Judge Nies served on the Federal Circuit from its inception in 1982 until 1996. On
November 1, 1995, Judge Nies took senior status, and died while serving on August 7, 1996.
Briefly, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 9, 1996, at A5.
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333

Plager
(100%)

2

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

3
(1.4%)

Prost
334
(30%)
-

-

-

-

-

-

-

0

1

0

3

(4%)

Rader
(100%)

0

2

2

0

0

3

6

5

7

1

26
(12.4%)

Rich
(45%)

0

1

1

1

3

-

-

-

-

-

6
(2.9%)

Schall
(100%)

0

2

1

3

3

2

0

1

2

4

18 (8.6%)

0

0

0

2

0

1

0

0

4

0

7
(3.3%)

335

Per
Curiam

Note: Biographical information on the judges can be found at
www.fedcir.gov/judgbios.html. In any year in which a given judge did not
serve at all on the Federal Circuit, the year is marked “-” for that judge.
This table does not include data for Senior Judges Friedman or Cowen,
who were on senior status when the Federal Circuit issued its en bank
Markman decision and who were not the authoring judge for any of the
decisions we studied.

333. Judge Plager took senior status on November 30, 2000. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FEDERAL CIRCUIT, JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHIES, at http://www.fedcir.gov/judg bios.html
(last modified Jan. 25, 2005) (on file with American University Law Review).
334. Judge Prost entered service on Oct. 2001.
335. See Victoria Slind-Flor, Giles S. Rich Dies at 95, NAT’L L.J., June 21, 1999, at A6;
Judge Giles S. Rich Succumbs to Illness (Boston Patent Law Ass’n), June 30, 1999, at 1.
Judge Rich served on the Federal Circuit from its inception in 1982 until the last days of his
life in 1999; he died on June 9, 1999.
FOR THE
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APPENDIX C
This Appendix contains the basic data from the detailed review of the
Federal Circuit’s claim construction cases from April 1995 to June 2004. It
contains data for all the opinions in which the court used one or more
dictionary definitions of a word in a patent claim to construe an element of
that patent claim. Cases are listed first in year order, then alphabetically by
first party name. The italicized portion of an entry in the “Claim Term”
column is the text for which the court used one or more dictionary
definitions. When the court relied on a dictionary definition for a cognate
of the word that appeared in the patent claim, rather than or in addition to
the claim word itself, the cognate is indicated in brackets.
CASE

YEAR

CLAIM
TERM

SOURCE(S) USED

JUDGE

National Presto Indus. v.
Black & Decker (U.S.)
Inc., Nos. 92-1388, 921476, 1995 WL 367072, at
*4 n.2 (Fed. Cir. June 20,
1995).
Quantum Corp. v. Rodime,
PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1581,
36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1162, 1166 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
Quantum Corp. v. Rodime,
PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1581
n.3, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1162, 1166 n.3 (Fed. Cir.
1995).
Athletic Alternatives, Inc.
v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73
F.3d 1573, 1579, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365,
1370 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Cole v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531,
41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
Dana Innovations v.
Speakercraft, Inc., No. 951472, 1996 WL 748250, at
*2 (Fed. Cir. Dec 2, 1996).
Dana Innovations v.
Speakercraft, Inc., No. 951472, 1996 WL 748250, at
*2 (Fed. Cir. Dec 2, 1996).

1995

means on
said
housing

Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary (1981)

Newman

1995

at least 600
tpi

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1986)

Plager

1995

at least
approximat
ely 600 tpi

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1986)

Plager

1996

varies
between

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1976)

Michel

1996

perforation
means

Webster’s Encyclopedic
Unabridged Dictionary
(1989)

Rich

1996

elongate
bar

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1986)

Schall

1996

elongate
bar

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1986)

Schall
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YEAR

CLAIM
TERM

SOURCE(S) USED

JUDGE

Great N. Corp. v. Henry
Molded Prods., Inc., 94
F.3d 1569, 1574, 39
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1997,
2001 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Greenberg v. Ethicon
Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91
F.3d 1580, 1583, 39
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1783,
1786 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

1996

greater
flexural
cushioning
/ [ flexure ]

Webster’s New International
Dictionary (1932)

Clevenger

1996

detent
mechanism

Bryson

Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc.,
86 F.3d 1098, 1105, 39
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001,
1005 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Texas Instruments, Inc. v.
Cypress Semiconductor
Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1564,
39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1492, 1497 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
Yamaha Corp. v. ESS
Tech., Inc., No. 95-1362,
1996 WL 146499, at *6
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 29, 1996).
Yamaha Corp. v. ESS
Tech., Inc., No. 95-1362,
1996 WL 146499, at *6
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 29, 1996).
Yamaha Corp. v. ESS
Tech., Inc., No. 95-1362,
1996 WL 146499, at *6
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 29, 1996).
York Prods., Inc. v.
Central Tractor Farm &
Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568,
1572-73, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1619, 1622 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
York Prods., Inc. v.
Central Tractor Farm &
Family Ctr., 99 F.3d 1568,
1575, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1619, 1625 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp.,
79 F.3d 1563, 1565 n.1, 38
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1281,
1282 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
American Permahedge,
Inc. v. Barcana, Inc., 105
F.3d 1441, 1444, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1614,
1616 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

1996

shoe upper

1996

a conductor

Random House Unabridged
Dictionary (2d ed. 1993);
Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1968);
Dictionary of Mechanical
Engineering (4th ed. 1996)
Maribeth Cuccinelli, The Art
& Science of Footwear
Manufacturing (Norman V.
Germany ed., 1974)
“the dictionary”

1996

a stored
waveshape
table

Clevenger

1996

a stored
waveshape
table

1996

a stored
waveshape
table

1996

a
substantial
part of /
[ substantia
lly ]

New IEEE Standard
Dictionary of Electrical and
Electronics Terms (5th ed.
1993)
New IEEE Standard
Dictionary of Electrical and
Electronics Terms (5th ed.
1993)
New IEEE Standard
Dictionary of Electrical and
Electronics Terms (5th ed.
1993)
American Heritage
Dictionary Second College
Edition (1982);
Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary (1983)

1996

a plurality
of . . .

American Heritage
Dictionary Second College
Edition (1982)

Rader

1996

coherence
length of
the beam

Handbook of Chemistry &
Physics (63d ed. 1982-83)

Nies

1997

extending
laterally of

American Heritage
Dictionary (2d ed. 1976)

Clevenger

Lourie

Lourie

Clevenger

Clevenger

Rader
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YEAR
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TERM

Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co.,
Inc., No. 96-1399, 1997
WL 419391, at *8 (Fed.
Cir. July 14, 1997).
Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron
Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501,
42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1608, 1613 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
Hazani v. United States
Int’l Trade Comm’n, 126
F.3d 1473, 1480, 44
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1358,
1363-64 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Hazani v. U.S. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 126 F.3d 1473,
1480, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1358, 1363-64
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
In re Morris, 127 F.3d
1048, 1056, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1023, 1029 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
Johansson v. Rose
Displays Ltd., No. 961410, 1997 WL 437016, at
*3 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 5,
1997).
Johansson v. Rose
Displays Ltd., No. 961410, 1997 WL 437016, at
*3 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 5,
1997).
Johnstown Am. Corp. v.
Trinity Indus., Inc., Nos.
97-1070, 97-1071, 1997
WL 291956, at *2 (Fed.
Cir. May 28, 1997).
Kegel Co., Inc. v. AMF
Bowling, Inc., 127 F.3d
1420, 1427, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1123, 1127 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
MHB Indus. Corp. v.
Garberg & Assocs., Inc.,
No. 96-1539, 1997 WL
423021, at *3 (Fed. Cir.
July 29, 1997).
MHB Indus. Corp. v.
Garberg & Assocs., Inc.,
No. 96-1539, 1997 WL
423021, at *4 (Fed. Cir.
July 29, 1997).

1997

are secured
to

Webster’s II New Riverside
University Dictionary (2d
ed. 1988)

Rader

1997

joined in
proper
reading
frame

Karl Drlica, Understanding
DNA and Gene Cloning: A
Guide for the Curious (2d
ed. 1992)

Rich

1997

integrally
formed in

Webster’s New International
Dictionary (2d ed. 1939)

Bryson

1997

integrally
formed in

Webster’s New International
Dictionary (2d ed. 1939)

Bryson

1997

integrally
formed as a
portion of

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1986)

Plager

1997

absent
deformatio
n or
destruction
of
absent
deformatio
n or
destruction
of
longitudina
l axis

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1966)

Clevenger

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1966)

Clevenger

Cyril M. Harris, Dictionary
of Architecture &
Construction (2d ed. 1993)

Archer

1997

maintenanc
e assembly

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1986)

Schall

1997

across said
common
header

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1971)

Archer

1997

bag

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1971)

Archer

1997

1997

SOURCE(S) USED

[Vol. 54:829
JUDGE
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CASE

YEAR

CLAIM
TERM

SOURCE(S) USED

JUDGE

Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon
Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d
1420, 1430-31, 44
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1103,
1112 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Young Dental Mfg. Co.,
Inc. v. Q3 Special Prods.,
Inc., 112 F.3d 1137, 1142,
42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1589, 1593 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
Action Techs., Inc. v.
Novell Sys., Inc., Nos. 971460, 97-1481, 1998 WL
279359, at *5 (Fed. Cir.
May 27, 1998).
Action Techns., Inc. v.
Novell Sys., Inc., Nos. 971460, 97-1481, 1998 WL
279359, at *6 (Fed. Cir.
May 27, 1998).
Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d
1448, 1459, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1169, 1177 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
Lee’s Aquarium & Pet
Prods., Inc. v. Python
Prods., Inc., Nos. 97-1278,
97-1328, 1998 WL
129903, at *3 (Fed. Cir.
Mar. 24, 1998).

1997

first
opening
through

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1981)

Rader

1997

axial bore

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1968)

Clevenger

1998

type of
conversatio
n

Webster’s New World
Dictionary (3d college ed.
1994)

Schall

1998

state of the
conversatio
n

Webster’s New World
Dictionary (3d college ed.
1994)

Schall

1998

through [X]
to [Y]

Webster’s II New Riverside
University Dictionary (1984)

Archer

1998

gravel

Per Curiam

Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Huntsman Polymers
Corp., 157 F.3d 866, 87475, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
Renishaw PLC v. Marposs
Societa’ per Azioni, 158
F.3d 1243, 1251, 1251 n.4,
48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1117, 1123, 1123 n.4 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).

1998

block
copolymer

Annual Book of ASTM
Standards, American Society
of Testing Materials (1996);
Random House Webster’s
College Dictionary (1991);
Webster’s New World
Dictionary (3d college ed.
1994);
American Heritage College
Dictionary (3d ed. 1997);
Webster’s New World
Dictionary
Encyclopedia of Polymer
Science (1965)

1998

generating
a trigger
signal when

Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary
(1985);
Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1993);
Chambers Concise
Dictionary (1992)

Clevenger

Per Curiam
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Rockwell Int’l Corp. v.
United States, 147 F.3d
1358, 1363, 1363 n.7, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1027,
1030, 1030 n.7 (Fed. Cir.
1998).

1998

G.B. Stringfellow & H.T.
Hall, 43 J. CRYSTAL
GROWTH 47 (1978)

Michel

Technology Chems. &
Prods., Inc. v. Home
Diagnostics, Inc., Nos. 971068, 97-1075, 1998 WL
163650, at *6 (Fed. Cir.
Apr. 9, 1998).
Trimedyne, Inc. v. Surgical
Laser Techs., Inc., No. 961538, 1998 WL 393864, at
*12 (Fed. Cir. July 10,
1998).
Antonious v. Spalding &
Evenflo Co., Inc., No. 981478, 1999 WL 777450, at
*3 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31,
1999).
Antonious v. Spalding &
Evenflo Co., Inc., No. 981478, 1999 WL 777450, at
*3 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 31,
1999).
Bickerstaff v. Dr. Shrink,
Inc., No. 99-1091, 1999
WL 693884, at *6 (Fed.
Cir. Sept. 3, 1999).
Karlin Tech., Inc. v.
Surgical Dynamics, Inc.,
177 F.3d 968, 971, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465,
1468 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Karlin Tech., Inc. v.
Surgical Dynamics, Inc.,
177 F.3d 968, 971, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465,
1468 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

1998

open coldwall reactor
[cold-wall
added
during
prosecution
history]
porosity
gradient

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1986)

Schall

1998

a hollow,
bulbous
element

Random House Unabridged
Dictionary (2d ed. 1993);
Webster’s II New Riverside
University Dictionary (1984)

Rich

1999

attached
solely to
said rear
wall

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1971)

Schall

1999

attached
solely to
said rear
wall

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1971)

Schall

1999

cowl

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1986)

Schall

1999

series of
threads

Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary (1986)

Rich

1999

series of
threads

Rich

Middleton, Inc. v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co., No. 99-1201, 1999
WL 1072246, at *4 (Fed.
Cir. Nov. 16, 1999).
National Recovery Techs.,
Inc. v. Magnetic
Separation Sys., Inc., 166
F.3d 1190, 1195, 49
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1671,
1675 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

1999

material for
finishing

McGraw-Hill Dictionary of
Scientific and Technical
Terms (5th ed. 1994);
A. Parish, Mechanical
Engineer’s Reference Book
(11th ed. 1973)
Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary (1984)

1999

selecting
for
processing

Webster’s New World
Dictionary (3d college ed.)

JUDGE

Clevenger
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CLAIM
TERM

SOURCE(S) USED

JUDGE

Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183
F.3d 1342, 1346, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Rival Co. v. Sunbeam
Corp., Nos. 98-1198, 981199, 1999 WL 96416, at
*5 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 23,
1999).
Ultrak, Inc. v. Radio
Eng’g Indus., Inc., Nos.
97-1523, 97-1543, 1999
WL 197173, at *4, 52
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1526,
1529 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 8,
1999).
Brita Wasser-FilterSysteme v. Recovery
Eng’g, Inc., No. 99-1322,
2000 WL 1375170, at *4
(Fed. Cir. Sept. 21, 2000).
Cortland Line Co., Inc. v.
Orvis Co., Inc., 203 F.3d
1351, 1356, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1734, 1737 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
Doyle v. Crain Indus.,
Inc., No. 00-1103, 2000
WL 1608826, at *4 (Fed.
Cir. Oct. 25, 2000).
Doyle v. Crain Indus.,
Inc., No. 00-1103, 2000
WL 1608826, at *5 (Fed.
Cir. Oct 25, 2000).
Eisenberg v. Alimed, Inc.,
No. 98-1317, 2000 WL
1119743, at *3 (Fed. Cir.
Aug. 8, 2000).
Eisenberg v. Alimed, Inc.,
No. 98-1317, 2000 WL
1119743, at *3 (Fed. Cir.
Aug. 8, 2000).
Elekta Instrument S.A. v.
O.U.R. Scientific Int’l,
Inc., 214 F.3d 1302, 1307,
54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1910, 1913 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
Elekta Instrument S.A. v.
O.U.R. Scientific Int’l,
Inc., 214 F.3d 1302, 1307,
54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1910, 1913 (Fed. Cir.
2000).

1999

flashlight

American Heritage
Dictionary (2d college ed.
1982)

Mayer

1999

defined by
the base

Webster’s II New Riverside
University Dictionary (1988)

Lourie

1999

lens
window
means

American Heritage
Dictionary (1969)

Rich

2000

sleeve

Oxford English Dictionary
(2d ed. 1989)

Gajarsa

2000

end plate

Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary (1990)

Rader

2000

at ambient
temperatur
es

Hawley’s Condensed
Chemical Dictionary (12th
ed. 1993)

Lourie

2000

ejecting
said
mixture

Webster’s New World
Dictionary (3d ed. 1988)

Lourie

2000

trough

Webster’s New Collegiate
Dictionary (1979)

Archer

2000

hollow
section

Webster’s New Collegiate
Dictionary (1979)

Archer

2000

only within
a zone
extending
between
latitudes

Webster’s New World
Dictionary (3d ed. 1988)

Lourie

2000

only within
a zone
extending
between
latitudes

Webster’s New World
Dictionary (3d ed. 1988)

Lourie
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Elekta Instrument S.A. v.
O.U.R. Scientific Int’l,
Inc., 214 F.3d 1302, 1307,
54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1910, 1913 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
Envirco Corp. v. Clestra
Cleanroom, Inc., 209 F.3d
1360, 1365, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1449, 1452 (Fed.
Cir 2000).
Hill-Rom Co., Inc. v.
Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 209
F.3d 1337, 1340-41, 54
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1437,
1440 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d
1367, 1371, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1664, 1667 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
Mitek Surgical Prods., Inc.
v. Arthrex, Inc., Nos. 991004, 99-1034, 2000 WL
217637, at *2 (Fed. Cir.
Feb. 22, 2000).
Moore U.S.A., Inc. v.
Standard Register Co.,
229 F.3d 1091, 1114, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225,
1241 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
NFA Corp. v. Asheboro
Elastics Corp., No. 981579, 2000 WL 6217, at
*2 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 5, 2000).
Optical Disc Corp. v. Del
Mar Avionics, 208 F.3d
1324, 1335, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1289, 1295 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
Optical Disc Corp. v. Del
Mar Avionics, 208 F.3d
1324, 1338, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1289, 1298 (Fed.
Cir. 2000).
Space Sys./Loral, Inc. v.
Lockheed Martin Corp.,
Nos. 99-1255, 99-1289,
2000 WL 1205154, at *5
(Fed. Cir. Aug. 23, 2000).
Tate Access Floors, Inc. v.
Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222
F.3d 958, 965, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513,
1517 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

2000

only within
a zone
extending
between
latitudes

Webster’s New World
Dictionary (3d ed. 1988)

Lourie

2000

Second
baffle
means

Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary (1990)

Rader

2000

cushion

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1976)

Bryson

2000

shar[e]ing

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1968)

Bryson

2000

for boring

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1971)

Per Curiam

2000

extending
along said
end edges

Webster’s II New Riverside
University Dictionary (1984)

Michel

2000

intermeshin
g with /
[ inter- ]

American Heritage
Dictionary (1st ed. 1981)

Clevenger

2000

ramped
trailing
edges /
[ ramp ]

Schall

2000

decreasing
the time

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1986);
Modern Dictionary of
Electronics (6th ed. 1997)
Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1986)

2000

automatical
ly

Webster’s II New Riverside
University Dictionary (1988)

Lourie

2000

an inner
body
portion

Webster’s New World
Dictionary (3d ed. 1988)

Lourie

Schall
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Tate Access Floors, Inc. v.
Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222
F.3d 958, 967, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513,
1518 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Tate Access Floors, Inc. v.
Maxcess Techs., Inc., 222
F.3d 958, 967, 55
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1513,
1518 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v.
Clinical Innovations
Assocs., No. 00-1140,
2000 WL 1838586, at *2
n.2 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 13,
2000).
UV Coatings, Ltd. v. Sico,
Inc., No. 99-1336, 2000
WL 986965, at *3 (Fed.
Cir. July 18, 2000).
Acromed Corp. v. Sofamor
Danek Group, Inc., 253
F.3d 1371, 1381, 59
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1130,
1137 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Bell Atl. Network Servs.,
Inc. v. Covad
Communications Group,
Inc., 262 F.3d 1258, 1276,
59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1865, 1877 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
Circle R, Inc. v. Trail King
Indus., Inc., 21 Fed. Appx.
894, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

2000

to expose

Webster’s New World
Dictionary (3d ed. 1988)

Lourie

2000

integral
contrasting
border

Webster’s New World
Dictionary (3d ed. 1988)

Lourie

2000

a liquid
column/[ U
-tube
manometer
]

McGraw-Hill Dictionary of
Scientific and Technical
Terms (5th ed. 1994)

Michel

2000

sprayable

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1986)

Rader

2001

engag[e]ing

Webster’s II New Riverside
University Dictionary (1988)

Rader

2001

channel

E. Bryan Carne,
Telecommunications Primer
(2d ed., Prentice Hall 1999);
Michael Busby,
Demystifying ATM/ADSL
(Wordware 1998)

Gajarsa

2001

substantiall
y flat

Dyk

Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total
Containment, Inc., 258
F.3d 1317, 1328, 1328 n.5,
59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1489, 1497, 1497 n.5 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
Doorking, Inc. v. Sentex
Sys., Inc., 19 Fed. Appx.
872, 876 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

2001

a plurality
of

2001

disabl[e]ing
said [X]

American Heritage
Dictionary Second College
Edition (1982);
Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary (1983)
American Heritage
Dictionary Second College
Edition (1982);
Random House Webster’s
Unabridged Dictionary (2d
ed. 1988)
Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1968)

Dyk

Dyk
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Dow Chem. Co. v.
Sumitomo Chem. Co., 257
F.3d 1364, 1373, 1373 n.8,
1374, 1374 n.9, 1375-76,
59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1609, 1615, 1615 n.8-9,
1616 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

2001

codistills . .
. at a
boiling
point /
[ distillatio
n]

Durel Corp. v. Osram
Sylvania Inc., 256 F.3d
1298, 1304, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1238, 1242 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).

2001

metal oxide
coating

Ecolab, Inc. v.
Envirochem, Inc., 264
F.3d 1358, 1366, 60
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1173,
1179 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Ecolab, Inc. v.
Envirochem, Inc., 264
F.3d 1358, 1366, 60
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1173,
1179 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

2001

substantiall
y uniform
alkaline
detergent

2001

substantiall
y uniform
alkaline
detergent

Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd.
v. OAM, Inc., 265 F.3d
1311, 1318, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1203, 1208 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254
F.3d 1334, 1343, 59
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1290,
1296 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254
F.3d 1334, 1343, 59
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1290,
1296 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Generation II Orthotics
Inc. v. Medical Tech. Inc.,
263 F.3d 1356, 1367, 59
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1919,
1928 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Glaxo Group Ltd. v.
Ranbaxy Pharm., Inc., 262
F.3d 1333, 1336, 59
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1950,
1952 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

2001

lateral

2001

SOURCE(S) USED

[Vol. 54:829
JUDGE

Hawley’s Condensed
Chemical Dictionary (13th
ed. 1997);
Louis F. Feisner, Organic
Experiments (Heath 1964);
Kenneth L. Williamson,
Macroscale and Microscale
Organic Experiments (2d
ed., Heath 1994);
Hala et al., Vapour Liquid
Equilibrium (2d English ed.
1967)
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of
Scientific and Technical
Terms (5th ed. 1994);
Hawley’s Condensed
Chemical Dictionary (12th
ed. 1993)
American Heritage College
Dictionary (3d ed. 1997)

Gajarsa

American Heritage
Dictionary Second College
Edition (1982);
Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary (9th
ed. 1983)
Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1968)

Linn

an angular
medial
surface

Webster’s New Collegiate
Dictionary (1975)

Linn

2001

an angular
medial
surface

Webster’s New Collegiate
Dictionary (1975)

Linn

2001

controlled
medial and
lateral
inclination

Stedman’s Medical
Dictionary (27th ed. 2000)

Linn

2001

essentially
free from

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1986)

Rader

Lourie

Linn

Clevenger
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Hemphill v. McNeil-PPC,
Inc., 25 Fed. Appx. 915,
918 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

2001

vaginal
swab

Kudlacek v. DBC, Inc., 25
Fed. Appx. 837, 844 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
LNP Eng’g Plastics, Inc.
v. Miller Waste Mills, Inc.,
275 F.3d 1347, 1354, 61
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1193,
1198 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
MSM Invs. Co. v.
Carolwood Corp., 259
F.3d 1335, 1339, 59
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1856,
1859 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Oak Tech., Inc. v.
International Trade
Comm’n, 248 F.3d 1316,
1329-30, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1748, 1758 (Fed.
Cir. 2001).
Pandrol USA v. Airboss
Ry. Prods., Inc., 10 Fed.
Appx. 837, 842, 842 n. 1
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram
Corp., 274 F.3d 1336,
1344, 60 U.S.P.Q. 2d
(BNA) 1851, 1855 (Fed.
Cir. 2001)
Schaefer Fan Co., Inc. v. J
& D Mfg., 265 F.3d 1282
(Fed. Cir. 2001)

2001

extending
into each

American Heritage
Dictionary (3d ed. 1992);
Dorland’s Illustrated
Medical Dictionary (28th ed.
1994)
Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary (1985)

2001

substantiall
y
completely
wetted

Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary (1983)

Rader

2001

method of
feeding

Webster’s II New Riverside
University Dictionary (1988)

Lourie

2001

cyclic
redundancy
checker

Encyclopedia of Computer
Science (1976)

Clevenger

2001

adher[e]ing
material

Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary (1985)

Clevenger

2001

portion

Random House Unabridged
Dictionary (2d ed. 1993)

Clevenger

2001

rings

Rader

Tapco Int’l Corp. v. Van
Mark Prods., 18 Fed.
Appx. 865, 868 (Fed. Cir.
2001)
Tapco Int’l Corp. v. Van
Mark Prods., 18 Fed.
Appx. 865, 868 (Fed. Cir.
2001)
Tapco Int’l Corp. v. Van
Mark Prods., 18 Fed.
Appx. 865, 868 (Fed. Cir.
2001)
Union Pac. Res. Co. v.
Chesapeake Energy Corp.,
236 F.3d 684, 692, 57
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1293,
1298 (Fed. Cir. 2001)

2001

portions
projecting
outwardly
from
portions
projecting
outwardly
from
portions
projecting
outwardly
from
comparing
[X] to [Y]

Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary
(1998);
American Heritage College
Dictionary (3d ed. 1997)
Webster’s New Collegiate
Dictionary (1979)

Webster’s New Collegiate
Dictionary (1979)

Archer

Webster’s New Collegiate
Dictionary (1979)

Archer

American Heritage College
Dictionary (3d ed. 1997)

Rader

2001

2001

2001

JUDGE
Dyk

Clevenger

Archer
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Wenger Mfg., Inc. v.
Coating Mach. Sys., Inc.,
239 F.3d 1225, 1232-33,
57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1679, 1684-85 (Fed. Cir.
2001)
Winbond Elecs. Corp. v.
International Trade
Comm’n, 4 Fed. Appx.
832, 840 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
Banyan Licensing, L.C. v.
Orthosupport Int’l, Inc.,
34 Fed. Appx. 696, 698
(Fed. Cir. 2002)
Beckson Marine, Inc. v.
NFM, Inc., 292 F.3d 718,
723-24, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1031, 1034 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)
Belden Wire & Cable Co.
v. Cable Design Techs.
Corp., 35 Fed. Appx. 905,
907 (Fed. Cir. 2002)

2001

air
circulat[e]i
ng means/[
re- ]

Webster’s New World
Dictionary (3d ed. 1988)

Lourie

2001

adjacent
said [X]

Webster’s II New Riverside
University Dictionary (1988)

Rader

2002

defines a
length

Oxford English Dictionary
(2d ed. 1989)

Linn

2002

sloping
drain
groove

American Heritage
Dictionary (4th ed. 2000);
Oxford English Dictionary
(2d ed. 1989)

Rader

2002

bronze

Lourie

Benetton Sportsystem
USA, Inc. v. First Team
Sports, Inc., 38 Fed. Appx.
599, 605 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
CCS Fitness, Inc. v.
Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d
1359, 1367, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1658, 1663 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)
Display Techs., Inc. v.
Paul Flum Ideas, Inc., 60
Fed. Appx. 787, 792 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)
Electro Scientific Indus.,
Inc. v. Dynamic Details,
Inc., 307 F.3d 1343, 1349,
64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1781, 1784 (Fed. Cir.
2002)
Frank’s Casing Crew &
Rental Tools, Inc. v. PMR
Techs., Ltd., 292 F.3d
1363, 1374 & n.8, 63
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065,
1073 & n. 8 (Fed. Cir.
2002)
Honeywell Inc. v. Victor
Co. of Japan, Ltd., 298
F.3d 1317, 1324-25, 63
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1904,
1907-09 (Fed. Cir. 2002)

2002

toe region

Copper Development
Association, Standards
Handbook: Wrought & Cast
Copper and Copper Alloy
Products (6th ed. 1994)
Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1993)

2002

reciprocatin
g member

Michel

2002

aperture

McGraw-Hill Dictionary of
Scientific and Technical
Terms (5th ed. 1994);
American Heritage
Dictionary (3d ed. 1996)
Webster’s New World
Dictionary (3rd college ed.
(1994)

2002

workpiece

Oxford English Dictionary
(2d ed. 1989);
Robert C. Faber, Landis on
Mechanics of Patent Claim
Drafting (4th ed. 2000)

Rader

2002

monitoring
the torque

Random House Webster’s
Unabridged Dictionary (2d
ed. 1998);
Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary (9th
ed. 1983)

Dyk

2002

placed
contiguous
the [X]

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1966)

Bryson

Clevenger

Schall
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In re Thrift, 298 F.3d
1357, 1364, 63 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 2002, 2006 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)

2002

IBM Dictionary of
Computing (10th ed. 1994);
Van Nostrand Reinhold
Dictionary of Information
Technology (3d ed. 1989)

Dyk

Inverness Med. Switz.
GmbH v. Princeton
Biomeditech Corp., 309
F.3d 1365, 1370 & n. 2-3,
64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1926, 1930 & n. 2-3 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)
Inverness Med. Switz.
GmbH v. Princeton
Biomeditech Corp., 309
F.3d 1365, 1370 & n. 4, 64
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1926,
1930 & n. 4 (Fed. Cir.
2002)
Inverness Med. Switz.
GmbH v. Warner Lambert
Co., 309 F.3d 1373, 1378,
64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1933, 1936 (Fed. Cir.
2002)
Inverness Med. Switz.
GmbH v. Warner Lambert
Co., 309 F.3d 1373, 137879, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1933, 1936-37 (Fed. Cir.
2002)
M-3 & Assocs., Inc. v.
Cargo Sys., Inc., 33 Fed.
Appx. 513, 515 (Fed. Cir.
2002)
Manning v. Paradis, 296
F.3d 1098, 1103 & n.1, 63
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1681,
1685 n. 1 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
Masco Corp. v. United
States, 303 F.3d 1316,
1323-24, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1182, 1186 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)
Masco Corp. v. United
States, 303 F.3d 1316,
1327-28, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1182, 1189 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)

2002

speech user
agent /
[ speech
recognition
] , [ speech
recognizer
]
mobility of
said [X] is
facilitated
by /
[ mobile ]

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1968);
Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary (3d ed. 1947)

Dyk

2002

mobility of
said [X] is
facilitated
by

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1968)

Dyk

2002

onto a
portion

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1968);
Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary (3d ed. 1947)

Dyk

2002

on said [X]

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1968);
Shorter Oxford English
Dictionary (3d ed. 1947)

Dyk

2002

restrain the
door

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1968)

Dyk

2002

a method of
treating

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1966)

Dyk

2002

to drive the
lever

Linn

2002

transmittin
g a force/
[ transmissi
on ]

American Heritage
Dictionary (3d ed. 1996);
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of
Scientific and Technical
Terms (5th ed. 1994)
Dictionary of Mechanical
Engineering (3d ed. 1985);
Oxford English Dictionary
(2d ed. 1989)

Linn
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Masco Corp. v. United
States, 303 F.3d 1316,
1328, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1182, 1189 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)
Middleton, Inc. v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co., 311 F.3d 1384, 1387,
65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1138, 1140 (Fed. Cir.
2002)
NeoMagic Corp. v. Trident
Microsystems, Inc., 287
F.3d 1062, 1070-71, 62
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1482,
1487-88 (Fed Cir. 2002)

2002

the dial

American College
Dictionary (1970)

Linn

2002

uniform
flexible
film

Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary (1985)

Rader

2002

having a
coupling

Clevenger

Nikken USA, Inc. v.
Robinsons-May, Inc., 51
Fed. Appx. 874, 881-81
(Fed. Cir. 2002)
Schreiber Foods, Inc. v.
Beatrice Cheese, Inc., 31
Fed. Appx. 727, 731 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)
Schreiber Foods, Inc. v.
Beatrice Cheese, Inc., 31
Fed. Appx. 727, 730 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)
Schumer v. Laboratory
Computer Sys., Inc., 308
F.3d 1304, 1311, 64
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1832,
1838 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
Semitool, Inc. v. Novellus
Sys., Inc., 44 Fed. Appx.
949, 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
Smith Eng’g Co., Inc. v.
Eisenmann Corp., 28 Fed.
Appx. 958, 963 (Fed. Cir.
2002)
Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v.
Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d
1193, 1206, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1813, 1821 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)

2002

magnetic
polarity

New IEEE Standard
Dictionary of Electrical and
Electronic Terms (5th ed.
1993);
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of
Scientific and Technical
Terms (5th ed. 1994);
Modern Dictionary of
Electronics (7th ed. 1999)
Serway & Faughn, College
Physics (4th ed. 1995)

2002

a
continuous
slice

Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary (1990)

Rader

2002

folding

Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary (1990)

Rader

2002

or

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1967)

Dyk

2002

wafer
support

Lourie

2002

inlet duct

Knight’s American
Mechanical Dictionary
(1876)
American Heritage
Dictionary (1981)

2002

repeatedly
substantiall
y
simultaneo
usly
activating/[
activate ]

Modern Dictionary of
Electronics (6th ed. 1984)

JUDGE

Lourie

Clevenger

Linn
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Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v.
Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d
1193, 1209, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1813, 1823 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)
Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v.
Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d
1193, 1209, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1813, 1823-24
(Fed. Cir. 2002)
Transclean Corp. v.
Bridgewood Servs., Inc.,
290 F.3d 1364, 1374-75,
62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1865, 1872 (Fed. Cir.
2002)
Union Carbide Chems. &
Plastics Tech. Corp. v.
Shell Oil Co., 308 F.3d
1167, 1177, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1545, 1552 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)
Abbott Labs. v. Syntron
Bioresearch, Inc., 334
F.3d 1343, 1350, 67
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337,
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Abbott Labs. v. Syntron
Bioresearch, Inc., 334
F.3d 1343, 1350, 67
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337,
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Abbott Labs. v. Syntron
Bioresearch, Inc., 334
F.3d 1343, 1350, 67
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337,
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Abbott Labs. v. Syntron
Bioresearch, Inc., 334
F.3d 1343, 1354, 67
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1337,
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec
Corp., 318 F.3d 1363,
1373, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1872 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)
Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v.
Rockwood Retaining
Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298,
1307-08, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1871 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)

2002

display
areas

Illustrated Dictionary of
Electronics (3d ed. 1985)

Linn

2002

background
area

Illustrated Dictionary of
Electronics (3d ed. 1985)

Linn

2002

exhibiting
resilient
characterist
ics /
[ resilience]

McGraw-Hill Dictionary of
Scientific and Technical
Terms (5th ed. 1994);
American Heritage
Dictionary (3d ed. 1992)

Lourie

2002

characteriz
able by an
efficiency
equation/[ c
haracterize
]
nondiffusively
bound

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1993)

Prost

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1968)

Dyk

2003

nondiffusively
immobilize
d

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1968)

Dyk

2003

nondiffusively/[
diffusion ]

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1968)

Dyk

2003

analyte

Skoog et al., Fundamentals
of Analytical Chemistry (7th
ed. 1996)

Dyk

2003

boot
selection
flag

Microsoft Press Computer
Dictionary (3d ed.)

Michel

2003

back
surface

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1993)

Gajarsa

2003

SOURCE(S) USED
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Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v.
Rockwood Retaining
Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298,
1307-08, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1871 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)
Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v.
Rockwood Retaining
Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298,
1308, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1872 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)
Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v.
Rockwood Retaining
Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298,
1309, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1872 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)
Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v.
Rockwood Retaining
Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298,
1311, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1872 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)
Anchor Wall Sys., Inc. v.
Rockwood Retaining
Walls, Inc., 340 F.3d 1298,
1311, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1874 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)
Apex Inc. v. Raritan
Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d
1364, 1373, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1444, 1451 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)
Apex Inc. v. Raritan
Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d
1364, 1374, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1444, 1452 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)
Apex Inc. v. Raritan
Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d
1364, 1375, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1444, 1453 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)
Apex Inc. v. Raritan
Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d
1364, 1376, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1444, 1453 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)
Apex Inc. v. Raritan
Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d
1364, 1376, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1444, 1453 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)

2003

back
surface

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1993)

Gajarsa

2003

a
protrusion

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1993)

Gajarsa

2003

to mate

Merriam-Webster’s New
Collegiate Dictionary (10th
ed. 1998)

Gajarsa

2003

generally
parallel

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1993)

Gajarsa

2003

generally
parallel

Merriam-Webster’s New
Collegiate Dictionary (10th
ed. 1998)

Gajarsa

2003

circuit

Dictionary of Computing
(4th ed. 1996)

Gajarsa

2003

interface
circuit/[ int
erface ]

Dictionary of Computing
(4th ed. 1996);
Modern Dictionary of
Electronics (7th ed. 1999)

Gajarsa

2003

serial data
packet

Microsoft Computer
Dictionary (4th ed. 1999)

Gajarsa

2003

overlay

Microsoft Computer
Dictionary (4th ed. 1999)

Gajarsa

2003

overlaid
signals/[ ov
erlay ]

Microsoft Computer
Dictionary (4th ed. 1999)

Gajarsa
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Apex Inc. v. Raritan
Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d
1364, 1376-77, 66
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1444,
1454 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Arlington Indus., Inc. v.
Bridgeport Fittings, Inc.,
345 F.3d 1318, 1326, 68
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1439,
1444 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Bell Communications
Research, Inc. v. Fore
Sys., Inc., 62 Fed. Appx.
951, 959 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Boehringer Ingelheim
Vetmedica, Inc. v.
Schering-Plough Corp.,
320 F.3d 1339, 1346-47,
65 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1961, 1965-66 (Fed. Cir.
2003)
Bowers v. Baystate Techs.,
Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1332
(Fed. Cir. 2003)
Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v.
Intuitive Surgical, Inc.,
326 F.3d 1215, 1221, 66
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1517,
1521 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Deere & Co. v. Toro Co.,
57 Fed. Appx. 442, 447
(Fed. Cir. 2003)
Deering Precision
Instruments, LLC. v.
Vector Distribution Sys.,
Inc. 347 F.3d 1314, 1323,
68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1716, 1722 (Fed. Cir.
2003)
E-Pass Techs., Inc. v.
3Com Corp., 343 F.3d
1364, 1367, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1947, 1949 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)

2003

switch

Microsoft Computer
Dictionary (4th ed. 1999)

Gajarsa

2003

capable of
flexing

Random House Unabridged
Dictionary (2d ed. 1993)

Linn

2003

derived
from

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1993)

Clevenger

2003

isolat[e]ing

Dictionary of Microbiology
and Molecular Biology (2d
ed. 1987);
Random House College
Dictionary (1980)

Clevenger

2003

plurality

Oxford English Dictionary
(2d ed. 1989)

Rader

2003

remote
location

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1993)

Linn

2003

pivotably
attached

Schall

2003

substantiall
y in [X]

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1986)
Webster’s New 20th Century
Dictionary (1983)

2003

electronic
multifunction
card

Dyk

Ferguson
Beauregard/Logic
Controls, Inc. v. Mega Sys.
LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1339,
69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1001, 1009 (Fed. Cir.
2003)

2003

normal
plunger
performanc
e

Merriam-Webster’s New
Collegiate Dictionary (10th
ed. 1999);
Random House Webster’s
Unabridged Dictionary (2d
ed. 1998);
Oxford English Dictionary
(2d ed. 1989)
Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1966)

Gajarsa

Linn
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Ferguson
Beauregard/Logic
Controls, Inc. v. Mega Sys.
LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1340,
69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1001, 1010 (Fed. Cir.
2003)
Genzyme Corp. v.
Transkaryotic Therapies,
Inc., 346 F.3d 1094, 1098,
68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1596, 1599 (Fed. Cir.
2003)
Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v.
Andrx Pharms., Inc., 344
F.3d 1226, 1229, 68
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1302,
1304 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Intellectual Prop. Dev.,
Inc. v. UA-Columbia
Cablevision, Inc., 336 F.3d
1308, 1315-16, 1316 n. 7,
67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1385, 1390 & n. 7 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)

2003

predetermi
ned plunger
performanc
e

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1966)

Linn

2003

chromosom
ally
integrated/[
integration
]

Benjamin Lewin, Genes IV
(1990)

Rader

2003

hydroxypro
pyl
methylcellu
lose

Michael Ash & Irene Ash,
Handbook of
Pharmaceutical Additives
(1995)

Newman

2003

high
frequency
carrier

Schall

Libman Co. v. Quickie
Mfg. Co., 74 Fed. Appx.
900, 904 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Moba, B.V. v. Diamond
Automation Inc., 325 F.3d
1306, 1315, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1429, 1435 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)
Moba, B.V. v. Diamond
Automation Inc., 325 F.3d
1306, 1316-17, 66
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1429,
1436 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

2003

surround
the [X]

McGraw-Hill Dictionary of
Scientific and Technical
Terms (1974);
Webster’s Seventh New
Collegiate Dictionary
(1967);
Oxford English Dictionary;
Dictionary of Electronics
Webster’s II New College
Dictionary (1995)

2003

holding
stations /
[ to hold ]

Oxford English Dictionary
(2d ed. 1989)

Per
Curiam

2003

to urge the
[X]

Oxford English Dictionary
(2d ed. 1989)

Per
Curiam

Rader
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Nautilus Group, Inc. v.
Icon Health & Fitness,
Inc., 82 Fed. Appx. 691,
692-93 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

2003

in
cantilevere
d fashion

Omega Eng’g, Inc. v.
Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d
1314, 1322, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1321, 1326 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)
Pieczenik v. Dyax Corp.,
76 Fed. Appx. 293, 29697, 297 n.4 (Fed. Cir.
2003)

2003

the
periphery

2003

oligonucleo
tide

Pinnacle Pigging Sys., Inc.
v. Eliminator Pigging Sys.
USA, Inc., 55 Fed. Appx.
943, 944-45 (Fed. Cir.
2003)
Rambus Inc. v. Infineon
Techs. Ag, 318 F.3d 1081,
1091, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1705, 1711 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)

2003

after
inflat[e]ion
of

2003

integrated
circuit
device

Rambus Inc. v. Infineon
Techs. Ag, 318 F.3d 1081,
1094, 65 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1705, 1713-14
(Fed. Cir. 2003)
Simmons, Inc. v.
Bombardier, Inc., 73 Fed.
Appx. 421, 423 (Fed. Cir.
2003)

2003

bus

2003

a bottom
for [X]
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American Heritage
Dictionary Second College
Edition (1986);
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of
Scientific and Technical
Terms (3d ed. 1984);
Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary
(1986);
Wordsworth Dictionary of
Science and Technology
(1995);
Marks’ Standard Handbook
for Mechanical Engineers
(9th ed. 1987);
McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia
of Science and Technology
(7th ed. 1992)
Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1993)

Rader

Melloni’s Illustrated
Medical Dictionary (1979);
Dorland’s Illustrated
Medical Dictionary (26th ed.
1981);
Stedman’s Medical
Dictionary (24th ed. 1982);
Stedman’s Medical
Dictionary (26th ed. 1995)
Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1968)

Rader

New IEEE Standard
Dictionary of Electrical and
Electronic Terms (5th ed.
1993);
IBM Dictionary of
Computing (10th ed. 1994)
New IEEE Standard
Dictionary of Electrical and
Electronic Terms (5th ed.
1993)
American Heritage College
Dictionary (3d ed. 1993)

Clevenger

Per Curiam

Rader

Rader

Per Curiam
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System Div., Inc. v. Teknek
LLC, 59 Fed. Appx. 333,
339-40 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

2003

permitting
ready
removal

Waner v. Ford Motor Co.,
331 F.3d 851, 854, 66
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1943,
1946 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Animatics Corp. v.
Quicksilver Controls, Inc.,
102 Fed. Appx. 659, 665
(Fed. Cir. 2004)
Animatics Corp. v.
Quicksilver Controls, Inc.,
102 Fed. Appx. 659, 662,
664-65 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
Animatics Corp. v.
Quicksilver Controls, Inc.,
102 Fed. Appx. 659, 66567 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v.
Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359
F.3d 1367, 1372, 69
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1996,
1999 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
Edwards Sys. Tech., Inc. v.
Digital Control Sys., Inc.,
99 Fed. Appx. 911, 912-13
(Fed. Cir. May 18, 2004)

2003

Globetrotter Software, Inc.
v. Elan Computer Group,
Inc., 362 F.3d 1367, 1380,
70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1161, 1171 (Fed. Cir.
2004)
Goldenberg v. Cytogen,
Inc., 373 F.3d 1158, 1165,
71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1255, 1260 (Fed. Cir.
2004)
Goldenberg v. Cytogen,
Inc., 373 F.3d 1158, 116566, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1255, 1261 (Fed. Cir.
2004)
Housey Pharms., Inc. v.
AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 366
F.3d 1348, 1353, 70
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641,
1645 (Fed. Cir. 2004)

2004

SOURCE(S) USED

[Vol. 54:829
JUDGE
Dyk

inboard
side flange

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1968);
Random House Webster’s
Unabridged Dictionary (2d
ed. 1998)
Webster’s New 20th Century
Dictionary (2d ed. 1962)

2004

modular
motor body

Webster’s Seventh New
Collegiate Dictionary (1976)

Schall

2004

modular
control unit

Webster’s Seventh New
Collegiate Dictionary (1976)

Schall

2004

connected
to

Webster’s Seventh New
Collegiate Dictionary (1976)

Schall

2004

surrender
value
protected
investment
credits
specularlyreflective
surface /[
specular
reflection ]
, [ specular
reflector ]
a message
preventing
said copy

Barron’s Dictionary of
Insurance Terms (4th ed.
2000)

Bryson

Photonics Dictionary (2000)

Archer

Random House Webster’s
Unabridged Dictionary (2d
ed. 1998);
Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(2002)
Dorland’s Illustrated
Medical Dictionary (29th ed.
2000)

Dyk

2004

Archer

2004

betasubunit

Gajarsa

2004

intracellula
r marker
substance

Dorland’s Illustrated
Medical Dictionary (29th ed.
2000)

Gajarsa

2004

an inhibitor
or activator
of a protein

Chambers Dictionary of
Science and Technology
(1999)

Clevenger
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Housey Pharms., Inc. v.
AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 366
F.3d 1348, 1353, 70
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641,
1645 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
In re Morgan, 87 Fed.
Appx. 746, 750 (Fed. Cir.
2004)
Intergraph Corp. v. Intel
Corp., 89 Fed. Appx. 218,
229 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
International Rectifier
Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361
F.3d 1363, 1370-71, 70
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209,
1215 (Fed. Cir. 2004)

2004

an inhibitor
or activator
of a protein

Henderson’s Dictionary of
Biological Terms (11th ed.
1995)

Clevenger

2004

a recess

Webster’s II New Riverside
University Dictionary (1984)

Gajarsa

2004

in a [Z]

Lourie

2004

polygonal
region

International Rectifier
Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361
F.3d 1363. 1372, 70
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209,
1216 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
International Rectifier
Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361
F.3d 1363, 1374, 70
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1209,
1217 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
Leoutsakos v. Coll’s Hosp.
Pharmacy, Inc., 98 Fed.
Appx. 835, 838-39 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)
Linear Tech. Corp. v.
Impala Linear Corp., 71
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161,
1165-66 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
Linear Tech. Corp. v.
Impala Linear Corp., 71
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161,
1168-69 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
Microsoft Corp. v. MultiTech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d
1340, 1347 n. 3, 69
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1815,
1821 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
Microsoft Corp. v. MultiTech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d
1340, 1352, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1815, 1825 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)
Novartis Pharms. Corp. v.
Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., 363
F.3d 1306, 1308-09, 70
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1438,
1440 (Fed. Cir. 2004)

2004

annular
ring

Webster’s New World
Dictionary (3d college ed.
1988)
Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1966);
Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1993)
Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1966)

2004

adjoining

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1966)

Linn

2004

planar
plate
member

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1993)

Rader

2004

circuit

Linn

2004

2004

simultaneo
usly
off/[ simult
aneous ]
full duplex

Dictionary of Computing
(4th ed. 1996);
Modern Dictionary of
Electronics (7th ed. 1999)
Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1993)
Microsoft Press Computer
Dictionary (1991)

Lourie

2004

headers

Microsoft Computer
Dictionary (4th ed. 1999)

Lourie

2004

hydrosol

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(2002)

Dyk

Linn

Linn

Linn
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Nystrom v. TREX Co.,
Inc., 374 F.3d 1105, 111112, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1241, 1246 (Fed. Cir.
2004)
Nystrom v. TREX Co.,
Inc., 374 F.3d 1105, 1115,
71 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1241, 1248 (Fed. Cir.
2004)
Phillips v. AWH Corp.,
363 F.3d 1207, 1212, 70
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1417,
1420 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
SuperGuide Corp. v.
DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358
F.3d 870, 850, 69
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865,
1872 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
SuperGuide Corp. v.
DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358
F.3d 870, 882, 69
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865,
1874 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
SuperGuide Corp. v.
DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358
F.3d 870, 886, 69
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865,
1877 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
TI Group Auto. Sys. (N.
Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am.,
L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126,
1134, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1328, 1334 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)
TI Group Auto. Sys. (N.
Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am.,
L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126,
1135-36, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1328, 1335-36
(Fed. Cir. 2004)
TI Group Auto. Sys. (N.
Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am.,
L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126,
1138, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1328, 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)
TI Group Auto. Sys. (N.
Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am.,
L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126,
1138, 71 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1328, 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2004)

2004

board

2004

convex top
surface

2004

internal
steel baffles

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1993)

Lourie

2004

regularly
received

American Heritage
Dictionary (6th ed. 1976)

Prost

2004

a search on

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1993)

Prost

2004

at least one
of [W], [X],
[Y], and
[Z]

Strunk & White, The
Elements of Style (4th ed.
2000)

Prost

2004

fuel
reservoir

Oxford English Dictionary
(2d ed. 1989);
Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1986)

Linn

2004

within

Oxford English Dictionary
(2d ed. 1989);
Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1986)

Linn

2004

opening for
connecting

Oxford English Dictionary
(2d ed. 1989)

Linn

2004

opening for
connecting

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(1986)

Linn

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(2002);
American Heritage
Dictionary (4th ed. 2000)
American Heritage
Dictionary (4th ed. 2000)

JUDGE
Linn

Linn
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Ultratech Stepper, Inc. v.
ASM Lithography, Inc., 97
Fed. Appx. 914, 919-20
(Fed. Cir. 2004)
W.E. Hall Co., Inc. v.
Atlanta Corrugating, LLC,
370 F.3d 1343, 1350, 71
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1135,
1140 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
Zimmer, Inc. v.
Howmedica Osteonics
Corp., 111 Fed. Appx.
593, 599 (Fed. Cir. 2004)

2004

microcircui
t device

2004

2004
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SOURCE(S) USED

JUDGE
Schall

open
channels

Oxford Reference
Dictionary (1989);
McGraw-Hill Electronics
Dictionary (5th ed. 1994)
Oxford English Dictionary
(2d ed. 1989)

modular
prosthesis
system

Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary
(2002)

Dyk

Gajarsa

